<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 19:46:20 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-94379</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-94379</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The login() function in MISP&amp;#39;s UsersController.php contained insufficient HTTP method validation for several security-critical code paths. The original code used an allowlist approach, checking only for specific HTTP methods (POST and PUT) before enforcing bruteforce protection, email one-time-password (OTP) verification, and login-failure logging. Because the checks were not exhaustive, an unauthenticated attacker could issue login requests using other HTTP methods and bypass all three security controls simultaneously. Specifically:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- the bruteforce blocklisting check and attempt counter were skipped, allowing unlimited credential-guessing attempts without being rate-limited or blocked
 -  the email OTP two-factor authentication step was skipped, defeating the second factor of authentication
 - login-failure events were neither logged nor counted, removing the audit trail and the mechanism that would normally trigger a blocklist entry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security impact is the effective disabling of brute-force protection and multi-factor authentication for any attacker who can craft an HTTP request with a non-POST/PUT method to the login endpoint, potentially leading to credential compromise and unauthorized access to the MISP instance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Version affected: &amp;lt;2.5.47&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The login() function in MISP&amp;#39;s UsersController.php contained insufficient HTTP method validation for several security-critical code paths. The original code used an allowlist approach, checking only for specific HTTP methods (POST and PUT) before enforcing bruteforce protection, email one-time-password (OTP) verification, and login-failure logging. Because the checks were not exhaustive, an unauthenticated attacker could issue login requests using other HTTP methods and bypass all three security controls simultaneously. Specifically:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- the bruteforce blocklisting check and attempt counter were skipped, allowing unlimited credential-guessing attempts without being rate-limited or blocked
 -  the email OTP two-factor authentication step was skipped, defeating the second factor of authentication
 - login-failure events were neither logged nor counted, removing the audit trail and the mechanism that would normally trigger a blocklist entry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security impact is the effective disabling of brute-force protection and multi-factor authentication for any attacker who can craft an HTTP request with a non-POST/PUT method to the login endpoint, potentially leading to credential compromise and unauthorized access to the MISP instance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Version affected: &amp;lt;2.5.47&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-94379</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GCVE-1-2026-20013 — MISP: HTTP Method Bypass of Login Security Controls (Bruteforce Protection and Email OTP)</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20013</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MISP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The login() function in MISP&amp;#39;s UsersController.php contained insufficient HTTP method validation for several security-critical code paths. The original code used an allowlist approach, checking only for specific HTTP methods (POST and PUT) before enforcing bruteforce protection, email one-time-password (OTP) verification, and login-failure logging. Because the checks were not exhaustive, an unauthenticated attacker could issue login requests using other HTTP methods and bypass all three security controls simultaneously. Specifically:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- the bruteforce blocklisting check and attempt counter were skipped, allowing unlimited credential-guessing attempts without being rate-limited or blocked
 -  the email OTP two-factor authentication step was skipped, defeating the second factor of authentication
 - login-failure events were neither logged nor counted, removing the audit trail and the mechanism that would normally trigger a blocklist entry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security impact is the effective disabling of brute-force protection and multi-factor authentication for any attacker who can craft an HTTP request with a non-POST/PUT method to the login endpoint, potentially leading to credential compromise and unauthorized access to the MISP instance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Version affected: &amp;lt;2.5.47&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MISP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The login() function in MISP&amp;#39;s UsersController.php contained insufficient HTTP method validation for several security-critical code paths. The original code used an allowlist approach, checking only for specific HTTP methods (POST and PUT) before enforcing bruteforce protection, email one-time-password (OTP) verification, and login-failure logging. Because the checks were not exhaustive, an unauthenticated attacker could issue login requests using other HTTP methods and bypass all three security controls simultaneously. Specifically:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- the bruteforce blocklisting check and attempt counter were skipped, allowing unlimited credential-guessing attempts without being rate-limited or blocked
 -  the email OTP two-factor authentication step was skipped, defeating the second factor of authentication
 - login-failure events were neither logged nor counted, removing the audit trail and the mechanism that would normally trigger a blocklist entry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security impact is the effective disabling of brute-force protection and multi-factor authentication for any attacker who can craft an HTTP request with a non-POST/PUT method to the login endpoint, potentially leading to credential compromise and unauthorized access to the MISP instance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Version affected: &amp;lt;2.5.47&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20013</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3q8c-466v-vgx3</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-3q8c-466v-vgx3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The login() function in MISP&amp;#39;s UsersController.php contained insufficient HTTP method validation for several security-critical code paths. The original code used an allowlist approach, checking only for specific HTTP methods (POST and PUT) before enforcing bruteforce protection, email one-time-password (OTP) verification, and login-failure logging. Because the checks were not exhaustive, an unauthenticated attacker could issue login requests using other HTTP methods and bypass all three security controls simultaneously. Specifically:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- the bruteforce blocklisting check and attempt counter were skipped, allowing unlimited credential-guessing attempts without being rate-limited or blocked
 -  the email OTP two-factor authentication step was skipped, defeating the second factor of authentication
 - login-failure events were neither logged nor counted, removing the audit trail and the mechanism that would normally trigger a blocklist entry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security impact is the effective disabling of brute-force protection and multi-factor authentication for any attacker who can craft an HTTP request with a non-POST/PUT method to the login endpoint, potentially leading to credential compromise and unauthorized access to the MISP instance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Version affected: &amp;lt;2.5.47&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The login() function in MISP&amp;#39;s UsersController.php contained insufficient HTTP method validation for several security-critical code paths. The original code used an allowlist approach, checking only for specific HTTP methods (POST and PUT) before enforcing bruteforce protection, email one-time-password (OTP) verification, and login-failure logging. Because the checks were not exhaustive, an unauthenticated attacker could issue login requests using other HTTP methods and bypass all three security controls simultaneously. Specifically:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- the bruteforce blocklisting check and attempt counter were skipped, allowing unlimited credential-guessing attempts without being rate-limited or blocked
 -  the email OTP two-factor authentication step was skipped, defeating the second factor of authentication
 - login-failure events were neither logged nor counted, removing the audit trail and the mechanism that would normally trigger a blocklist entry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security impact is the effective disabling of brute-force protection and multi-factor authentication for any attacker who can craft an HTTP request with a non-POST/PUT method to the login endpoint, potentially leading to credential compromise and unauthorized access to the MISP instance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Version affected: &amp;lt;2.5.47&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-3q8c-466v-vgx3</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
