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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-87994</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-87994</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.5 until 0.11.1, the channel branch of chat_completion in backend/open_webui/main.py checked channel write access and channel membership for a supplied message_id but did not verify that the calling user authored the targeted message. A channel member could use the chat completions endpoint to replace another member&amp;#39;s message while preserving the victim as the stored author, altering the conversation record without gaining access to other channels. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.5 until 0.11.1, the channel branch of chat_completion in backend/open_webui/main.py checked channel write access and channel membership for a supplied message_id but did not verify that the calling user authored the targeted message. A channel member could use the chat completions endpoint to replace another member&amp;#39;s message while preserving the victim as the stored author, altering the conversation record without gaining access to other channels. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-87994</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-fmqh-xp37-5hr8 — Open WebUI: Channel members can overwrite another member's message via the chat completions endpoint</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-fmqh-xp37-5hr8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
Any member of a channel who can post to it could also replace the text of a message written by a different member. The channel branch of the chat completions endpoint checked that the caller may write to the channel, and that the targeted message belongs to that channel, but never checked that the caller actually wrote the message being edited. The message kept its original author, so the replacement text was displayed and stored as though the victim had written it. The dedicated channel message edit route performed the authorship check correctly and refused the same edit, so the two paths disagreed about who may modify a message.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Preconditions
- Channels must be enabled. `ENABLE_CHANNELS` defaults to `False`, so a default deployment is not affected until an administrator turns channels on.
- The attacker must be an approved user holding write access to the target channel, which is the ordinary state for any participant. No elevated role, group membership or additional permission is needed, and the attacker does not need to be the channel owner.
- The attacker must know the id of the targeted message. That id is returned to every member who reads the channel, so it requires no further access.
- Channels the attacker cannot post to are not affected, and neither are deployments with channels disabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
An attacker can rewrite what another member said, under that member&amp;#39;s name, in a shared channel. The stored record and every later reader show the victi…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
Any member of a channel who can post to it could also replace the text of a message written by a different member. The channel branch of the chat completions endpoint checked that the caller may write to the channel, and that the targeted message belongs to that channel, but never checked that the caller actually wrote the message being edited. The message kept its original author, so the replacement text was displayed and stored as though the victim had written it. The dedicated channel message edit route performed the authorship check correctly and refused the same edit, so the two paths disagreed about who may modify a message.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Preconditions
- Channels must be enabled. `ENABLE_CHANNELS` defaults to `False`, so a default deployment is not affected until an administrator turns channels on.
- The attacker must be an approved user holding write access to the target channel, which is the ordinary state for any participant. No elevated role, group membership or additional permission is needed, and the attacker does not need to be the channel owner.
- The attacker must know the id of the targeted message. That id is returned to every member who reads the channel, so it requires no further access.
- Channels the attacker cannot post to are not affected, and neither are deployments with channels disabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
An attacker can rewrite what another member said, under that member&amp;#39;s name, in a shared channel. The stored record and every later reader show the victi…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-fmqh-xp37-5hr8</guid>
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