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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 02:29:49 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98563</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98563</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: phylink: record the PHY only once bringup cannot fail&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;phylink_bringup_phy() stores the PHY in pl-&amp;gt;phydev before its last
fallible step: on a MAC whose phylink ops implement LPI,
phy_eee_rx_clock_stop() can fail with a real MDIO error. The callers
unwind with phy_detach(), which knows nothing about pl-&amp;gt;phydev, so a
pointer to a PHY that is no longer attached outlives the failed
connect.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What that costs depends on how the caller got here.
phylink_connect_phy() goes through phylink_attach_phy(), which refuses
to attach while pl-&amp;gt;phydev is set, turning a transient MDIO error into
a permanent -EBUSY. The SFP path is worse than that: sfp_sm_probe_phy()
answers the failure with phy_device_remove() and phy_device_free(), and
it assigns sfp-&amp;gt;mod_phy only past that error return, so nothing clears
pl-&amp;gt;phydev and it is left pointing at a freed phy_device that
phylink_resolve() and the ethtool helpers go on reading.
phylink_fwnode_phy_connect() has no such check, so a later connect
overwrites the stale pointer and hides the problem. A disconnect does
not: phylink_disconnect_phy() hands that pointer to phy_disconnect(),
and the second phy_detach() on the same PHY drops references the first
one already released.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Found while making a DSA port survive a PHY whose driver arrives after
the switch probes: keeping the port across a failed connect and
retrying is what makes this window reachable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Publish the pointer aft…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: phylink: record the PHY only once bringup cannot fail&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;phylink_bringup_phy() stores the PHY in pl-&amp;gt;phydev before its last
fallible step: on a MAC whose phylink ops implement LPI,
phy_eee_rx_clock_stop() can fail with a real MDIO error. The callers
unwind with phy_detach(), which knows nothing about pl-&amp;gt;phydev, so a
pointer to a PHY that is no longer attached outlives the failed
connect.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What that costs depends on how the caller got here.
phylink_connect_phy() goes through phylink_attach_phy(), which refuses
to attach while pl-&amp;gt;phydev is set, turning a transient MDIO error into
a permanent -EBUSY. The SFP path is worse than that: sfp_sm_probe_phy()
answers the failure with phy_device_remove() and phy_device_free(), and
it assigns sfp-&amp;gt;mod_phy only past that error return, so nothing clears
pl-&amp;gt;phydev and it is left pointing at a freed phy_device that
phylink_resolve() and the ethtool helpers go on reading.
phylink_fwnode_phy_connect() has no such check, so a later connect
overwrites the stale pointer and hides the problem. A disconnect does
not: phylink_disconnect_phy() hands that pointer to phy_disconnect(),
and the second phy_detach() on the same PHY drops references the first
one already released.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Found while making a DSA port survive a PHY whose driver arrives after
the switch probes: keeping the port across a failed connect and
retrying is what makes this window reachable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Publish the pointer aft…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98563</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-84r8-c8cx-whp6</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-84r8-c8cx-whp6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: phylink: record the PHY only once bringup cannot fail&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;phylink_bringup_phy() stores the PHY in pl-&amp;gt;phydev before its last
fallible step: on a MAC whose phylink ops implement LPI,
phy_eee_rx_clock_stop() can fail with a real MDIO error. The callers
unwind with phy_detach(), which knows nothing about pl-&amp;gt;phydev, so a
pointer to a PHY that is no longer attached outlives the failed
connect.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What that costs depends on how the caller got here.
phylink_connect_phy() goes through phylink_attach_phy(), which refuses
to attach while pl-&amp;gt;phydev is set, turning a transient MDIO error into
a permanent -EBUSY. The SFP path is worse than that: sfp_sm_probe_phy()
answers the failure with phy_device_remove() and phy_device_free(), and
it assigns sfp-&amp;gt;mod_phy only past that error return, so nothing clears
pl-&amp;gt;phydev and it is left pointing at a freed phy_device that
phylink_resolve() and the ethtool helpers go on reading.
