fkie_cve-2026-77463

Remark42 is a self-hosted comment engine for blogs, articles, or any other place where readers can add comments. From 1.0.0 until 1.16.2, Remark42 globally trusts True-Client-IP, X-Real-IP, and X-Forwarded-For without verifying that the direct peer is a trusted proxy, and middleware.RealIP overwrites r.RemoteAddr before per-IP controls run. In a directly reachable deployment, or a proxy that forwards attacker-controlled headers, a remote attacker can rotate spoofed forwarding headers to obtain fresh token buckets for rate-limited endpoints, bypass vote de-duplication when --votes-ip is enabled, mint anonymous identities, and poison stored comment IPs and request logs. The global concurrent-request throttle and per-request timeouts still limit availability impact. Mitigation support is available in version 1.16.2, but operators must configure --trusted-proxy for the deployment topology.

GHSA-56x6-q882-mf27 — Remark42: Rate limit bypass via unconditional trust of X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-IP headers in direct-internet deployment

Affected: Go: github.com/umputun/remark42/backend, Go: github.com/umputun/remark42

### Summary Remark42 applied chi's `middleware.RealIP` globally, trusting `True-Client-IP` / `X-Real-IP` / `X-Forwarded-For` headers without verifying the request came from a trusted proxy. The per-IP rate limiters key on the overwritten `r.RemoteAddr`, so any client can bypass every per-IP rate limiter by rotating spoofed IP headers. The same spoofed IP also drives other per-IP controls (stored comment IP, anonymous identity derivation, and `--votes-ip` vote de-duplication). This affects deployments reachable directly from the internet (Remark42's built-in HTTP, static TLS, and ACME modes are all documented and supported), as well as any proxied deployment where the proxy forwards an attacker-controlled recognised header.

### Details The router applies `middleware.RealIP` globally, ahead of the per-route limiters, without any check that the server is behind a trusted proxy (in v1.16.1, `backend/app/rest/api/rest.go:207`).

The `rateLimiter` function (v1.16.1, `backend/app/rest/api/rest.go:769-779`) builds a tollbooth limiter with `IPLookup{Name: "RemoteAddr"}`, which reads `r.RemoteAddr`. Since chi's `middleware.RealIP` (v1.16.1, `backend/vendor/github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware/realip.go:42-55`) unconditionally overwrites `r.RemoteAddr` from `True-Client-IP > X-Real-IP > first X-Forwarded-For` (accepting any syntactically valid IP), any client can set its apparent IP to an arbitrary value.

This bypasses every per-IP rate limiter that runs after `RealIP`: `/auth` (2/s),…

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fkie_cve-2026-77463

GHSA-56x6-q882-mf27 — Remark42: Rate limit bypass via unconditional trust of X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-IP headers in direct-internet deployment