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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 10:30:52 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98829</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98829</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: mac80211: drop oversized fragments to avoid extra_len overflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(), fragment payloads are accumulated into
entry-&amp;gt;extra_len as subsequent fragments arrive:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;entry-&amp;gt;extra_len += rx-&amp;gt;skb-&amp;gt;len;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the final fragment arrives, the head fragment is dequeued, and
pskb_expand_head() is called with entry-&amp;gt;extra_len to ensure sufficient
tailroom for all queued fragments before copying:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (skb_tailroom(rx-&amp;gt;skb) &amp;lt; entry-&amp;gt;extra_len) {
                if (unlikely(pskb_expand_head(rx-&amp;gt;skb, 0, entry-&amp;gt;extra_len,
                                              GFP_ATOMIC))) {
                        ...
                }
        }
        while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&amp;amp;entry-&amp;gt;skb_list))) {
                skb_put_data(rx-&amp;gt;skb, skb-&amp;gt;data, skb-&amp;gt;len);
                dev_kfree_skb(skb);
        }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In commit 69f132236827 (&amp;#34;mac80211: shrink struct
ieee80211_fragment_entry&amp;#34;), entry-&amp;gt;extra_len was narrowed from unsigned
int to u16 in order to reduce structure memory footprint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, an IEEE 802.11 frame sequence can contain up to 16 fragments
(frag numbers 0..15). If a sequence of large fragments arrives (e.g. from
a malicious peer or rogue AP), the sum of fragment lengths can exceed
65535 bytes (for example, 15 fragments of 4400 bytes total 66000 bytes).
Because extra_len is a u16, this addition overflows and wraps around
modulo 65536 (e.g. 66000 wraps to 464).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Consequently,…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: mac80211: drop oversized fragments to avoid extra_len overflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(), fragment payloads are accumulated into
entry-&amp;gt;extra_len as subsequent fragments arrive:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;entry-&amp;gt;extra_len += rx-&amp;gt;skb-&amp;gt;len;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the final fragment arrives, the head fragment is dequeued, and
pskb_expand_head() is called with entry-&amp;gt;extra_len to ensure sufficient
tailroom for all queued fragments before copying:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (skb_tailroom(rx-&amp;gt;skb) &amp;lt; entry-&amp;gt;extra_len) {
                if (unlikely(pskb_expand_head(rx-&amp;gt;skb, 0, entry-&amp;gt;extra_len,
                                              GFP_ATOMIC))) {
                        ...
                }
        }
        while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&amp;amp;entry-&amp;gt;skb_list))) {
                skb_put_data(rx-&amp;gt;skb, skb-&amp;gt;data, skb-&amp;gt;len);
                dev_kfree_skb(skb);
        }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In commit 69f132236827 (&amp;#34;mac80211: shrink struct
ieee80211_fragment_entry&amp;#34;), entry-&amp;gt;extra_len was narrowed from unsigned
int to u16 in order to reduce structure memory footprint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, an IEEE 802.11 frame sequence can contain up to 16 fragments
(frag numbers 0..15). If a sequence of large fragments arrives (e.g. from
a malicious peer or rogue AP), the sum of fragment lengths can exceed
65535 bytes (for example, 15 fragments of 4400 bytes total 66000 bytes).
Because extra_len is a u16, this addition overflows and wraps around
modulo 65536 (e.g. 66000 wraps to 464).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Consequently,…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98829</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8w97-qwf2-rgh5</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8w97-qwf2-rgh5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: mac80211: drop oversized fragments to avoid extra_len overflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(), fragment payloads are accumulated into
entry-&amp;gt;extra_len as subsequent fragments arrive:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;entry-&amp;gt;extra_len += rx-&amp;gt;skb-&amp;gt;len;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the final fragment arrives, the head fragment is dequeued, and
pskb_expand_head() is called with entry-&amp;gt;extra_len to ensure sufficient
tailroom for all queued fragments before copying:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (skb_tailroom(rx-&amp;gt;skb) &amp;lt; entry-&amp;gt;extra_len) {
                if (unlikely(pskb_expand_head(rx-&amp;gt;skb, 0, entry-&amp;gt;extra_len,
                                              GFP_ATOMIC))) {
                        ...
                }
        }
        while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&amp;amp;entry-&amp;gt;skb_list))) {
                skb_put_data(rx-&amp;gt;skb, skb-&amp;gt;data, skb-&amp;gt;len);
                dev_kfree_skb(skb);
        }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In commit 69f132236827 (&amp;#34;mac80211: shrink struct
ieee80211_fragment_entry&amp;#34;), entry-&amp;gt;extra_len was narrowed from unsigned
int to u16 in order to reduce structure memory footprint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, an IEEE 802.11 frame sequence can contain up to 16 fragments
(frag numbers 0..15). If a sequence of large fragments arrives (e.g. from
a malicious peer or rogue AP), the sum of fragment lengths can exceed
65535 bytes (for example, 15 fragments of 4400 bytes total 66000 bytes).
