<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 22:08:56 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-82840</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-82840</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Session fixation in Apache Wicket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;org.apache.wicket.authroles.authentication.AuthenticatedWebSession is the authentication base class of Wicket&amp;#39;s role-based security module, and its signIn(String, String) method is the entry point through which an application authenticates a session. Renewing the container session id at that point is the standard defence against an attacker who has fixed a session id in a victim&amp;#39;s browser, and Wicket provides that renewal as org.apache.wicket.Session#changeSessionId(), whose documentation directs callers to invoke it on login for exactly that reason.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AuthenticatedWebSession#signIn(String, String) calls it inside a guard that succeeds only on the first transition of the session&amp;#39;s signed-in flag. The session id is therefore renewed when a session first signs in, and is not renewed when a session that is already signed in authenticates again. signIn(String, String) returns true either way, so neither the caller nor the application can tell that the renewal did not happen.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An application is affected where it authenticates through AuthenticatedWebSession, which AuthenticatedWebApplication requires and which the shipped UsernamePasswordPanel uses, and where a session that is already signed in can authenticate again: a step-up prompt before a sensitive action, an account switch, or simply a sign-in form that stays reachable once the user is signed in. Nothing in the module hides that form from a signed-in session. Reaching the defect also requi…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Session fixation in Apache Wicket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;org.apache.wicket.authroles.authentication.AuthenticatedWebSession is the authentication base class of Wicket&amp;#39;s role-based security module, and its signIn(String, String) method is the entry point through which an application authenticates a session. Renewing the container session id at that point is the standard defence against an attacker who has fixed a session id in a victim&amp;#39;s browser, and Wicket provides that renewal as org.apache.wicket.Session#changeSessionId(), whose documentation directs callers to invoke it on login for exactly that reason.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AuthenticatedWebSession#signIn(String, String) calls it inside a guard that succeeds only on the first transition of the session&amp;#39;s signed-in flag. The session id is therefore renewed when a session first signs in, and is not renewed when a session that is already signed in authenticates again. signIn(String, String) returns true either way, so neither the caller nor the application can tell that the renewal did not happen.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An application is affected where it authenticates through AuthenticatedWebSession, which AuthenticatedWebApplication requires and which the shipped UsernamePasswordPanel uses, and where a session that is already signed in can authenticate again: a step-up prompt before a sensitive action, an account switch, or simply a sign-in form that stays reachable once the user is signed in. Nothing in the module hides that form from a signed-in session. Reaching the defect also requi…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-82840</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qqf3-jqrg-fm5r</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-qqf3-jqrg-fm5r</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Session fixation in Apache Wicket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;org.apache.wicket.authroles.authentication.AuthenticatedWebSession is the authentication base class of Wicket&amp;#39;s role-based security module, and its signIn(String, String) method is the entry point through which an application authenticates a session. Renewing the container session id at that point is the standard defence against an attacker who has fixed a session id in a victim&amp;#39;s browser, and Wicket provides that renewal as org.apache.wicket.Session#changeSessionId(), whose documentation directs callers to invoke it on login for exactly that reason.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AuthenticatedWebSession#signIn(String, String) calls it inside a guard that succeeds only on the first transition of the session&amp;#39;s signed-in flag. The session id is therefore renewed when a session first signs in, and is not renewed when a session that is already signed in authenticates again. signIn(String, String) returns true either way, so neither the caller nor the application can tell that the renewal did not happen.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An application is affected where it authenticates through AuthenticatedWebSession, which AuthenticatedWebApplication requires and which the shipped UsernamePasswordPanel uses, and where a session that is already signed in can authenticate again: a step-up prompt before a sensitive action, an account switch, or simply a sign-in form that stays reachable once the user is signed in. Nothing in the module hides that form from a signed-in session. Reaching the defect also requi…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Session fixation in Apache Wicket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;org.apache.wicket.authroles.authentication.AuthenticatedWebSession is the authentication base class of Wicket&amp;#39;s role-based security module, and its signIn(String, String) method is the entry point through which an application authenticates a session. Renewing the container session id at that point is the standard defence against an attacker who has fixed a session id in a victim&amp;#39;s browser, and Wicket provides that renewal as org.apache.wicket.Session#changeSessionId(), whose documentation directs callers to invoke it on login for exactly that reason.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AuthenticatedWebSession#signIn(String, String) calls it inside a guard that succeeds only on the first transition of the session&amp;#39;s signed-in flag. The session id is therefore renewed when a session first signs in, and is not renewed when a session that is already signed in authenticates again. signIn(String, String) returns true either way, so neither the caller nor the application can tell that the renewal did not happen.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An application is affected where it authenticates through AuthenticatedWebSession, which AuthenticatedWebApplication requires and which the shipped UsernamePasswordPanel uses, and where a session that is already signed in can authenticate again: a step-up prompt before a sensitive action, an account switch, or simply a sign-in form that stays reachable once the user is signed in. Nothing in the module hides that form from a signed-in session. Reaching the defect also requi…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-qqf3-jqrg-fm5r</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
