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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 07:45:21 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-76913</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76913</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;NotrinosERP is an open-source web-based enterprise resource planning system written in PHP and MySQL. From 1.0.0 until 1.1.0, the employee document handler in hrm/manage/employees.php allows an authenticated user with SA_EMPLOYEE permission to submit doc_file through tab_documents() and stores the raw client filename, including an executable extension, under company/0/documents/employees/ without extension, MIME, or content validation. Uploading a PHP file places executable content beneath the web root, where requesting the stored file results in server-side code execution. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;NotrinosERP is an open-source web-based enterprise resource planning system written in PHP and MySQL. From 1.0.0 until 1.1.0, the employee document handler in hrm/manage/employees.php allows an authenticated user with SA_EMPLOYEE permission to submit doc_file through tab_documents() and stores the raw client filename, including an executable extension, under company/0/documents/employees/ without extension, MIME, or content validation. Uploading a PHP file places executable content beneath the web root, where requesting the stored file results in server-side code execution. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76913</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qv4m-m73m-8hj7 — NotrinosERP: Authenticated arbitrary file upload leads to remote code execution via HRM employee "Documents" (doc_file)</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-qv4m-m73m-8hj7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: notrinos/notrinos-erp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Summary
An authenticated user with the HR &amp;#34;Manage Employees&amp;#34; permission (`SA_EMPLOYEE`) can upload a
file with an arbitrary extension through the employee **Documents** tab. The handler writes the
raw client-supplied filename — extension intact — into a web-served directory with no extension,
MIME, or content validation, so a `.php` file is stored under the web root and executes as code,
yielding remote code execution on the server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Details
The document-upload branch in `hrm/manage/employees.php` (function `tab_documents()`) moves the
uploaded file using the client filename verbatim:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// hrm/manage/employees.php -&amp;gt; tab_documents()  (HEAD lines 597-602; release 1.0.0 lines 568-573)
$upload_dir = company_path().&amp;#39;/documents/employees&amp;#39;;
if (!file_exists($upload_dir))
    mkdir($upload_dir, 0777, true);
$file_path = $upload_dir.&amp;#39;/&amp;#39;.$employee_id.&amp;#39;_&amp;#39;.time().&amp;#39;_&amp;#39;.$_FILES[&amp;#39;doc_file&amp;#39;][&amp;#39;name&amp;#39;];
if (!move_uploaded_file($_FILES[&amp;#39;doc_file&amp;#39;][&amp;#39;tmp_name&amp;#39;], $file_path)) { ... }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is **no** extension allow-list, `getimagesize()`, MIME check, or content inspection on this
path. Contrast this with the profile-photo (`pic`) upload in the *same file*, which validates image
type/extension/size, and with core `includes/ui/attachment.inc`, which deliberately generates a
random extension-less name (`uniqid()`) with a comment warning that client filenames must never be
trusted. The document handler ignores that established safe pattern.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reachability of the written file:
- `co…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: notrinos/notrinos-erp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Summary
An authenticated user with the HR &amp;#34;Manage Employees&amp;#34; permission (`SA_EMPLOYEE`) can upload a
file with an arbitrary extension through the employee **Documents** tab. The handler writes the
raw client-supplied filename — extension intact — into a web-served directory with no extension,
MIME, or content validation, so a `.php` file is stored under the web root and executes as code,
yielding remote code execution on the server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Details
The document-upload branch in `hrm/manage/employees.php` (function `tab_documents()`) moves the
uploaded file using the client filename verbatim:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// hrm/manage/employees.php -&amp;gt; tab_documents()  (HEAD lines 597-602; release 1.0.0 lines 568-573)
$upload_dir = company_path().&amp;#39;/documents/employees&amp;#39;;
if (!file_exists($upload_dir))
    mkdir($upload_dir, 0777, true);
$file_path = $upload_dir.&amp;#39;/&amp;#39;.$employee_id.&amp;#39;_&amp;#39;.time().&amp;#39;_&amp;#39;.$_FILES[&amp;#39;doc_file&amp;#39;][&amp;#39;name&amp;#39;];
if (!move_uploaded_file($_FILES[&amp;#39;doc_file&amp;#39;][&amp;#39;tmp_name&amp;#39;], $file_path)) { ... }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is **no** extension allow-list, `getimagesize()`, MIME check, or content inspection on this
path. Contrast this with the profile-photo (`pic`) upload in the *same file*, which validates image
type/extension/size, and with core `includes/ui/attachment.inc`, which deliberately generates a
random extension-less name (`uniqid()`) with a comment warning that client filenames must never be
trusted. The document handler ignores that established safe pattern.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reachability of the written file:
- `co…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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