https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 19 Oct 2026 20:46:55 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-88900 <p>Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Camel-Jgroups component.</p> <p>This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.</p> <p>JGroupsEndpoint.createExchange(Message), which CamelJGroupsReceiver calls for every message the jgroups consumer receives before the exchange is routed, set the exchange body from org.jgroups.Message.getObject(). For an ObjectMessage, which is the message type the Camel jgroups producer sends, JGroups Java-deserializes the payload through an ObjectInputStream on its own receive thread as the message arrives, and getObject() returns the resulting object. No java.io.ObjectInputFilter was applied on that path unless the deployment had set a JVM-wide serialization filter: camel-jgroups installed none, and the JGroups versions shipped with the affected releases apply none of their own, so any serializable class on the application classpath could be instantiated and its deserialization callbacks run. Unless a channel or the channelProperties option is configured, the consumer creates its channel with new JChannel(), the stock JGroups protocol stack, which multicasts over UDP without the AUTH protocol and without encryption, so any host able to reach the cluster&#39;s multicast group or bind port can join the cluster and send messages to the consumer without credentials. Such a host could send a crafted serialized object that leads to remote code execution in the Camel process when a usable deserialization g…</p> <p>Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Camel-Jgroups component.</p> <p>This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.</p> <p>JGroupsEndpoint.createExchange(Message), which CamelJGroupsReceiver calls for every message the jgroups consumer receives before the exchange is routed, set the exchange body from org.jgroups.Message.getObject(). For an ObjectMessage, which is the message type the Camel jgroups producer sends, JGroups Java-deserializes the payload through an ObjectInputStream on its own receive thread as the message arrives, and getObject() returns the resulting object. No java.io.ObjectInputFilter was applied on that path unless the deployment had set a JVM-wide serialization filter: camel-jgroups installed none, and the JGroups versions shipped with the affected releases apply none of their own, so any serializable class on the application classpath could be instantiated and its deserialization callbacks run. Unless a channel or the channelProperties option is configured, the consumer creates its channel with new JChannel(), the stock JGroups protocol stack, which multicasts over UDP without the AUTH protocol and without encryption, so any host able to reach the cluster&#39;s multicast group or bind port can join the cluster and send messages to the consumer without credentials. Such a host could send a crafted serialized object that leads to remote code execution in the Camel process when a usable deserialization g…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-88900 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-wqmw-6vq7-3mxp <p>Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Camel-Jgroups component.</p> <p>This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.</p> <p>JGroupsEndpoint.createExchange(Message), which CamelJGroupsReceiver calls for every message the jgroups consumer receives before the exchange is routed, set the exchange body from org.jgroups.Message.getObject(). For an ObjectMessage, which is the message type the Camel jgroups producer sends, JGroups Java-deserializes the payload through an ObjectInputStream on its own receive thread as the message arrives, and getObject() returns the resulting object. No java.io.ObjectInputFilter was applied on that path unless the deployment had set a JVM-wide serialization filter: camel-jgroups installed none, and the JGroups versions shipped with the affected releases apply none of their own, so any serializable class on the application classpath could be instantiated and its deserialization callbacks run. Unless a channel or the channelProperties option is configured, the consumer creates its channel with new JChannel(), the stock JGroups protocol stack, which multicasts over UDP without the AUTH protocol and without encryption, so any host able to reach the cluster&#39;s multicast group or bind port can join the cluster and send messages to the consumer without credentials. Such a host could send a crafted serialized object that leads to remote code execution in the Camel process when a usable deserialization g…</p> <p>Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Camel-Jgroups component.</p> <p>This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.</p> <p>JGroupsEndpoint.createExchange(Message), which CamelJGroupsReceiver calls for every message the jgroups consumer receives before the exchange is routed, set the exchange body from org.jgroups.Message.getObject(). For an ObjectMessage, which is the message type the Camel jgroups producer sends, JGroups Java-deserializes the payload through an ObjectInputStream on its own receive thread as the message arrives, and getObject() returns the resulting object. No java.io.ObjectInputFilter was applied on that path unless the deployment had set a JVM-wide serialization filter: camel-jgroups installed none, and the JGroups versions shipped with the affected releases apply none of their own, so any serializable class on the application classpath could be instantiated and its deserialization callbacks run. Unless a channel or the channelProperties option is configured, the consumer creates its channel with new JChannel(), the stock JGroups protocol stack, which multicasts over UDP without the AUTH protocol and without encryption, so any host able to reach the cluster&#39;s multicast group or bind port can join the cluster and send messages to the consumer without credentials. Such a host could send a crafted serialized object that leads to remote code execution in the Camel process when a usable deserialization g…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-wqmw-6vq7-3mxp