https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 03 Nov 2026 10:30:58 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1375 certfr-2026-avi-1375 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1375 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98711 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>wifi: cw1200: fix TX padding OOB read leaking heap data to device</p> <p>The TX path rounds the transfer size up to the bus alignment (align_size(), up to 511 bytes for SDIO, 1 byte for SPI) but sends the padded length straight from the frame buffer, which has no room reserved for the padding. cw1200_data_write() therefore reads past the end of the frame and the bus transfer carries those bytes to the device. A bogus device can collect up to 511 bytes of kernel heap data per TX frame.</p> <p>The RX path does not have this problem: it allocates the skb with the aligned length (alloc_len) before reading.</p> <p>Compute the exact padding with the bus align_size() callback, make sure queued TX frames have tailroom for it, and zero the padding bytes before the transfer so nothing past the frame is exposed.</p> <p>This is not expected to change driver behavior on most cases: frame contents and transfer sizes are unchanged, only the content of the padding bytes (previously undefined stale memory, now zero), which the device never reads since the WSM header carries the real frame length. The skb expansion can only fail under memory exhaustion, in which case the frame is dropped like on the existing error paths of cw1200_tx().</p> <p>Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>wifi: cw1200: fix TX padding OOB read leaking heap data to device</p> <p>The TX path rounds the transfer size up to the bus alignment (align_size(), up to 511 bytes for SDIO, 1 byte for SPI) but sends the padded length straight from the frame buffer, which has no room reserved for the padding. cw1200_data_write() therefore reads past the end of the frame and the bus transfer carries those bytes to the device. A bogus device can collect up to 511 bytes of kernel heap data per TX frame.</p> <p>The RX path does not have this problem: it allocates the skb with the aligned length (alloc_len) before reading.</p> <p>Compute the exact padding with the bus align_size() callback, make sure queued TX frames have tailroom for it, and zero the padding bytes before the transfer so nothing past the frame is exposed.</p> <p>This is not expected to change driver behavior on most cases: frame contents and transfer sizes are unchanged, only the content of the padding bytes (previously undefined stale memory, now zero), which the device never reads since the WSM header carries the real frame length. The skb expansion can only fail under memory exhaustion, in which case the frame is dropped like on the existing error paths of cw1200_tx().</p> <p>Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98711 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-rfqv-xwf2-63qv <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>wifi: cw1200: fix TX padding OOB read leaking heap data to device</p> <p>The TX path rounds the transfer size up to the bus alignment (align_size(), up to 511 bytes for SDIO, 1 byte for SPI) but sends the padded length straight from the frame buffer, which has no room reserved for the padding. cw1200_data_write() therefore reads past the end of the frame and the bus transfer carries those bytes to the device. A bogus device can collect up to 511 bytes of kernel heap data per TX frame.</p> <p>The RX path does not have this problem: it allocates the skb with the aligned length (alloc_len) before reading.</p> <p>Compute the exact padding with the bus align_size() callback, make sure queued TX frames have tailroom for it, and zero the padding bytes before the transfer so nothing past the frame is exposed.</p> <p>This is not expected to change driver behavior on most cases: frame contents and transfer sizes are unchanged, only the content of the padding bytes (previously undefined stale memory, now zero), which the device never reads since the WSM header carries the real frame length. The skb expansion can only fail under memory exhaustion, in which case the frame is dropped like on the existing error paths of cw1200_tx().</p> <p>Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>wifi: cw1200: fix TX padding OOB read leaking heap data to device</p> <p>The TX path rounds the transfer size up to the bus alignment (align_size(), up to 511 bytes for SDIO, 1 byte for SPI) but sends the padded length straight from the frame buffer, which has no room reserved for the padding. cw1200_data_write() therefore reads past the end of the frame and the bus transfer carries those bytes to the device. A bogus device can collect up to 511 bytes of kernel heap data per TX frame.</p> <p>The RX path does not have this problem: it allocates the skb with the aligned length (alloc_len) before reading.</p> <p>Compute the exact padding with the bus align_size() callback, make sure queued TX frames have tailroom for it, and zero the padding bytes before the transfer so nothing past the frame is exposed.</p> <p>This is not expected to change driver behavior on most cases: frame contents and transfer sizes are unchanged, only the content of the padding bytes (previously undefined stale memory, now zero), which the device never reads since the WSM header carries the real frame length. The skb expansion can only fail under memory exhaustion, in which case the frame is dropped like on the existing error paths of cw1200_tx().</p> <p>Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-rfqv-xwf2-63qv https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98711 msrc_CVE-2026-98711 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98711 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98711 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 247 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cw1200: fix TX padding OOB read leaking heap data to device The TX path rounds the transfer size up to the bus alignment (align_size(), up to 511 bytes for SDIO, 1 byte for SPI) but sends the padded length straight from the frame buffer, which has no room reserved for the padding. cw1200_data_write() therefore reads past the end of the frame and the bus transfer carries those bytes to the device. A bogus device can collect up to 511 bytes of kernel heap data per TX frame. The RX path does not have this problem: it allocates the skb with the aligned length (alloc_len) before reading. Compute the exact padding with the bus align_size() callback, make sure queued TX frames have tailroom for it, and zero the padding bytes before the transfer so nothing past the frame is exposed. This is not expected to change driver behavior on most cases: frame contents and transfer sizes are unchanged, only the content of the padding bytes (previously undefined stale memory, now zero), which the device never reads since the WSM header carries the real frame length. The skb expansion can only fail under memory exhaustion, in which case the frame is dropped like on the existing error paths of cw1200_tx(). Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 247 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cw1200: fix TX padding OOB read leaking heap data to device The TX path rounds the transfer size up to the bus alignment (align_size(), up to 511 bytes for SDIO, 1 byte for SPI) but sends the padded length straight from the frame buffer, which has no room reserved for the padding. cw1200_data_write() therefore reads past the end of the frame and the bus transfer carries those bytes to the device. A bogus device can collect up to 511 bytes of kernel heap data per TX frame. The RX path does not have this problem: it allocates the skb with the aligned length (alloc_len) before reading. Compute the exact padding with the bus align_size() callback, make sure queued TX frames have tailroom for it, and zero the padding bytes before the transfer so nothing past the frame is exposed. This is not expected to change driver behavior on most cases: frame contents and transfer sizes are unchanged, only the content of the padding bytes (previously undefined stale memory, now zero), which the device never reads since the WSM header carries the real frame length. The skb expansion can only fail under memory exhaustion, in which case the frame is dropped like on the existing error paths of cw1200_tx(). Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98711 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4019 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4019