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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 17:52:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-99076</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99076</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv6: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, when ICMPv6 Packet Too Big and Redirect Message packets are
locally delivered and quote a UDP packet, an exception is only created
in the IPv6 exception cache if the kernel can match the UDP packet to an
existing socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This behavior allows off-path attackers to conduct a side-channel attack
on the exception cache in order to discover the ephemeral port used by a
connected UDP socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 4785305c05b2 (&amp;#34;ipv6: use siphash in rt6_exception_hash()&amp;#34;) and
commit a00df2caffed (&amp;#34;ipv6: make exception cache less predictible&amp;#34;) tried
to mitigate such attacks by making it harder for attackers to discover
hash collisions in the exception cache and by randomizing the number of
exceptions a hash bucket can hold, respectively. Unfortunately, both of
the mitigations can be bypassed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Instead, mitigate such attacks by always creating an exception, even
before trying to find a matching socket. Do that by calling
ip6_update_pmtu() and ip6_redirect(), the helpers used when the quoted
packet did not originate from a socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means that guesses (right or wrong) from an off-path attacker will
always result in an exception being created or updated in the cache that
the attacker can observe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass the ifindex of the ingress device and the default uid, in a similar
fashion to icmpv6_err(). Unlike IPv4, an oif of 0 would not match any
nexthop in ip6_redirect_nh…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv6: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, when ICMPv6 Packet Too Big and Redirect Message packets are
locally delivered and quote a UDP packet, an exception is only created
in the IPv6 exception cache if the kernel can match the UDP packet to an
existing socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This behavior allows off-path attackers to conduct a side-channel attack
on the exception cache in order to discover the ephemeral port used by a
connected UDP socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 4785305c05b2 (&amp;#34;ipv6: use siphash in rt6_exception_hash()&amp;#34;) and
commit a00df2caffed (&amp;#34;ipv6: make exception cache less predictible&amp;#34;) tried
to mitigate such attacks by making it harder for attackers to discover
hash collisions in the exception cache and by randomizing the number of
exceptions a hash bucket can hold, respectively. Unfortunately, both of
the mitigations can be bypassed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Instead, mitigate such attacks by always creating an exception, even
before trying to find a matching socket. Do that by calling
ip6_update_pmtu() and ip6_redirect(), the helpers used when the quoted
packet did not originate from a socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means that guesses (right or wrong) from an off-path attacker will
always result in an exception being created or updated in the cache that
the attacker can observe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass the ifindex of the ingress device and the default uid, in a similar
fashion to icmpv6_err(). Unlike IPv4, an oif of 0 would not match any
nexthop in ip6_redirect_nh…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99076</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r224-867j-vfxf</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-r224-867j-vfxf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv6: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, when ICMPv6 Packet Too Big and Redirect Message packets are
locally delivered and quote a UDP packet, an exception is only created
in the IPv6 exception cache if the kernel can match the UDP packet to an
existing socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This behavior allows off-path attackers to conduct a side-channel attack
on the exception cache in order to discover the ephemeral port used by a
connected UDP socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 4785305c05b2 (&amp;#34;ipv6: use siphash in rt6_exception_hash()&amp;#34;) and
commit a00df2caffed (&amp;#34;ipv6: make exception cache less predictible&amp;#34;) tried
to mitigate such attacks by making it harder for attackers to discover
hash collisions in the exception cache and by randomizing the number of
exceptions a hash bucket can hold, respectively. Unfortunately, both of
the mitigations can be bypassed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Instead, mitigate such attacks by always creating an exception, even
before trying to find a matching socket. Do that by calling
ip6_update_pmtu() and ip6_redirect(), the helpers used when the quoted
packet did not originate from a socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means that guesses (right or wrong) from an off-path attacker will
always result in an exception being created or updated in the cache that
the attacker can observe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass the ifindex of the ingress device and the default uid, in a similar
fashion to icmpv6_err(). Unlike IPv4, an oif of 0 would not match any
