<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 18:32:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98954</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98954</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: always dissect GSO packets in __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 9e8db5913264 (&amp;#34;net: avoid false positives in untrusted gso
validation&amp;#34;) added a &amp;#39;&amp;amp;&amp;amp; skb-&amp;gt;network_header&amp;#39; check before flow-dissecting
GSO packets without VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM in
__virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(), because some callers (such as tun_get_user(),
tun_xdp_one(), virtnet_receive_done(), and raw_verify_header()) called
virtio_net_hdr_*_to_skb() before initializing skb-&amp;gt;network_header and
skb-&amp;gt;dev.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because __alloc_skb() and __build_skb_around() zero-initialize
skb-&amp;gt;network_header to 0 (unlike mac_header and transport_header which
are initialized to ~0U), those four callers always had
skb-&amp;gt;network_header == 0 and bypassed flow dissection in
__virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). More generally, skb-&amp;gt;network_header is an
offset from skb-&amp;gt;head (where 0 is also a valid offset whenever
skb_headroom(skb) is 0), not a boolean flag.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Whenever the &amp;#39;if (gso_type &amp;amp;&amp;amp; skb-&amp;gt;network_header)&amp;#39; branch was skipped,
the fallback &amp;#39;else if (gso_type)&amp;#39; only pulled nh_min_len + thlen (40 bytes
for TCPv4) without dissecting the packet, without validating ip_proto or
n_proto, and without setting skb-&amp;gt;transport_header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the packet has a malformed network header, it is not rejected and a
subsequent skb_probe_transport_header() also fails, leaving
skb-&amp;gt;transport_header at ~0U (0xffff). Similarly, if an IPv4 packet
carries IP options (ihl &amp;gt; 5) or an IPv6 packet carries…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: always dissect GSO packets in __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 9e8db5913264 (&amp;#34;net: avoid false positives in untrusted gso
validation&amp;#34;) added a &amp;#39;&amp;amp;&amp;amp; skb-&amp;gt;network_header&amp;#39; check before flow-dissecting
GSO packets without VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM in
__virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(), because some callers (such as tun_get_user(),
tun_xdp_one(), virtnet_receive_done(), and raw_verify_header()) called
virtio_net_hdr_*_to_skb() before initializing skb-&amp;gt;network_header and
skb-&amp;gt;dev.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because __alloc_skb() and __build_skb_around() zero-initialize
skb-&amp;gt;network_header to 0 (unlike mac_header and transport_header which
are initialized to ~0U), those four callers always had
skb-&amp;gt;network_header == 0 and bypassed flow dissection in
__virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). More generally, skb-&amp;gt;network_header is an
offset from skb-&amp;gt;head (where 0 is also a valid offset whenever
skb_headroom(skb) is 0), not a boolean flag.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Whenever the &amp;#39;if (gso_type &amp;amp;&amp;amp; skb-&amp;gt;network_header)&amp;#39; branch was skipped,
the fallback &amp;#39;else if (gso_type)&amp;#39; only pulled nh_min_len + thlen (40 bytes
for TCPv4) without dissecting the packet, without validating ip_proto or
n_proto, and without setting skb-&amp;gt;transport_header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the packet has a malformed network header, it is not rejected and a
subsequent skb_probe_transport_header() also fails, leaving
skb-&amp;gt;transport_header at ~0U (0xffff). Similarly, if an IPv4 packet
carries IP options (ihl &amp;gt; 5) or an IPv6 packet carries…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98954</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-27vc-2785-hfjh</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-27vc-2785-hfjh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: always dissect GSO packets in __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 9e8db5913264 (&amp;#34;net: avoid false positives in untrusted gso
validation&amp;#34;) added a &amp;#39;&amp;amp;&amp;amp; skb-&amp;gt;network_header&amp;#39; check before flow-dissecting
GSO packets without VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM in
__virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(), because some callers (such as tun_get_user(),
tun_xdp_one(), virtnet_receive_done(), and raw_verify_header()) called
virtio_net_hdr_*_to_skb() before initializing skb-&amp;gt;network_header and
skb-&amp;gt;dev.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because __alloc_skb() and __build_skb_around() zero-initialize
skb-&amp;gt;network_header to 0 (unlike mac_header and transport_header which
are initialized to ~0U), those four callers always had
skb-&amp;gt;network_header == 0 and bypassed flow dissection in
__virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). More generally, skb-&amp;gt;network_header is an
offset from skb-&amp;gt;head (where 0 is also a valid offset whenever
skb_headroom(skb) is 0), not a boolean flag.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Whenever the &amp;#39;if (gso_type &amp;amp;&amp;amp; skb-&amp;gt;network_header)&amp;#39; branch was skipped,
the fallback &amp;#39;else if (gso_type)&amp;#39; only pulled nh_min_len + thlen (40 bytes
for TCPv4) without dissecting the packet, without validating ip_proto or
n_proto, and without setting skb-&amp;gt;transport_header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the packet has a malformed network header, it is not rejected and a
subsequent skb_probe_transport_header() also fails, leaving
skb-&amp;gt;transport_header at ~0U (0xffff). Similarly, if an IPv4 packet
carries IP options (ihl &amp;gt; 5) or an IPv6 packet carries…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: always dissect GSO packets in __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 9e8db5913264 (&amp;#34;net: avoid false positives in untrusted gso
