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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-81868</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81868</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. Prior to 4.3.0, Steeltoe.Security.Authorization.Certificate deployments using AddOrgAndSpacePolicies() and UseCertificateAuthorization() trust the public certificate supplied in the X-Client-Cert request header without proving possession of the corresponding private key. Common Cloud Foundry routers do not remove this header from inbound requests. When inbound requests are not restricted to a known trusted proxy source IP, an attacker who obtains the public certificate of an application instance in the target organization or space and can reach the application can spoof X-Client-Cert to bypass the SameOrg and SameSpace policies for the certificate validity period. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. Prior to 4.3.0, Steeltoe.Security.Authorization.Certificate deployments using AddOrgAndSpacePolicies() and UseCertificateAuthorization() trust the public certificate supplied in the X-Client-Cert request header without proving possession of the corresponding private key. Common Cloud Foundry routers do not remove this header from inbound requests. When inbound requests are not restricted to a known trusted proxy source IP, an attacker who obtains the public certificate of an application instance in the target organization or space and can reach the application can spoof X-Client-Cert to bypass the SameOrg and SameSpace policies for the certificate validity period. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81868</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5mq7-rwhj-4fh9 — Steeltoe: Header-forwarded client cert lacks proof of private-key possession</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5mq7-rwhj-4fh9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NuGet: Steeltoe.Security.Authorization.Certificate&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When Steeltoe&amp;#39;s certificate-based authorization (`UseCertificateAuthorization`) is configured, the default configuration of the middleware relies on the `X-Client-Cert` HTTP header to identify the client certificate, without verifying private-key possession. This header is not stripped by common Cloud Foundry routers (like Gorouter or Envoy) on inbound requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who obtains the public certificate of an application instance in the target organization or space can spoof the `X-Client-Cert` header. This allows the attacker to bypass `SameOrg` and `SameSpace` authorization policies, granting unauthorized access to protected endpoints for the duration of the certificate&amp;#39;s validity period.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected configuration&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- The application uses `AddOrgAndSpacePolicies()` and `UseCertificateAuthorization()` for inter-service authorization.
- Inbound requests are not restricted to a known trusted proxy source IP.
- The application&amp;#39;s endpoints are network-accessible to the attacker (e.g., exposed to the internet via a public Cloud Foundry route, or the attacker has access to the internal Cloud Foundry network).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If an immediate upgrade to a patched version is not possible:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Restrict `UseCertificateForwarding` to trusted proxy source IPs using `ForwardedHeadersOptions.KnownProxies` and `KnownNetworks`.
- Change the forwarding header to `X-Forwarded-Client-Cert` so that Cloud Foundry Gorouter and Envoy header stripping mechanisms app…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NuGet: Steeltoe.Security.Authorization.Certificate&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When Steeltoe&amp;#39;s certificate-based authorization (`UseCertificateAuthorization`) is configured, the default configuration of the middleware relies on the `X-Client-Cert` HTTP header to identify the client certificate, without verifying private-key possession. This header is not stripped by common Cloud Foundry routers (like Gorouter or Envoy) on inbound requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who obtains the public certificate of an application instance in the target organization or space can spoof the `X-Client-Cert` header. This allows the attacker to bypass `SameOrg` and `SameSpace` authorization policies, granting unauthorized access to protected endpoints for the duration of the certificate&amp;#39;s validity period.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected configuration&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- The application uses `AddOrgAndSpacePolicies()` and `UseCertificateAuthorization()` for inter-service authorization.
- Inbound requests are not restricted to a known trusted proxy source IP.
- The application&amp;#39;s endpoints are network-accessible to the attacker (e.g., exposed to the internet via a public Cloud Foundry route, or the attacker has access to the internal Cloud Foundry network).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If an immediate upgrade to a patched version is not possible:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Restrict `UseCertificateForwarding` to trusted proxy source IPs using `ForwardedHeadersOptions.KnownProxies` and `KnownNetworks`.
- Change the forwarding header to `X-Forwarded-Client-Cert` so that Cloud Foundry Gorouter and Envoy header stripping mechanisms app…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5mq7-rwhj-4fh9</guid>
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