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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 08:21:05 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1375 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1375</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1375</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1375</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98539</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98539</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs/ntfs3: use d_instantiate_new() in ntfs_create_inode() and murder syzbot&amp;#39;s &amp;#34;WARNING in do_new_mount&amp;#34; saga&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs_create_inode() creates a new inode via ntfs_new_inode(). It hashes
it with insert_inode_locked() and so it&amp;#39;s marked as I_NEW until
unlock_new_inode().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs 3 calls d_instantiate() in between though... Since the dentry was
already hashed by the lookup before the create any path walk finds it
without touching the parent&amp;#39;s i_rwsem and so can lock the inode.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the inode is a directory unlock_new_inode() calls
lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() and marks i_rwsem with the
i_mutex_dir_key class.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That resets the count and the owner of a lock somebody else may already
hold by now...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;syzbot has been spamming us with the same godforsaken bug&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;#34;WARNING in do_new_mount&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;since 2023. I can&amp;#39;t take it anymore so I went looking. Afaict, syzbot&amp;#39;s
executor chdirs into a freshly mounted ntfs3 image, creates a
directory and then mounts some pseudofs on it. Everytime the mkdir()
takes longer than syzbot waits mount() runs concurrently:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkdir(&amp;#34;./sys&amp;#34;)                        mount(NULL, &amp;#34;./sys&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;sysfs&amp;#34;)
  ntfs_create_inode()
    d_instantiate()
                                        user_path_at() finds the dentry
                                        do_lock_mount()
                                          inode_lock(inode)
                                          namespace_lock()
    unlock_new_inode(…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs/ntfs3: use d_instantiate_new() in ntfs_create_inode() and murder syzbot&amp;#39;s &amp;#34;WARNING in do_new_mount&amp;#34; saga&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs_create_inode() creates a new inode via ntfs_new_inode(). It hashes
it with insert_inode_locked() and so it&amp;#39;s marked as I_NEW until
unlock_new_inode().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs 3 calls d_instantiate() in between though... Since the dentry was
already hashed by the lookup before the create any path walk finds it
without touching the parent&amp;#39;s i_rwsem and so can lock the inode.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the inode is a directory unlock_new_inode() calls
lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() and marks i_rwsem with the
i_mutex_dir_key class.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That resets the count and the owner of a lock somebody else may already
hold by now...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;syzbot has been spamming us with the same godforsaken bug&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;#34;WARNING in do_new_mount&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;since 2023. I can&amp;#39;t take it anymore so I went looking. Afaict, syzbot&amp;#39;s
executor chdirs into a freshly mounted ntfs3 image, creates a
directory and then mounts some pseudofs on it. Everytime the mkdir()
takes longer than syzbot waits mount() runs concurrently:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkdir(&amp;#34;./sys&amp;#34;)                        mount(NULL, &amp;#34;./sys&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;sysfs&amp;#34;)
  ntfs_create_inode()
    d_instantiate()
                                        user_path_at() finds the dentry
                                        do_lock_mount()
                                          inode_lock(inode)
                                          namespace_lock()
    unlock_new_inode(…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98539</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-fgm8-xgjp-8vhv</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-fgm8-xgjp-8vhv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs/ntfs3: use d_instantiate_new() in ntfs_create_inode() and murder syzbot&amp;#39;s &amp;#34;WARNING in do_new_mount&amp;#34; saga&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs_create_inode() creates a new inode via ntfs_new_inode(). It hashes
it with insert_inode_locked() and so it&amp;#39;s marked as I_NEW until
unlock_new_inode().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs 3 calls d_instantiate() in between though... Since the dentry was
already hashed by the lookup before the create any path walk finds it
without touching the parent&amp;#39;s i_rwsem and so can lock the inode.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the inode is a directory unlock_new_inode() calls
lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() and marks i_rwsem with the
i_mutex_dir_key class.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That resets the count and the owner of a lock somebody else may already
hold by now...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;syzbot has been spamming us with the same godforsaken bug&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;#34;WARNING in do_new_mount&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;since 2023. I can&amp;#39;t take it anymore so I went looking. Afaict, syzbot&amp;#39;s
executor chdirs into a freshly mounted ntfs3 image, creates a
directory and then mounts some pseudofs on it. Everytime the mkdir()
takes longer than syzbot waits mount() runs concurrently:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkdir(&amp;#34;./sys&amp;#34;)                        mount(NULL, &amp;#34;./sys&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;sysfs&amp;#34;)
