https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 02 Nov 2026 08:36:50 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1375 certfr-2026-avi-1375 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1375 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98591 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>bpf: Fix bounds check for skb-backed dynptrs</p> <p>The skb_pointer_if_linear() function checks whether a memory region of length len starting at offset off into the skb is in the linear area, and returns a pointer to the region if so. The check currently subtracts between skb_headlen and offset of the check, and since skb_headlen is unsigned the subtraction can underflow. This causes the bounds check to spuriously pass and generate an arbitrary pointer of the form *(skb-&gt;data + off).</p> <p>The only user of this helper is currently skb-backed BPF dynptr code. Returning the wrong pointer leads to the dynptr erroneously being backed with invalid memory.</p> <p>Ensure the subtraction cannot underflow, and fail the check if it would. Use u64 arithmetic to also prevent overflow when calculating (skb_headlen(skb) - off) since off is unsigned.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>bpf: Fix bounds check for skb-backed dynptrs</p> <p>The skb_pointer_if_linear() function checks whether a memory region of length len starting at offset off into the skb is in the linear area, and returns a pointer to the region if so. The check currently subtracts between skb_headlen and offset of the check, and since skb_headlen is unsigned the subtraction can underflow. This causes the bounds check to spuriously pass and generate an arbitrary pointer of the form *(skb-&gt;data + off).</p> <p>The only user of this helper is currently skb-backed BPF dynptr code. Returning the wrong pointer leads to the dynptr erroneously being backed with invalid memory.</p> <p>Ensure the subtraction cannot underflow, and fail the check if it would. Use u64 arithmetic to also prevent overflow when calculating (skb_headlen(skb) - off) since off is unsigned.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98591 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-4j29-hvp6-5v88 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>bpf: Fix bounds check for skb-backed dynptrs</p> <p>The skb_pointer_if_linear() function checks whether a memory region of length len starting at offset off into the skb is in the linear area, and returns a pointer to the region if so. The check currently subtracts between skb_headlen and offset of the check, and since skb_headlen is unsigned the subtraction can underflow. This causes the bounds check to spuriously pass and generate an arbitrary pointer of the form *(skb-&gt;data + off).</p> <p>The only user of this helper is currently skb-backed BPF dynptr code. Returning the wrong pointer leads to the dynptr erroneously being backed with invalid memory.</p> <p>Ensure the subtraction cannot underflow, and fail the check if it would. Use u64 arithmetic to also prevent overflow when calculating (skb_headlen(skb) - off) since off is unsigned.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>bpf: Fix bounds check for skb-backed dynptrs</p> <p>The skb_pointer_if_linear() function checks whether a memory region of length len starting at offset off into the skb is in the linear area, and returns a pointer to the region if so. The check currently subtracts between skb_headlen and offset of the check, and since skb_headlen is unsigned the subtraction can underflow. This causes the bounds check to spuriously pass and generate an arbitrary pointer of the form *(skb-&gt;data + off).</p> <p>The only user of this helper is currently skb-backed BPF dynptr code. Returning the wrong pointer leads to the dynptr erroneously being backed with invalid memory.</p> <p>Ensure the subtraction cannot underflow, and fail the check if it would. Use u64 arithmetic to also prevent overflow when calculating (skb_headlen(skb) - off) since off is unsigned.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-4j29-hvp6-5v88 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98591 msrc_CVE-2026-98591 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98591 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98591 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 154 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix bounds check for skb-backed dynptrs The skb_pointer_if_linear() function checks whether a memory region of length len starting at offset off into the skb is in the linear area, and returns a pointer to the region if so. The check currently subtracts between skb_headlen and offset of the check, and since skb_headlen is unsigned the subtraction can underflow. This causes the bounds check to spuriously pass and generate an arbitrary pointer of the form *(skb-&gt;data + off). The only user of this helper is currently skb-backed BPF dynptr code. Returning the wrong pointer leads to the dynptr erroneously being backed with invalid memory. Ensure the subtraction cannot underflow, and fail the check if it would. Use u64 arithmetic to also prevent overflow when calculating (skb_headlen(skb) - off) since off is unsigned.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 154 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix bounds check for skb-backed dynptrs The skb_pointer_if_linear() function checks whether a memory region of length len starting at offset off into the skb is in the linear area, and returns a pointer to the region if so. The check currently subtracts between skb_headlen and offset of the check, and since skb_headlen is unsigned the subtraction can underflow. This causes the bounds check to spuriously pass and generate an arbitrary pointer of the form *(skb-&gt;data + off). The only user of this helper is currently skb-backed BPF dynptr code. Returning the wrong pointer leads to the dynptr erroneously being backed with invalid memory. Ensure the subtraction cannot underflow, and fail the check if it would. Use u64 arithmetic to also prevent overflow when calculating (skb_headlen(skb) - off) since off is unsigned.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98591