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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 14:43:35 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BIT-zookeeper-2026-84439 — Apache ZooKeeper: Audit log injection via unsanitized output from multiple sources</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/bit-zookeeper-2026-84439</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: zookeeper&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When audit logging is enabled (zookeeper.audit.enable=true), an unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary fields into Apache ZooKeeper&amp;#39;s audit log by sending a digest authentication request with tab characters (\t) embedded in the username. Because the audit log uses tab-separated key=value format, the injected tabs are parsed as legitimate field separators, allowing the attacker to spoof audit results (e.g., injecting result=success), forge operation types, and corrupt forensic evidence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A log injection vulnerability in Apache ZooKeeper allows a client that can call setACL to inject forged key-value fields into zookeeper_audit.log. When audit logging is enabled, the server serializes attacker-controlled digest ACL ids into the acl= audit field without escaping tab characters. Because audit events are emitted as tab-separated key=value records, a crafted ACL id can make one successful setAcl event appear to contain forged fields such as operation=delete and znode=/forged. This undermines the integrity of downstream audit parsing, alerting, and incident response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 through 3.9.5, from 3.8.0 through 3.8.6.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.6 or 3.8.7, which fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: zookeeper&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When audit logging is enabled (zookeeper.audit.enable=true), an unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary fields into Apache ZooKeeper&amp;#39;s audit log by sending a digest authentication request with tab characters (\t) embedded in the username. Because the audit log uses tab-separated key=value format, the injected tabs are parsed as legitimate field separators, allowing the attacker to spoof audit results (e.g., injecting result=success), forge operation types, and corrupt forensic evidence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A log injection vulnerability in Apache ZooKeeper allows a client that can call setACL to inject forged key-value fields into zookeeper_audit.log. When audit logging is enabled, the server serializes attacker-controlled digest ACL ids into the acl= audit field without escaping tab characters. Because audit events are emitted as tab-separated key=value records, a crafted ACL id can make one successful setAcl event appear to contain forged fields such as operation=delete and znode=/forged. This undermines the integrity of downstream audit parsing, alerting, and incident response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 through 3.9.5, from 3.8.0 through 3.8.6.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.6 or 3.8.7, which fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/bit-zookeeper-2026-84439</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1177 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans Apache Zookeeper. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provoquer une…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1177</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1177</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1177</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CLEANSTART-2026-MZ33445 — When audit logging is enabled (zookeeper</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cleanstart-2026-mz33445</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: apache-hive&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security vulnerability affects the apache-hive package. When audit logging is enabled (zookeeper.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: apache-hive&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security vulnerability affects the apache-hive package. When audit logging is enabled (zookeeper.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cleanstart-2026-mz33445</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-84439</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84439</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;When audit logging is enabled (zookeeper.audit.enable=true), an unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary fields into Apache ZooKeeper&amp;#39;s audit log by sending a digest authentication request with tab characters (\t) embedded in the username. Because the audit log uses tab-separated key=value format, the injected tabs are parsed as legitimate field separators, allowing the attacker to spoof audit results (e.g., injecting result=success), forge operation types, and corrupt forensic evidence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A log injection vulnerability in Apache ZooKeeper allows a client that can call setACL to inject forged key-value fields into zookeeper_audit.log. When audit logging is enabled, the server serializes attacker-controlled digest ACL ids into the acl= audit field without escaping tab characters. Because audit events are emitted as tab-separated key=value records, a crafted ACL id can make one successful setAcl event appear to contain forged fields such as operation=delete and znode=/forged. This undermines the integrity of downstream audit parsing, alerting, and incident response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 through 3.9.5, from 3.8.0 through 3.8.6.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.6 or 3.8.7, which fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;When audit logging is enabled (zookeeper.audit.enable=true), an unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary fields into Apache ZooKeeper&amp;#39;s audit log by sending a digest authentication request with tab characters (\t) embedded in the username. Because the audit log uses tab-separated key=value format, the injected tabs are parsed as legitimate field separators, allowing the attacker to spoof audit results (e.g., injecting result=success), forge operation types, and corrupt forensic evidence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A log injection vulnerability in Apache ZooKeeper allows a client that can call setACL to inject forged key-value fields into zookeeper_audit.log. When audit logging is enabled, the server serializes attacker-controlled digest ACL ids into the acl= audit field without escaping tab characters. Because audit events are emitted as tab-separated key=value records, a crafted ACL id can make one successful setAcl event appear to contain forged fields such as operation=delete and znode=/forged. This undermines the integrity of downstream audit parsing, alerting, and incident response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 through 3.9.5, from 3.8.0 through 3.8.6.