Because extra_len is a u16, this addition overflows and wraps around
modulo 65536 (e.g. 66000 wraps to 464).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Consequently,…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: mac80211: drop oversized fragments to avoid extra_len overflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(), fragment payloads are accumulated into
entry-&amp;gt;extra_len as subsequent fragments arrive:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;entry-&amp;gt;extra_len += rx-&amp;gt;skb-&amp;gt;len;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the final fragment arrives, the head fragment is dequeued, and
pskb_expand_head() is called with entry-&amp;gt;extra_len to ensure sufficient
tailroom for all queued fragments before copying:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (skb_tailroom(rx-&amp;gt;skb) &amp;lt; entry-&amp;gt;extra_len) {
                if (unlikely(pskb_expand_head(rx-&amp;gt;skb, 0, entry-&amp;gt;extra_len,
                                              GFP_ATOMIC))) {
                        ...
                }
        }
        while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&amp;amp;entry-&amp;gt;skb_list))) {
                skb_put_data(rx-&amp;gt;skb, skb-&amp;gt;data, skb-&amp;gt;len);
                dev_kfree_skb(skb);
        }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In commit 69f132236827 (&amp;#34;mac80211: shrink struct
ieee80211_fragment_entry&amp;#34;), entry-&amp;gt;extra_len was narrowed from unsigned
int to u16 in order to reduce structure memory footprint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, an IEEE 802.11 frame sequence can contain up to 16 fragments
(frag numbers 0..15). If a sequence of large fragments arrives (e.g. from
a malicious peer or rogue AP), the sum of fragment lengths can exceed
65535 bytes (for example, 15 fragments of 4400 bytes total 66000 bytes).
Because extra_len is a u16, this addition overflows and wraps around
modulo 65536 (e.g. 66000 wraps to 464).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Consequently,…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8w97-qwf2-rgh5</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-98829 — wifi: mac80211: drop oversized fragments to avoid extra_len overflow</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98829</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-98829</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98829</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98829</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98829</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge and 247 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: drop oversized fragments to avoid extra_len overflow In ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(), fragment payloads are accumulated into entry-&amp;gt;extra_len as subsequent fragments arrive:         entry-&amp;gt;extra_len += rx-&amp;gt;skb-&amp;gt;len; When the final fragment arrives, the head fragment is dequeued, and pskb_expand_head() is called with entry-&amp;gt;extra_len to ensure sufficient tailroom for all queued fragments before copying:         if (skb_tailroom(rx-&amp;gt;skb) &amp;lt; entry-&amp;gt;extra_len) {                 if (unlikely(pskb_expand_head(rx-&amp;gt;skb, 0, entry-&amp;gt;extra_len,                                               GFP_ATOMIC))) {                         ...                 }         }         while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&amp;amp;entry-&amp;gt;skb_list))) {                 skb_put_data(rx-&amp;gt;skb, skb-&amp;gt;data, skb-&amp;gt;len);                 dev_kfree_skb(skb);         } In commit 69f132236827 (&amp;#34;mac80211: shrink struct ieee80211_fragment_entry&amp;#34;), entry-&amp;gt;extra_len was narrowed from unsigned int to u16 in order to reduce structure memory footprint. However, an IEEE 802.11 frame sequence can contain up to 16 fragments (frag numbers 0..15). If a sequence of large fragments arrives (e.g. from a malicious peer or rogue AP), the sum of fragment lengths can exceed 65535 bytes (for example, 15 fragments of 4400 bytes total 66000 bytes). Because extra_len is a u16, this addition overflows and wraps around modulo 65536 (e.g. 66000 wraps to 464). Consequently, pskb_ex…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge and 247 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: drop oversized fragments to avoid extra_len overflow In ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(), fragment payloads are accumulated into entry-&amp;gt;extra_len as subsequent fragments arrive:         entry-&amp;gt;extra_len += rx-&amp;gt;skb-&amp;gt;len; When the final fragment arrives, the head fragment is dequeued, and pskb_expand_head() is called with entry-&amp;gt;extra_len to ensure sufficient tailroom for all queued fragments before copying:         if (skb_tailroom(rx-&amp;gt;skb) &amp;lt; entry-&amp;gt;extra_len) {                 if (unlikely(pskb_expand_head(rx-&amp;gt;skb, 0, entry-&amp;gt;extra_len,                                               GFP_ATOMIC))) {                         ...                 }         }         while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&amp;amp;entry-&amp;gt;skb_list))) {                 skb_put_data(rx-&amp;gt;skb, skb-&amp;gt;data, skb-&amp;gt;len);                 dev_kfree_skb(skb);         } In commit 69f132236827 (&amp;#34;mac80211: shrink struct ieee80211_fragment_entry&amp;#34;), entry-&amp;gt;extra_len was narrowed from unsigned int to u16 in order to reduce structure memory footprint. However, an IEEE 802.11 frame sequence can contain up to 16 fragments (frag numbers 0..15). If a sequence of large fragments arrives (e.g. from a malicious peer or rogue AP), the sum of fragment lengths can exceed 65535 bytes (for example, 15 fragments of 4400 bytes total 66000 bytes). Because extra_len is a u16, this addition overflows and wraps around modulo 65536 (e.g. 66000 wraps to 464). Consequently, pskb_ex…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98829</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4019 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4019</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4019</guid>
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