phylink_fwnode_phy_connect() has no such check, so a later connect
overwrites the stale pointer and hides the problem. A disconnect does
not: phylink_disconnect_phy() hands that pointer to phy_disconnect(),
and the second phy_detach() on the same PHY drops references the first
one already released.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Found while making a DSA port survive a PHY whose driver arrives after
the switch probes: keeping the port across a failed connect and
retrying is what makes this window reachable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Publish the pointer aft…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: phylink: record the PHY only once bringup cannot fail&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;phylink_bringup_phy() stores the PHY in pl-&amp;gt;phydev before its last
fallible step: on a MAC whose phylink ops implement LPI,
phy_eee_rx_clock_stop() can fail with a real MDIO error. The callers
unwind with phy_detach(), which knows nothing about pl-&amp;gt;phydev, so a
pointer to a PHY that is no longer attached outlives the failed
connect.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What that costs depends on how the caller got here.
phylink_connect_phy() goes through phylink_attach_phy(), which refuses
to attach while pl-&amp;gt;phydev is set, turning a transient MDIO error into
a permanent -EBUSY. The SFP path is worse than that: sfp_sm_probe_phy()
answers the failure with phy_device_remove() and phy_device_free(), and
it assigns sfp-&amp;gt;mod_phy only past that error return, so nothing clears
pl-&amp;gt;phydev and it is left pointing at a freed phy_device that
phylink_resolve() and the ethtool helpers go on reading.
phylink_fwnode_phy_connect() has no such check, so a later connect
overwrites the stale pointer and hides the problem. A disconnect does
not: phylink_disconnect_phy() hands that pointer to phy_disconnect(),
and the second phy_detach() on the same PHY drops references the first
one already released.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Found while making a DSA port survive a PHY whose driver arrives after
the switch probes: keeping the port across a failed connect and
retrying is what makes this window reachable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Publish the pointer aft…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-84r8-c8cx-whp6</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-98563 — net: phylink: record the PHY only once bringup cannot fail</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98563</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-98563</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98563</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98563</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98563</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: phylink: record the PHY only once bringup cannot fail phylink_bringup_phy() stores the PHY in pl-&amp;gt;phydev before its last fallible step: on a MAC whose phylink ops implement LPI, phy_eee_rx_clock_stop() can fail with a real MDIO error. The callers unwind with phy_detach(), which knows nothing about pl-&amp;gt;phydev, so a pointer to a PHY that is no longer attached outlives the failed connect. What that costs depends on how the caller got here. phylink_connect_phy() goes through phylink_attach_phy(), which refuses to attach while pl-&amp;gt;phydev is set, turning a transient MDIO error into a permanent -EBUSY. The SFP path is worse than that: sfp_sm_probe_phy() answers the failure with phy_device_remove() and phy_device_free(), and it assigns sfp-&amp;gt;mod_phy only past that error return, so nothing clears pl-&amp;gt;phydev and it is left pointing at a freed phy_device that phylink_resolve() and the ethtool helpers go on reading. phylink_fwnode_phy_connect() has no such check, so a later connect overwrites the stale pointer and hides the problem. A disconnect does not: phylink_disconnect_phy() hands that pointer to phy_disconnect(), and the second phy_detach() on the same PHY drops references the first one already released. Found while making a DSA port survive a PHY whose driver arrives after the switch probes: keeping the port across a failed connect and retrying is what makes this window reachable. Publish the pointer after th…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: phylink: record the PHY only once bringup cannot fail phylink_bringup_phy() stores the PHY in pl-&amp;gt;phydev before its last fallible step: on a MAC whose phylink ops implement LPI, phy_eee_rx_clock_stop() can fail with a real MDIO error. The callers unwind with phy_detach(), which knows nothing about pl-&amp;gt;phydev, so a pointer to a PHY that is no longer attached outlives the failed connect. What that costs depends on how the caller got here. phylink_connect_phy() goes through phylink_attach_phy(), which refuses to attach while pl-&amp;gt;phydev is set, turning a transient MDIO error into a permanent -EBUSY. The SFP path is worse than that: sfp_sm_probe_phy() answers the failure with phy_device_remove() and phy_device_free(), and it assigns sfp-&amp;gt;mod_phy only past that error return, so nothing clears pl-&amp;gt;phydev and it is left pointing at a freed phy_device that phylink_resolve() and the ethtool helpers go on reading. phylink_fwnode_phy_connect() has no such check, so a later connect overwrites the stale pointer and hides the problem. A disconnect does not: phylink_disconnect_phy() hands that pointer to phy_disconnect(), and the second phy_detach() on the same PHY drops references the first one already released. Found while making a DSA port survive a PHY whose driver arrives after the switch probes: keeping the port across a failed connect and retrying is what makes this window reachable. Publish the pointer after th…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98563</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4019 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4019</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4019</guid>
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