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CLEANSTART-2026-BW44579 — RabbitMQ amqp091-go is a Go AMQP 0

Affected: CleanStart: opentelemetry-collector-contrib

Security vulnerability affects the opentelemetry-collector-contrib package. RabbitMQ amqp091-go is a Go AMQP 0.

fkie_cve-2026-77410

RabbitMQ amqp091-go is a Go AMQP 0.9.1 client. Prior to 1.13.0, Channel.recvContent in channel.go preallocates the message body slice with the uint64 ch.header.Size value supplied by an AMQP content header without capping the allocation to the negotiated Connection.Config.FrameSize value. A malicious or compromised broker can send an extreme declared body size and cause the Go runtime to attempt a correspondingly large allocation before body data is received. The allocation can exhaust memory and terminate the client process. This issue is fixed in version 1.13.0.

GHSA-r9c8-gcjp-xfwh — RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Resource Exhaustion (OOM) via Unbounded Body Buffer Allocation

Affected: Go: github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go

**Summary** A flaw in the `recvContent` function allows a malicious AMQP server to trigger an Out-of-Memory (OOM) error, forcing the host operating system or container runtime to immediately terminate the client process.

**Vulnerability Details** When receiving message content payloads, the client processes the expected size from the content header framework. The `recvContent` function attempts to optimize performance by pre-allocating memory for the message body based on the `ch.header.Size` field, which is a 64-bit unsigned integer (`uint64`).

```go // channel.go:495-496 if cap(ch.body) == 0 { ch.body = make([]byte, 0, ch.header.Size) // unbounded } ```

The underlying library fails to validate or cap this requested size against any upper boundary—such as the maximum frame size negotiated during connection establishment (`FrameMax`). If a server specifies an extreme body size (e.g., `2^62` bytes), the Go runtime attempts to allocate an exabyte-scale slice capacity. This immediately exhausts available system memory, causing the operating system's OOM killer to terminate the application.

**Attack Vector / Exploitation Scenario**

- Message Delivery Phase: A malicious or compromised AMQP broker sends a standard `basic.deliver` frame containing a content header with an intentionally inflated `body-size` variable. - Authentication Requirement: No special privileges or authentication bypasses are required; the crash occurs seamlessly during normal message consumption.

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RHSA-2026:68290 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs bug fix and enhancement update

github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go: RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Denial of Service via AMQP frame size negotiation github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go: RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Connection configuration overwrite via unsanitized TLS path parameter injection github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go: RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Denial of Service via signed-to-unsigned integer casting github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go: RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Plaintext Credential Exposure via Exported PLAIN Authentication Fields github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go: RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Denial of Service due to synchronous event channel blocking github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go: RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Denial of Service via unbounded body buffer allocation github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go: RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Denial of Service via Malicious AMQP Field Length go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk/log: OpenTelemetry-Go: Denial of Service via attacker-driven log emission