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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 11:58:41 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98987</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98987</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;namespace: look at the topmost mount for a mount namespace file&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attach_recursive_mnt() preallocates a mountpoint for the root of the
topmost mount of the source so that a mount that already sits at the
destination can be put on top of the source or on top of one of its
propagated copies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The copies are made without CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE so their chain of
overmounts is shorter than the source&amp;#39;s. It ends below the first bind
mount of a mount namespace file. So while the loop walks up the chain of
the source it remembers the mountpoint of that mount in &amp;#34;shorter&amp;#34; and
the existing mount is put there for the copies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the loop ends at the topmost mount without ever looking at it. If
the topmost mount is the only mount namespace file in the chain
&amp;#34;shorter&amp;#34; stays NULL and mnt_change_mountpoint() attaches the existing
mount of the copy below the root of the mount namespace file. That&amp;#39;s a
dentry of nsfs. No path walk in the copy&amp;#39;s mount namespace ever gets
there. The mount is gone until its parent goes and the copy that took
its place can&amp;#39;t be unmounted synchronously because it has a child:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;S      bind mount of a file
  N      bind mount of a mount namespace file on top of S
  A      shared mount, B a slave of A, Q mounted on B/file&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;move_mount(S, A/file)
  cat B/file          -&amp;gt; the content of S instead of Q
  umount B/file       -&amp;gt; EBUSY&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Look at every mount of the chain including the topmost one.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;namespace: look at the topmost mount for a mount namespace file&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attach_recursive_mnt() preallocates a mountpoint for the root of the
topmost mount of the source so that a mount that already sits at the
destination can be put on top of the source or on top of one of its
propagated copies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The copies are made without CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE so their chain of
overmounts is shorter than the source&amp;#39;s. It ends below the first bind
mount of a mount namespace file. So while the loop walks up the chain of
the source it remembers the mountpoint of that mount in &amp;#34;shorter&amp;#34; and
the existing mount is put there for the copies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the loop ends at the topmost mount without ever looking at it. If
the topmost mount is the only mount namespace file in the chain
&amp;#34;shorter&amp;#34; stays NULL and mnt_change_mountpoint() attaches the existing
mount of the copy below the root of the mount namespace file. That&amp;#39;s a
dentry of nsfs. No path walk in the copy&amp;#39;s mount namespace ever gets
there. The mount is gone until its parent goes and the copy that took
its place can&amp;#39;t be unmounted synchronously because it has a child:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;S      bind mount of a file
  N      bind mount of a mount namespace file on top of S
  A      shared mount, B a slave of A, Q mounted on B/file&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;move_mount(S, A/file)
  cat B/file          -&amp;gt; the content of S instead of Q
  umount B/file       -&amp;gt; EBUSY&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Look at every mount of the chain including the topmost one.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98987</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8fp8-xwh3-vf8f</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8fp8-xwh3-vf8f</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;namespace: look at the topmost mount for a mount namespace file&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attach_recursive_mnt() preallocates a mountpoint for the root of the
topmost mount of the source so that a mount that already sits at the
destination can be put on top of the source or on top of one of its
propagated copies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The copies are made without CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE so their chain of
overmounts is shorter than the source&amp;#39;s. It ends below the first bind
mount of a mount namespace file. So while the loop walks up the chain of
the source it remembers the mountpoint of that mount in &amp;#34;shorter&amp;#34; and
the existing mount is put there for the copies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the loop ends at the topmost mount without ever looking at it. If
the topmost mount is the only mount namespace file in the chain
&amp;#34;shorter&amp;#34; stays NULL and mnt_change_mountpoint() attaches the existing
mount of the copy below the root of the mount namespace file. That&amp;#39;s a
dentry of nsfs. No path walk in the copy&amp;#39;s mount namespace ever gets
there. The mount is gone until its parent goes and the copy that took
its place can&amp;#39;t be unmounted synchronously because it has a child:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;S      bind mount of a file
  N      bind mount of a mount namespace file on top of S
  A      shared mount, B a slave of A, Q mounted on B/file&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;move_mount(S, A/file)
  cat B/file          -&amp;gt; the content of S instead of Q
  umount B/file       -&amp;gt; EBUSY&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Look at every mount of the chain including the topmost one.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;namespace: look at the topmost mount for a mount namespace file&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attach_recursive_mnt() preallocates a mountpoint for the root of the
topmost mount of the source so that a mount that already sits at the
destination can be put on top of the source or on top of one of its
propagated copies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The copies are made without CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE so their chain of
overmounts is shorter than the source&amp;#39;s. It ends below the first bind
mount of a mount namespace file. So while the loop walks up the chain of
the source it remembers the mountpoint of that mount in &amp;#34;shorter&amp;#34; and
the existing mount is put there for the copies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the loop ends at the topmost mount without ever looking at it. If
the topmost mount is the only mount namespace file in the chain
&amp;#34;shorter&amp;#34; stays NULL and mnt_change_mountpoint() attaches the existing
mount of the copy below the root of the mount namespace file. That&amp;#39;s a
dentry of nsfs. No path walk in the copy&amp;#39;s mount namespace ever gets
there. The mount is gone until its parent goes and the copy that took
its place can&amp;#39;t be unmounted synchronously because it has a child:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;S      bind mount of a file
  N      bind mount of a mount namespace file on top of S
  A      shared mount, B a slave of A, Q mounted on B/file&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;move_mount(S, A/file)
  cat B/file          -&amp;gt; the content of S instead of Q
  umount B/file       -&amp;gt; EBUSY&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Look at every mount of the chain including the topmost one.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8fp8-xwh3-vf8f</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-98987 — namespace: look at the topmost mount for a mount namespace file</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98987</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-98987</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98987</guid>
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