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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 12:12:36 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1375 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1375</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1375</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1375</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98548</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98548</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sctp: discard the rest of the packet on a stale-cookie error&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When an association is in COOKIE-ECHOED state and the peer sends a
bundled [ERROR(Stale Cookie)][DATA] packet from one of its non-primary
addresses, processing the ERROR chunk takes the non-fatal stale-cookie
retry path sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which queues
SCTP_CMD_DEL_NON_PRIMARY while keeping the association alive.
sctp_cmd_del_non_primary() removes every non-primary transport -
including the very transport this packet arrived on, which is still
referenced by the receive lookup and shared by all chunks of the
packet via chunk-&amp;gt;transport.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sctp_assoc_rm_peer() does redirect asoc-&amp;gt;peer.last_data_from away from
the removed transport, but right afterwards the bundled DATA chunk
makes sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() re-register
asoc-&amp;gt;peer.last_data_from = chunk-&amp;gt;transport unconditionally, undoing
the redirection with the just-removed transport.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Once the packet is done, the receive reference is dropped and the
transport is RCU-freed, while the surviving association keeps the
dangling last_data_from.  A later FWD-TSN (or the delayed SACK timer)
makes sctp_gen_sack() dereference it (-&amp;gt;param_flags and friends), and
sctp_make_sack()/sctp_outq_select_transport() may write to the freed
object and link it into the live transport list.  This is a
use-after-free triggerable by any malicious SCTP peer (or a local
unprivileged user acting as one) with no capabilities re…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sctp: discard the rest of the packet on a stale-cookie error&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When an association is in COOKIE-ECHOED state and the peer sends a
bundled [ERROR(Stale Cookie)][DATA] packet from one of its non-primary
addresses, processing the ERROR chunk takes the non-fatal stale-cookie
retry path sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which queues
SCTP_CMD_DEL_NON_PRIMARY while keeping the association alive.
sctp_cmd_del_non_primary() removes every non-primary transport -
including the very transport this packet arrived on, which is still
referenced by the receive lookup and shared by all chunks of the
packet via chunk-&amp;gt;transport.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sctp_assoc_rm_peer() does redirect asoc-&amp;gt;peer.last_data_from away from
the removed transport, but right afterwards the bundled DATA chunk
makes sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() re-register
asoc-&amp;gt;peer.last_data_from = chunk-&amp;gt;transport unconditionally, undoing
the redirection with the just-removed transport.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Once the packet is done, the receive reference is dropped and the
transport is RCU-freed, while the surviving association keeps the
dangling last_data_from.  A later FWD-TSN (or the delayed SACK timer)
makes sctp_gen_sack() dereference it (-&amp;gt;param_flags and friends), and
sctp_make_sack()/sctp_outq_select_transport() may write to the freed
object and link it into the live transport list.  This is a
use-after-free triggerable by any malicious SCTP peer (or a local
unprivileged user acting as one) with no capabilities re…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98548</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3mq3-vc9v-9wmc</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-3mq3-vc9v-9wmc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sctp: discard the rest of the packet on a stale-cookie error&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When an association is in COOKIE-ECHOED state and the peer sends a
bundled [ERROR(Stale Cookie)][DATA] packet from one of its non-primary
addresses, processing the ERROR chunk takes the non-fatal stale-cookie
retry path sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which queues
SCTP_CMD_DEL_NON_PRIMARY while keeping the association alive.
sctp_cmd_del_non_primary() removes every non-primary transport -
including the very transport this packet arrived on, which is still
referenced by the receive lookup and shared by all chunks of the
packet via chunk-&amp;gt;transport.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sctp_assoc_rm_peer() does redirect asoc-&amp;gt;peer.last_data_from away from
the removed transport, but right afterwards the bundled DATA chunk
makes sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() re-register
asoc-&amp;gt;peer.last_data_from = chunk-&amp;gt;transport unconditionally, undoing
the redirection with the just-removed transport.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Once the packet is done, the receive reference is dropped and the
transport is RCU-freed, while the surviving association keeps the
dangling last_data_from.  A later FWD-TSN (or the delayed SACK timer)
makes sctp_gen_sack() dereference it (-&amp;gt;param_flags and friends), and
sctp_make_sack()/sctp_outq_select_transport() may write to the freed
object and link it into the live transport list.  This is a
use-after-free triggerable by any malicious SCTP peer (or a local
unprivileged user acting as one) with no capabilities re…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sctp: discard the rest of the packet on a stale-cookie error&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When an association is in COOKIE-ECHOED state and the peer sends a
bundled [ERROR(Stale Cookie)][DATA] packet from one of its non-primary
addresses, processing the ERROR chunk takes the non-fatal stale-cookie
retry path sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which queues
SCTP_CMD_DEL_NON_PRIMARY while keeping the association alive.