nexthop in ip6_redirect_nh…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv6: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, when ICMPv6 Packet Too Big and Redirect Message packets are
locally delivered and quote a UDP packet, an exception is only created
in the IPv6 exception cache if the kernel can match the UDP packet to an
existing socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This behavior allows off-path attackers to conduct a side-channel attack
on the exception cache in order to discover the ephemeral port used by a
connected UDP socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 4785305c05b2 (&amp;#34;ipv6: use siphash in rt6_exception_hash()&amp;#34;) and
commit a00df2caffed (&amp;#34;ipv6: make exception cache less predictible&amp;#34;) tried
to mitigate such attacks by making it harder for attackers to discover
hash collisions in the exception cache and by randomizing the number of
exceptions a hash bucket can hold, respectively. Unfortunately, both of
the mitigations can be bypassed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Instead, mitigate such attacks by always creating an exception, even
before trying to find a matching socket. Do that by calling
ip6_update_pmtu() and ip6_redirect(), the helpers used when the quoted
packet did not originate from a socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means that guesses (right or wrong) from an off-path attacker will
always result in an exception being created or updated in the cache that
the attacker can observe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass the ifindex of the ingress device and the default uid, in a similar
fashion to icmpv6_err(). Unlike IPv4, an oif of 0 would not match any
nexthop in ip6_redirect_nh…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-r224-867j-vfxf</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-99076 — ipv6: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99076</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-99076</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99076</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-99076</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-99076</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0 and 240 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching Currently, when ICMPv6 Packet Too Big and Redirect Message packets are locally delivered and quote a UDP packet, an exception is only created in the IPv6 exception cache if the kernel can match the UDP packet to an existing socket. This behavior allows off-path attackers to conduct a side-channel attack on the exception cache in order to discover the ephemeral port used by a connected UDP socket. Commit 4785305c05b2 (&amp;#34;ipv6: use siphash in rt6_exception_hash()&amp;#34;) and commit a00df2caffed (&amp;#34;ipv6: make exception cache less predictible&amp;#34;) tried to mitigate such attacks by making it harder for attackers to discover hash collisions in the exception cache and by randomizing the number of exceptions a hash bucket can hold, respectively. Unfortunately, both of the mitigations can be bypassed. Instead, mitigate such attacks by always creating an exception, even before trying to find a matching socket. Do that by calling ip6_update_pmtu() and ip6_redirect(), the helpers used when the quoted packet did not originate from a socket. This means that guesses (right or wrong) from an off-path attacker will always result in an exception being created or updated in the cache that the attacker can observe. Pass the ifindex of the ingress device and the default uid, in a similar fashion to icmpv6_err(). Unlike IPv4, an oif of 0 would not match any nexthop in ip6_redirect_nh_match(…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0 and 240 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching Currently, when ICMPv6 Packet Too Big and Redirect Message packets are locally delivered and quote a UDP packet, an exception is only created in the IPv6 exception cache if the kernel can match the UDP packet to an existing socket. This behavior allows off-path attackers to conduct a side-channel attack on the exception cache in order to discover the ephemeral port used by a connected UDP socket. Commit 4785305c05b2 (&amp;#34;ipv6: use siphash in rt6_exception_hash()&amp;#34;) and commit a00df2caffed (&amp;#34;ipv6: make exception cache less predictible&amp;#34;) tried to mitigate such attacks by making it harder for attackers to discover hash collisions in the exception cache and by randomizing the number of exceptions a hash bucket can hold, respectively. Unfortunately, both of the mitigations can be bypassed. Instead, mitigate such attacks by always creating an exception, even before trying to find a matching socket. Do that by calling ip6_update_pmtu() and ip6_redirect(), the helpers used when the quoted packet did not originate from a socket. This means that guesses (right or wrong) from an off-path attacker will always result in an exception being created or updated in the cache that the attacker can observe. Pass the ifindex of the ingress device and the default uid, in a similar fashion to icmpv6_err(). Unlike IPv4, an oif of 0 would not match any nexthop in ip6_redirect_nh_match(…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-99076</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4152 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4152</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4152</guid>
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