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.6 or 3.8.7, which fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84439</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mxvw-9w3g-hmrq</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-mxvw-9w3g-hmrq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;When audit logging is enabled (zookeeper.audit.enable=true), an unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary fields into Apache ZooKeeper&amp;#39;s audit log by sending a digest authentication request with tab characters (\t) embedded in the username. Because the audit log uses tab-separated key=value format, the injected tabs are parsed as legitimate field separators, allowing the attacker to spoof audit results (e.g., injecting result=success), forge operation types, and corrupt forensic evidence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A log injection vulnerability in Apache ZooKeeper allows a client that can call setACL to inject forged key-value fields into zookeeper_audit.log. When audit logging is enabled, the server serializes attacker-controlled digest ACL ids into the acl= audit field without escaping tab characters. Because audit events are emitted as tab-separated key=value records, a crafted ACL id can make one successful setAcl event appear to contain forged fields such as operation=delete and znode=/forged. This undermines the integrity of downstream audit parsing, alerting, and incident response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 through 3.9.5, from 3.8.0 through 3.8.6.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.6 or 3.8.7, which fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;When audit logging is enabled (zookeeper.audit.enable=true), an unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary fields into Apache ZooKeeper&amp;#39;s audit log by sending a digest authentication request with tab characters (\t) embedded in the username. Because the audit log uses tab-separated key=value format, the injected tabs are parsed as legitimate field separators, allowing the attacker to spoof audit results (e.g., injecting result=success), forge operation types, and corrupt forensic evidence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A log injection vulnerability in Apache ZooKeeper allows a client that can call setACL to inject forged key-value fields into zookeeper_audit.log. When audit logging is enabled, the server serializes attacker-controlled digest ACL ids into the acl= audit field without escaping tab characters. Because audit events are emitted as tab-separated key=value records, a crafted ACL id can make one successful setAcl event appear to contain forged fields such as operation=delete and znode=/forged. This undermines the integrity of downstream audit parsing, alerting, and incident response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 through 3.9.5, from 3.8.0 through 3.8.6.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.6 or 3.8.7, which fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-mxvw-9w3g-hmrq</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-84439</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-84439</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: zookeeper, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: zookeeper, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: zookeeper, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: zookeeper, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: zookeeper, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: zookeeper, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: zookeeper&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When audit logging is enabled (zookeeper.audit.enable=true), an unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary fields into Apache ZooKeeper&amp;#39;s audit log by sending a digest authentication request with tab characters (\t) embedded in the username. Because the audit log uses tab-separated key=value format, the injected tabs are parsed as legitimate field separators, allowing the attacker to spoof audit results (e.g., injecting result=success), forge operation types, and corrupt forensic evidence. A log injection vulnerability in Apache ZooKeeper allows a client that can call setACL to inject forged key-value fields into zookeeper_audit.log. When audit logging is enabled, the server serializes attacker-controlled digest ACL ids into the acl= audit field without escaping tab characters. Because audit events are emitted as tab-separated key=value records, a crafted ACL id can make one successful setAcl event appear to contain forged fields such as operation=delete and znode=/forged. This undermines the integrity of downstream audit parsing, alerting, and incident response. This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 through 3.9.5, from 3.8.0 through 3.8.6. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.6 or 3.8.7, which fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: zookeeper, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: zookeeper, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: zookeeper, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: zookeeper, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: zookeeper, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: zookeeper, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: zookeeper&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When audit logging is enabled (zookeeper.audit.enable=true), an unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary fields into Apache ZooKeeper&amp;#39;s audit log by sending a digest authentication request with tab characters (\t) embedded in the username. Because the audit log uses tab-separated key=value format, the injected tabs are parsed as legitimate field separators, allowing the attacker to spoof audit results (e.g., injecting result=success), forge operation types, and corrupt forensic evidence. A log injection vulnerability in Apache ZooKeeper allows a client that can call setACL to inject forged key-value fields into zookeeper_audit.log. When audit logging is enabled, the server serializes attacker-controlled digest ACL ids into the acl= audit field without escaping tab characters. Because audit events are emitted as tab-separated key=value records, a crafted ACL id can make one successful setAcl event appear to contain forged fields such as operation=delete and znode=/forged. This undermines the integrity of downstream audit parsing, alerting, and incident response. This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 through 3.9.5, from 3.8.0 through 3.8.6. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.6 or 3.8.7, which fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-84439</guid>
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