validation&amp;#34;) added a &amp;#39;&amp;amp;&amp;amp; skb-&amp;gt;network_header&amp;#39; check before flow-dissecting
GSO packets without VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM in
__virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(), because some callers (such as tun_get_user(),
tun_xdp_one(), virtnet_receive_done(), and raw_verify_header()) called
virtio_net_hdr_*_to_skb() before initializing skb-&amp;gt;network_header and
skb-&amp;gt;dev.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because __alloc_skb() and __build_skb_around() zero-initialize
skb-&amp;gt;network_header to 0 (unlike mac_header and transport_header which
are initialized to ~0U), those four callers always had
skb-&amp;gt;network_header == 0 and bypassed flow dissection in
__virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). More generally, skb-&amp;gt;network_header is an
offset from skb-&amp;gt;head (where 0 is also a valid offset whenever
skb_headroom(skb) is 0), not a boolean flag.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Whenever the &amp;#39;if (gso_type &amp;amp;&amp;amp; skb-&amp;gt;network_header)&amp;#39; branch was skipped,
the fallback &amp;#39;else if (gso_type)&amp;#39; only pulled nh_min_len + thlen (40 bytes
for TCPv4) without dissecting the packet, without validating ip_proto or
n_proto, and without setting skb-&amp;gt;transport_header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the packet has a malformed network header, it is not rejected and a
subsequent skb_probe_transport_header() also fails, leaving
skb-&amp;gt;transport_header at ~0U (0xffff). Similarly, if an IPv4 packet
carries IP options (ihl &amp;gt; 5) or an IPv6 packet carries…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-27vc-2785-hfjh</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-98954 — net: always dissect GSO packets in __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98954</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-98954</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98954</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98954</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98954</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0 and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: always dissect GSO packets in __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() Commit 9e8db5913264 (&amp;#34;net: avoid false positives in untrusted gso validation&amp;#34;) added a &amp;#39;&amp;amp;&amp;amp; skb-&amp;gt;network_header&amp;#39; check before flow-dissecting GSO packets without VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM in __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(), because some callers (such as tun_get_user(), tun_xdp_one(), virtnet_receive_done(), and raw_verify_header()) called virtio_net_hdr_*_to_skb() before initializing skb-&amp;gt;network_header and skb-&amp;gt;dev. Because __alloc_skb() and __build_skb_around() zero-initialize skb-&amp;gt;network_header to 0 (unlike mac_header and transport_header which are initialized to ~0U), those four callers always had skb-&amp;gt;network_header == 0 and bypassed flow dissection in __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). More generally, skb-&amp;gt;network_header is an offset from skb-&amp;gt;head (where 0 is also a valid offset whenever skb_headroom(skb) is 0), not a boolean flag. Whenever the &amp;#39;if (gso_type &amp;amp;&amp;amp; skb-&amp;gt;network_header)&amp;#39; branch was skipped, the fallback &amp;#39;else if (gso_type)&amp;#39; only pulled nh_min_len + thlen (40 bytes for TCPv4) without dissecting the packet, without validating ip_proto or n_proto, and without setting skb-&amp;gt;transport_header. If the packet has a malformed network header, it is not rejected and a subsequent skb_probe_transport_header() also fails, leaving skb-&amp;gt;transport_header at ~0U (0xffff). Similarly, if an IPv4 packet carries IP options (ihl &amp;gt; 5) or an IPv6 packet carries exten…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0 and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: always dissect GSO packets in __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() Commit 9e8db5913264 (&amp;#34;net: avoid false positives in untrusted gso validation&amp;#34;) added a &amp;#39;&amp;amp;&amp;amp; skb-&amp;gt;network_header&amp;#39; check before flow-dissecting GSO packets without VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM in __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(), because some callers (such as tun_get_user(), tun_xdp_one(), virtnet_receive_done(), and raw_verify_header()) called virtio_net_hdr_*_to_skb() before initializing skb-&amp;gt;network_header and skb-&amp;gt;dev. Because __alloc_skb() and __build_skb_around() zero-initialize skb-&amp;gt;network_header to 0 (unlike mac_header and transport_header which are initialized to ~0U), those four callers always had skb-&amp;gt;network_header == 0 and bypassed flow dissection in __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). More generally, skb-&amp;gt;network_header is an offset from skb-&amp;gt;head (where 0 is also a valid offset whenever skb_headroom(skb) is 0), not a boolean flag. Whenever the &amp;#39;if (gso_type &amp;amp;&amp;amp; skb-&amp;gt;network_header)&amp;#39; branch was skipped, the fallback &amp;#39;else if (gso_type)&amp;#39; only pulled nh_min_len + thlen (40 bytes for TCPv4) without dissecting the packet, without validating ip_proto or n_proto, and without setting skb-&amp;gt;transport_header. If the packet has a malformed network header, it is not rejected and a subsequent skb_probe_transport_header() also fails, leaving skb-&amp;gt;transport_header at ~0U (0xffff). Similarly, if an IPv4 packet carries IP options (ihl &amp;gt; 5) or an IPv6 packet carries exten…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98954</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4152 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4152</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4152</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
