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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 08:29:55 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-76088</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76088</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PGPainless is a simple-to-use OpenPGP API based on Bouncy Castle. Prior to 1.7.8 and from 2.0.0 until 2.0.4, pgpainless-sop/src/main/kotlin/org/pgpainless/sop/InlineDetachImpl.kt InlineDetachImpl and pgpainless-core/src/main/kotlin/org/pgpainless/decryption_verification/MessageInspector.kt MessageInspector manually descend PGPCompressedData packets without incrementing or enforcing MAX_LAYER_DEPTH. A remote unauthenticated attacker can supply an untrusted OpenPGP message containing deeply nested compressed packet structures to a downstream application using inline-detach or message inspection, bypass the intended 16-layer limit, and force continued decompression and packet processing. The resulting resource consumption can block processing threads, exhaust heap memory, and crash the consuming application. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.8 and 2.0.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;PGPainless is a simple-to-use OpenPGP API based on Bouncy Castle. Prior to 1.7.8 and from 2.0.0 until 2.0.4, pgpainless-sop/src/main/kotlin/org/pgpainless/sop/InlineDetachImpl.kt InlineDetachImpl and pgpainless-core/src/main/kotlin/org/pgpainless/decryption_verification/MessageInspector.kt MessageInspector manually descend PGPCompressedData packets without incrementing or enforcing MAX_LAYER_DEPTH. A remote unauthenticated attacker can supply an untrusted OpenPGP message containing deeply nested compressed packet structures to a downstream application using inline-detach or message inspection, bypass the intended 16-layer limit, and force continued decompression and packet processing. The resulting resource consumption can block processing threads, exhaust heap memory, and crash the consuming application. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.8 and 2.0.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76088</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-cvx8-9ff6-54xq — PGPainless: Unbounded Compressed Packet Descent in inline-detach and MessageInspector leads to Denial of Service (DoS)</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-cvx8-9ff6-54xq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: org.pgpainless:pgpainless-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
An architectural security boundary bypass in inline-detach and MessageInspector allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to force unbounded recursive decompression routines. By supplying a specially crafted OpenPGP message containing deeply nested compressed packet structures, an attacker can completely bypass the library&amp;#39;s built-in DoS protections (MAX_LAYER_DEPTH = 16), leading to resource exhaustion, thread blocking, and potential Out-of-Memory (OOM) application crashes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The pg-painless core processing pipeline implements a defensive threshold constraint to prevent decompression bomb sequences (Zip Bombs) and arbitrary resource consumption:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Enforcement Location: pgpainless-main/pgpainless-core/src/main/kotlin/org/pgpainless/decryption_verification/MessageMetadata.kt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Threshold Constant: MAX_LAYER_DEPTH = 16&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, a code architecture review revealed two specific packet-walking implementations that unpack and step through PGPCompressedData packets manually, entirely failing to track or increment a layer depth index counter against the static compliance limits:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In InlineDetachImpl.kt (Line ~78-93): The logic loops over data packets via compressedData.dataStream. Because it processes the incoming data block-by-block without leveraging or passing constraints down to the guarded OpenPgpMessageInputStream tracking mechanism, it accepts infinite nesting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In MessageInspector.kt (Line ~95): The inspector utility descends recursively d…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: org.pgpainless:pgpainless-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
An architectural security boundary bypass in inline-detach and MessageInspector allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to force unbounded recursive decompression routines. By supplying a specially crafted OpenPGP message containing deeply nested compressed packet structures, an attacker can completely bypass the library&amp;#39;s built-in DoS protections (MAX_LAYER_DEPTH = 16), leading to resource exhaustion, thread blocking, and potential Out-of-Memory (OOM) application crashes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The pg-painless core processing pipeline implements a defensive threshold constraint to prevent decompression bomb sequences (Zip Bombs) and arbitrary resource consumption:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Enforcement Location: pgpainless-main/pgpainless-core/src/main/kotlin/org/pgpainless/decryption_verification/MessageMetadata.kt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Threshold Constant: MAX_LAYER_DEPTH = 16&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, a code architecture review revealed two specific packet-walking implementations that unpack and step through PGPCompressedData packets manually, entirely failing to track or increment a layer depth index counter against the static compliance limits:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In InlineDetachImpl.kt (Line ~78-93): The logic loops over data packets via compressedData.dataStream. Because it processes the incoming data block-by-block without leveraging or passing constraints down to the guarded OpenPgpMessageInputStream tracking mechanism, it accepts infinite nesting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In MessageInspector.kt (Line ~95): The inspector utility descends recursively d…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-cvx8-9ff6-54xq</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-76088</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-76088</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: pgpainless&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(PGPainless is a simple-to-use OpenPGP API based on Bouncy Castle. Prio ...)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: pgpainless&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(PGPainless is a simple-to-use OpenPGP API based on Bouncy Castle. Prio ...)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-76088</guid>
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