https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 23 Oct 2026 10:51:26 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-86249 <p>On a brpc::Server that sets both ServerOptions.auth and ServerOptions.internal_port, the HTTP built-in service exemption on internal_port can be abused to bypass authentication entirely. VerifyHttpRequest() returns true without checking any credential when a built-in service is requested on internal_port, and this verdict is not per - request: verification runs only for the first message of a connection and the result latches the connection. Sending a request such as GET /status to internal_port first authenticates the whole connection, after which every subsequent request dispatched on the same connection is handled without ever calling VerifyHttpRequest(). This lets a remote attacker reach ordinary (non-built-in, non-tabbed) authenticated services without supplying valid credentials whenever the server uses ServerOptions.internal_port together with an Authenticator. The fix restricts internal_port so that it carries only built-in and Tabbed services; requests for ordinary services sent to internal_port are rejected with EPREM / HTTP 403.</p> <p>Mitigation / Fix: upgrade to 1.18.0 or apply PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3525 .</p> <p>Users who rely on serving normal services on internal_port must move those requests to the port passed to Server::Start().</p> <p>On a brpc::Server that sets both ServerOptions.auth and ServerOptions.internal_port, the HTTP built-in service exemption on internal_port can be abused to bypass authentication entirely. VerifyHttpRequest() returns true without checking any credential when a built-in service is requested on internal_port, and this verdict is not per - request: verification runs only for the first message of a connection and the result latches the connection. Sending a request such as GET /status to internal_port first authenticates the whole connection, after which every subsequent request dispatched on the same connection is handled without ever calling VerifyHttpRequest(). This lets a remote attacker reach ordinary (non-built-in, non-tabbed) authenticated services without supplying valid credentials whenever the server uses ServerOptions.internal_port together with an Authenticator. The fix restricts internal_port so that it carries only built-in and Tabbed services; requests for ordinary services sent to internal_port are rejected with EPREM / HTTP 403.</p> <p>Mitigation / Fix: upgrade to 1.18.0 or apply PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3525 .</p> <p>Users who rely on serving normal services on internal_port must move those requests to the port passed to Server::Start().</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-86249 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-9hx3-v45m-g57x <p>On a brpc::Server that sets both ServerOptions.auth and ServerOptions.internal_port, the HTTP built-in service exemption on internal_port can be abused to bypass authentication entirely. VerifyHttpRequest() returns true without checking any credential when a built-in service is requested on internal_port, and this verdict is not per - request: verification runs only for the first message of a connection and the result latches the connection. Sending a request such as GET /status to internal_port first authenticates the whole connection, after which every subsequent request dispatched on the same connection is handled without ever calling VerifyHttpRequest(). This lets a remote attacker reach ordinary (non-built-in, non-tabbed) authenticated services without supplying valid credentials whenever the server uses ServerOptions.internal_port together with an Authenticator. The fix restricts internal_port so that it carries only built-in and Tabbed services; requests for ordinary services sent to internal_port are rejected with EPREM / HTTP 403.</p> <p>Mitigation / Fix: upgrade to 1.18.0 or apply PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3525 .</p> <p>Users who rely on serving normal services on internal_port must move those requests to the port passed to Server::Start().</p> <p>On a brpc::Server that sets both ServerOptions.auth and ServerOptions.internal_port, the HTTP built-in service exemption on internal_port can be abused to bypass authentication entirely. VerifyHttpRequest() returns true without checking any credential when a built-in service is requested on internal_port, and this verdict is not per - request: verification runs only for the first message of a connection and the result latches the connection. Sending a request such as GET /status to internal_port first authenticates the whole connection, after which every subsequent request dispatched on the same connection is handled without ever calling VerifyHttpRequest(). This lets a remote attacker reach ordinary (non-built-in, non-tabbed) authenticated services without supplying valid credentials whenever the server uses ServerOptions.internal_port together with an Authenticator. The fix restricts internal_port so that it carries only built-in and Tabbed services; requests for ordinary services sent to internal_port are rejected with EPREM / HTTP 403.</p> <p>Mitigation / Fix: upgrade to 1.18.0 or apply PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3525 .</p> <p>Users who rely on serving normal services on internal_port must move those requests to the port passed to Server::Start().</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-9hx3-v45m-g57x