sctp_cmd_del_non_primary() removes every non-primary transport -
including the very transport this packet arrived on, which is still
referenced by the receive lookup and shared by all chunks of the
packet via chunk-&amp;gt;transport.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sctp_assoc_rm_peer() does redirect asoc-&amp;gt;peer.last_data_from away from
the removed transport, but right afterwards the bundled DATA chunk
makes sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() re-register
asoc-&amp;gt;peer.last_data_from = chunk-&amp;gt;transport unconditionally, undoing
the redirection with the just-removed transport.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Once the packet is done, the receive reference is dropped and the
transport is RCU-freed, while the surviving association keeps the
dangling last_data_from.  A later FWD-TSN (or the delayed SACK timer)
makes sctp_gen_sack() dereference it (-&amp;gt;param_flags and friends), and
sctp_make_sack()/sctp_outq_select_transport() may write to the freed
object and link it into the live transport list.  This is a
use-after-free triggerable by any malicious SCTP peer (or a local
unprivileged user acting as one) with no capabilities re…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-3mq3-vc9v-9wmc</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-98548 — sctp: discard the rest of the packet on a stale-cookie error</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98548</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-98548</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98548</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98548</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98548</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 247 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: discard the rest of the packet on a stale-cookie error When an association is in COOKIE-ECHOED state and the peer sends a bundled [ERROR(Stale Cookie)][DATA] packet from one of its non-primary addresses, processing the ERROR chunk takes the non-fatal stale-cookie retry path sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which queues SCTP_CMD_DEL_NON_PRIMARY while keeping the association alive. sctp_cmd_del_non_primary() removes every non-primary transport - including the very transport this packet arrived on, which is still referenced by the receive lookup and shared by all chunks of the packet via chunk-&amp;gt;transport. sctp_assoc_rm_peer() does redirect asoc-&amp;gt;peer.last_data_from away from the removed transport, but right afterwards the bundled DATA chunk makes sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() re-register asoc-&amp;gt;peer.last_data_from = chunk-&amp;gt;transport unconditionally, undoing the redirection with the just-removed transport. Once the packet is done, the receive reference is dropped and the transport is RCU-freed, while the surviving association keeps the dangling last_data_from.  A later FWD-TSN (or the delayed SACK timer) makes sctp_gen_sack() dereference it (-&amp;gt;param_flags and friends), and sctp_make_sack()/sctp_outq_select_transport() may write to the freed object and link it into the live transport list.  This is a use-after-free triggerable by any malicious SCTP peer (or a local unprivileged user acting as one) with no capabilities requir…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 247 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: discard the rest of the packet on a stale-cookie error When an association is in COOKIE-ECHOED state and the peer sends a bundled [ERROR(Stale Cookie)][DATA] packet from one of its non-primary addresses, processing the ERROR chunk takes the non-fatal stale-cookie retry path sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which queues SCTP_CMD_DEL_NON_PRIMARY while keeping the association alive. sctp_cmd_del_non_primary() removes every non-primary transport - including the very transport this packet arrived on, which is still referenced by the receive lookup and shared by all chunks of the packet via chunk-&amp;gt;transport. sctp_assoc_rm_peer() does redirect asoc-&amp;gt;peer.last_data_from away from the removed transport, but right afterwards the bundled DATA chunk makes sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() re-register asoc-&amp;gt;peer.last_data_from = chunk-&amp;gt;transport unconditionally, undoing the redirection with the just-removed transport. Once the packet is done, the receive reference is dropped and the transport is RCU-freed, while the surviving association keeps the dangling last_data_from.  A later FWD-TSN (or the delayed SACK timer) makes sctp_gen_sack() dereference it (-&amp;gt;param_flags and friends), and sctp_make_sack()/sctp_outq_select_transport() may write to the freed object and link it into the live transport list.  This is a use-after-free triggerable by any malicious SCTP peer (or a local unprivileged user acting as one) with no capabilities requir…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98548</guid>
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