  ntfs_create_inode()
    d_instantiate()
                                        user_path_at() finds the dentry
                                        do_lock_mount()
                                          inode_lock(inode)
                                          namespace_lock()
    unlock_new_inode(…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs/ntfs3: use d_instantiate_new() in ntfs_create_inode() and murder syzbot&amp;#39;s &amp;#34;WARNING in do_new_mount&amp;#34; saga&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs_create_inode() creates a new inode via ntfs_new_inode(). It hashes
it with insert_inode_locked() and so it&amp;#39;s marked as I_NEW until
unlock_new_inode().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs 3 calls d_instantiate() in between though... Since the dentry was
already hashed by the lookup before the create any path walk finds it
without touching the parent&amp;#39;s i_rwsem and so can lock the inode.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the inode is a directory unlock_new_inode() calls
lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() and marks i_rwsem with the
i_mutex_dir_key class.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That resets the count and the owner of a lock somebody else may already
hold by now...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;syzbot has been spamming us with the same godforsaken bug&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;#34;WARNING in do_new_mount&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;since 2023. I can&amp;#39;t take it anymore so I went looking. Afaict, syzbot&amp;#39;s
executor chdirs into a freshly mounted ntfs3 image, creates a
directory and then mounts some pseudofs on it. Everytime the mkdir()
takes longer than syzbot waits mount() runs concurrently:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkdir(&amp;#34;./sys&amp;#34;)                        mount(NULL, &amp;#34;./sys&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;sysfs&amp;#34;)
  ntfs_create_inode()
    d_instantiate()
                                        user_path_at() finds the dentry
                                        do_lock_mount()
                                          inode_lock(inode)
                                          namespace_lock()
    unlock_new_inode(…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-fgm8-xgjp-8vhv</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-98539 — fs/ntfs3: use d_instantiate_new() in ntfs_create_inode() and murder syzbot's "WARNING in do_new_mount" saga</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98539</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-98539</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98539</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98539</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98539</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 194 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: use d_instantiate_new() in ntfs_create_inode() and murder syzbot&amp;#39;s &amp;#34;WARNING in do_new_mount&amp;#34; saga ntfs_create_inode() creates a new inode via ntfs_new_inode(). It hashes it with insert_inode_locked() and so it&amp;#39;s marked as I_NEW until unlock_new_inode(). ntfs 3 calls d_instantiate() in between though... Since the dentry was already hashed by the lookup before the create any path walk finds it without touching the parent&amp;#39;s i_rwsem and so can lock the inode. If the inode is a directory unlock_new_inode() calls lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() and marks i_rwsem with the i_mutex_dir_key class. That resets the count and the owner of a lock somebody else may already hold by now... syzbot has been spamming us with the same godforsaken bug   &amp;#34;WARNING in do_new_mount&amp;#34; since 2023. I can&amp;#39;t take it anymore so I went looking. Afaict, syzbot&amp;#39;s executor chdirs into a freshly mounted ntfs3 image, creates a directory and then mounts some pseudofs on it. Everytime the mkdir() takes longer than syzbot waits mount() runs concurrently:   mkdir(&amp;#34;./sys&amp;#34;)                        mount(NULL, &amp;#34;./sys&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;sysfs&amp;#34;)   ntfs_create_inode()     d_instantiate()                                         user_path_at() finds the dentry                                         do_lock_mount()                                           inode_lock(inode)                                           namespace_lock()     unlock_new_inode()       l…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 194 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: use d_instantiate_new() in ntfs_create_inode() and murder syzbot&amp;#39;s &amp;#34;WARNING in do_new_mount&amp;#34; saga ntfs_create_inode() creates a new inode via ntfs_new_inode(). It hashes it with insert_inode_locked() and so it&amp;#39;s marked as I_NEW until unlock_new_inode(). ntfs 3 calls d_instantiate() in between though... Since the dentry was already hashed by the lookup before the create any path walk finds it without touching the parent&amp;#39;s i_rwsem and so can lock the inode. If the inode is a directory unlock_new_inode() calls lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() and marks i_rwsem with the i_mutex_dir_key class. That resets the count and the owner of a lock somebody else may already hold by now... syzbot has been spamming us with the same godforsaken bug   &amp;#34;WARNING in do_new_mount&amp;#34; since 2023. I can&amp;#39;t take it anymore so I went looking. Afaict, syzbot&amp;#39;s executor chdirs into a freshly mounted ntfs3 image, creates a directory and then mounts some pseudofs on it. Everytime the mkdir() takes longer than syzbot waits mount() runs concurrently:   mkdir(&amp;#34;./sys&amp;#34;)                        mount(NULL, &amp;#34;./sys&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;sysfs&amp;#34;)   ntfs_create_inode()     d_instantiate()                                         user_path_at() finds the dentry                                         do_lock_mount()                                           inode_lock(inode)                                           namespace_lock()     unlock_new_inode()       l…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98539</guid>
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