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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 17:58:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1375 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1375</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1375</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1375</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98485</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98485</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ip6t_rt: fix zero-address non-strict match out-of-bounds read&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rt_mt6_check() permits rules to be configured with rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr == 0
even when address matching (IP6T_RT_FST_MASK) is requested.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the IP6T_RT_FST_NSTRICT path, rt_mt6() evaluates packet routing
addresses against rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[i] and terminates backwards at the bottom
of the loop:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &amp;amp;rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[i])) {
        i++;
    }
    if (i == rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr)
        break;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When addrnr is 0, if the first packet address matches rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[0],
i is incremented to 1. Because i is now strictly greater than addrnr (0),
the loop termination condition (i == rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr) is bypassed and will
never be satisfied.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a crafted IPv6 packet contains matching routing addresses, i will
advance past IP6T_RT_HOPS (16). The subsequent call to ipv6_addr_equal()
reads beyond struct ip6t_rt, triggering UBSAN/KASAN out-of-bounds warnings
or kernel panics.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by:
1. Rejecting rules in rt_mt6_check() where IP6T_RT_FST_MASK is set but
   rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr is zero.
2. In rt_mt6(), moving the termination condition (i &amp;lt; rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr)
   into the for-loop header condition and removing the backwards break
   at the end of the loop body.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ip6t_rt: fix zero-address non-strict match out-of-bounds read&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rt_mt6_check() permits rules to be configured with rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr == 0
even when address matching (IP6T_RT_FST_MASK) is requested.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the IP6T_RT_FST_NSTRICT path, rt_mt6() evaluates packet routing
addresses against rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[i] and terminates backwards at the bottom
of the loop:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &amp;amp;rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[i])) {
        i++;
    }
    if (i == rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr)
        break;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When addrnr is 0, if the first packet address matches rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[0],
i is incremented to 1. Because i is now strictly greater than addrnr (0),
the loop termination condition (i == rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr) is bypassed and will
never be satisfied.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a crafted IPv6 packet contains matching routing addresses, i will
advance past IP6T_RT_HOPS (16). The subsequent call to ipv6_addr_equal()
reads beyond struct ip6t_rt, triggering UBSAN/KASAN out-of-bounds warnings
or kernel panics.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by:
1. Rejecting rules in rt_mt6_check() where IP6T_RT_FST_MASK is set but
   rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr is zero.
2. In rt_mt6(), moving the termination condition (i &amp;lt; rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr)
   into the for-loop header condition and removing the backwards break
   at the end of the loop body.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98485</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mhfj-849g-frgh</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-mhfj-849g-frgh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ip6t_rt: fix zero-address non-strict match out-of-bounds read&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rt_mt6_check() permits rules to be configured with rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr == 0
even when address matching (IP6T_RT_FST_MASK) is requested.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the IP6T_RT_FST_NSTRICT path, rt_mt6() evaluates packet routing
addresses against rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[i] and terminates backwards at the bottom
of the loop:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &amp;amp;rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[i])) {
        i++;
    }
    if (i == rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr)
        break;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When addrnr is 0, if the first packet address matches rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[0],
i is incremented to 1. Because i is now strictly greater than addrnr (0),
the loop termination condition (i == rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr) is bypassed and will
never be satisfied.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a crafted IPv6 packet contains matching routing addresses, i will
advance past IP6T_RT_HOPS (16). The subsequent call to ipv6_addr_equal()
reads beyond struct ip6t_rt, triggering UBSAN/KASAN out-of-bounds warnings
or kernel panics.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by:
1. Rejecting rules in rt_mt6_check() where IP6T_RT_FST_MASK is set but
   rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr is zero.
2. In rt_mt6(), moving the termination condition (i &amp;lt; rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr)
   into the for-loop header condition and removing the backwards break
   at the end of the loop body.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ip6t_rt: fix zero-address non-strict match out-of-bounds read&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rt_mt6_check() permits rules to be configured with rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr == 0
even when address matching (IP6T_RT_FST_MASK) is requested.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the IP6T_RT_FST_NSTRICT path, rt_mt6() evaluates packet routing
addresses against rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[i] and terminates backwards at the bottom
of the loop:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &amp;amp;rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[i])) {
        i++;
    }
    if (i == rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr)
        break;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When addrnr is 0, if the first packet address matches rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[0],
i is incremented to 1. Because i is now strictly greater than addrnr (0),
the loop termination condition (i == rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr) is bypassed and will
never be satisfied.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a crafted IPv6 packet contains matching routing addresses, i will
advance past IP6T_RT_HOPS (16). The subsequent call to ipv6_addr_equal()
reads beyond struct ip6t_rt, triggering UBSAN/KASAN out-of-bounds warnings
or kernel panics.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by:
1. Rejecting rules in rt_mt6_check() where IP6T_RT_FST_MASK is set but
   rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr is zero.
2. In rt_mt6(), moving the termination condition (i &amp;lt; rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr)
   into the for-loop header condition and removing the backwards break
   at the end of the loop body.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-mhfj-849g-frgh</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-98485 — netfilter: ip6t_rt: fix zero-address non-strict match out-of-bounds read</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98485</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-98485</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98485</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98485</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98485</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 248 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ip6t_rt: fix zero-address non-strict match out-of-bounds read rt_mt6_check() permits rules to be configured with rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr == 0 even when address matching (IP6T_RT_FST_MASK) is requested. In the IP6T_RT_FST_NSTRICT path, rt_mt6() evaluates packet routing addresses against rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[i] and terminates backwards at the bottom of the loop:     if (ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &amp;amp;rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[i])) {         i++;     }     if (i == rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr)         break; When addrnr is 0, if the first packet address matches rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[0], i is incremented to 1. Because i is now strictly greater than addrnr (0), the loop termination condition (i == rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr) is bypassed and will never be satisfied. If a crafted IPv6 packet contains matching routing addresses, i will advance past IP6T_RT_HOPS (16). The subsequent call to ipv6_addr_equal() reads beyond struct ip6t_rt, triggering UBSAN/KASAN out-of-bounds warnings or kernel panics. Fix this by: 1. Rejecting rules in rt_mt6_check() where IP6T_RT_FST_MASK is set but    rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr is zero. 2. In rt_mt6(), moving the termination condition (i &amp;lt; rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr)    into the for-loop header condition and removing the backwards break    at the end of the loop body.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 248 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ip6t_rt: fix zero-address non-strict match out-of-bounds read rt_mt6_check() permits rules to be configured with rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr == 0 even when address matching (IP6T_RT_FST_MASK) is requested. In the IP6T_RT_FST_NSTRICT path, rt_mt6() evaluates packet routing addresses against rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[i] and terminates backwards at the bottom of the loop:     if (ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &amp;amp;rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[i])) {         i++;     }     if (i == rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr)         break; When addrnr is 0, if the first packet address matches rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrs[0], i is incremented to 1. Because i is now strictly greater than addrnr (0), the loop termination condition (i == rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr) is bypassed and will never be satisfied. If a crafted IPv6 packet contains matching routing addresses, i will advance past IP6T_RT_HOPS (16). The subsequent call to ipv6_addr_equal() reads beyond struct ip6t_rt, triggering UBSAN/KASAN out-of-bounds warnings or kernel panics. Fix this by: 1. Rejecting rules in rt_mt6_check() where IP6T_RT_FST_MASK is set but    rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr is zero. 2. In rt_mt6(), moving the termination condition (i &amp;lt; rtinfo-&amp;gt;addrnr)    into the for-loop header condition and removing the backwards break    at the end of the loop body.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98485</guid>
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