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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 10:30:57 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98719</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98719</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: SEV: Nullify &amp;#34;have run CPUs&amp;#34; mask pointer when freeing it&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nullify have_run_cpus when freeing the mask, particularly in the error path
of __sev_guest_init(), so that KVM doesn&amp;#39;t have to subtly use sev-&amp;gt;active
to track whether or not the mask has been freed.  As pointed out by Sashiko,
blindly freeing the mask in sev_vm_destroy() results in a double-free if
the mask is freed if __sev_guest_init() fails.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Throw the logic in a helper as nullifying the pointer is frustratingly
difficult and weird due to have_run_cpus being a single-entry array when
CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=n.  Deliberately don&amp;#39;t use CPUMASK_VAR_NULL, as it&amp;#39;s not
directly assignable when the cpumask is on-stack, e.g. requires using a
local variable and a memcpy(), which is beyond ridiculous.  Furthermore,
while clearing the on-stack bitmask is an unnecessary and arguably unwanted
side effect, KVM absolutely relies on &amp;#39;0&amp;#39; being the &amp;#34;null&amp;#34; value given that
the struct is zero-allocated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Opportunistically add an alloc() helper to pair with free(); there are just
enough call sites to make doing so worthwhile.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: SEV: Nullify &amp;#34;have run CPUs&amp;#34; mask pointer when freeing it&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nullify have_run_cpus when freeing the mask, particularly in the error path
of __sev_guest_init(), so that KVM doesn&amp;#39;t have to subtly use sev-&amp;gt;active
to track whether or not the mask has been freed.  As pointed out by Sashiko,
blindly freeing the mask in sev_vm_destroy() results in a double-free if
the mask is freed if __sev_guest_init() fails.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Throw the logic in a helper as nullifying the pointer is frustratingly
difficult and weird due to have_run_cpus being a single-entry array when
CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=n.  Deliberately don&amp;#39;t use CPUMASK_VAR_NULL, as it&amp;#39;s not
directly assignable when the cpumask is on-stack, e.g. requires using a
local variable and a memcpy(), which is beyond ridiculous.  Furthermore,
while clearing the on-stack bitmask is an unnecessary and arguably unwanted
side effect, KVM absolutely relies on &amp;#39;0&amp;#39; being the &amp;#34;null&amp;#34; value given that
the struct is zero-allocated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Opportunistically add an alloc() helper to pair with free(); there are just
enough call sites to make doing so worthwhile.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98719</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-j294-cf74-gq7q</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-j294-cf74-gq7q</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: SEV: Nullify &amp;#34;have run CPUs&amp;#34; mask pointer when freeing it&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nullify have_run_cpus when freeing the mask, particularly in the error path
of __sev_guest_init(), so that KVM doesn&amp;#39;t have to subtly use sev-&amp;gt;active
to track whether or not the mask has been freed.  As pointed out by Sashiko,
blindly freeing the mask in sev_vm_destroy() results in a double-free if
the mask is freed if __sev_guest_init() fails.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Throw the logic in a helper as nullifying the pointer is frustratingly
difficult and weird due to have_run_cpus being a single-entry array when
CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=n.  Deliberately don&amp;#39;t use CPUMASK_VAR_NULL, as it&amp;#39;s not
directly assignable when the cpumask is on-stack, e.g. requires using a
local variable and a memcpy(), which is beyond ridiculous.  Furthermore,
while clearing the on-stack bitmask is an unnecessary and arguably unwanted
side effect, KVM absolutely relies on &amp;#39;0&amp;#39; being the &amp;#34;null&amp;#34; value given that
the struct is zero-allocated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Opportunistically add an alloc() helper to pair with free(); there are just
enough call sites to make doing so worthwhile.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: SEV: Nullify &amp;#34;have run CPUs&amp;#34; mask pointer when freeing it&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nullify have_run_cpus when freeing the mask, particularly in the error path
of __sev_guest_init(), so that KVM doesn&amp;#39;t have to subtly use sev-&amp;gt;active
to track whether or not the mask has been freed.  As pointed out by Sashiko,
blindly freeing the mask in sev_vm_destroy() results in a double-free if
the mask is freed if __sev_guest_init() fails.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Throw the logic in a helper as nullifying the pointer is frustratingly
difficult and weird due to have_run_cpus being a single-entry array when
CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=n.  Deliberately don&amp;#39;t use CPUMASK_VAR_NULL, as it&amp;#39;s not
directly assignable when the cpumask is on-stack, e.g. requires using a
local variable and a memcpy(), which is beyond ridiculous.  Furthermore,
while clearing the on-stack bitmask is an unnecessary and arguably unwanted
side effect, KVM absolutely relies on &amp;#39;0&amp;#39; being the &amp;#34;null&amp;#34; value given that
the struct is zero-allocated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Opportunistically add an alloc() helper to pair with free(); there are just
enough call sites to make doing so worthwhile.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-j294-cf74-gq7q</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98719</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98719</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 106 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Nullify &amp;#34;have run CPUs&amp;#34; mask pointer when freeing it Nullify have_run_cpus when freeing the mask, particularly in the error path of __sev_guest_init(), so that KVM doesn&amp;#39;t have to subtly use sev-&amp;gt;active to track whether or not the mask has been freed.  As pointed out by Sashiko, blindly freeing the mask in sev_vm_destroy() results in a double-free if the mask is freed if __sev_guest_init() fails. Throw the logic in a helper as nullifying the pointer is frustratingly difficult and weird due to have_run_cpus being a single-entry array when CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=n.  Deliberately don&amp;#39;t use CPUMASK_VAR_NULL, as it&amp;#39;s not directly assignable when the cpumask is on-stack, e.g. requires using a local variable and a memcpy(), which is beyond ridiculous.  Furthermore, while clearing the on-stack bitmask is an unnecessary and arguably unwanted side effect, KVM absolutely relies on &amp;#39;0&amp;#39; being the &amp;#34;null&amp;#34; value given that the struct is zero-allocated. Opportunistically add an alloc() helper to pair with free(); there are just enough call sites to make doing so worthwhile.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 106 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Nullify &amp;#34;have run CPUs&amp;#34; mask pointer when freeing it Nullify have_run_cpus when freeing the mask, particularly in the error path of __sev_guest_init(), so that KVM doesn&amp;#39;t have to subtly use sev-&amp;gt;active to track whether or not the mask has been freed.  As pointed out by Sashiko, blindly freeing the mask in sev_vm_destroy() results in a double-free if the mask is freed if __sev_guest_init() fails. Throw the logic in a helper as nullifying the pointer is frustratingly difficult and weird due to have_run_cpus being a single-entry array when CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=n.  Deliberately don&amp;#39;t use CPUMASK_VAR_NULL, as it&amp;#39;s not directly assignable when the cpumask is on-stack, e.g. requires using a local variable and a memcpy(), which is beyond ridiculous.  Furthermore, while clearing the on-stack bitmask is an unnecessary and arguably unwanted side effect, KVM absolutely relies on &amp;#39;0&amp;#39; being the &amp;#34;null&amp;#34; value given that the struct is zero-allocated. Opportunistically add an alloc() helper to pair with free(); there are just enough call sites to make doing so worthwhile.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98719</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4019 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4019</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4019</guid>
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