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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-69157</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69157</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Atomic Server is an open source headless CMS and real-time database. From 0.29.0 to 0.40.2, Atomic Server provisions a well-known /setup invite with write enabled, the Drive root as its target, and usagesLeft set to one. construct_invite_redirect in server/src/plugins/invite.rs discards the redeemer identity, so an unauthenticated request containing an attacker-controlled public-key can create a new Agent and grant it write access to the entire Drive. On a fresh, unclaimed deployment, this permits reading, modifying, or deleting resources, changing permissions, and creating or altering Agents. No complete fixed version was verified as of this review.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Atomic Server is an open source headless CMS and real-time database. From 0.29.0 to 0.40.2, Atomic Server provisions a well-known /setup invite with write enabled, the Drive root as its target, and usagesLeft set to one. construct_invite_redirect in server/src/plugins/invite.rs discards the redeemer identity, so an unauthenticated request containing an attacker-controlled public-key can create a new Agent and grant it write access to the entire Drive. On a fresh, unclaimed deployment, this permits reading, modifying, or deleting resources, changing permissions, and creating or altering Agents. No complete fixed version was verified as of this review.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69157</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj — Atomic Server: Unauthenticated `/setup` invite grants write access to the entire Drive</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: atomic-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;atomic-server provisions a well-known invite at `{server}/setup` with `write = true`, `target` = the Drive root, and `usagesLeft = 1`. Invite redemption **ignores the redeemer&amp;#39;s identity** (`for_agent: _` in `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22`), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An **unauthenticated** attacker who sends `GET /setup?public-key=&amp;lt;attacker_key&amp;gt;` has the server create a new Agent and grant it **write access to the entire Drive**. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Severity&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8).** No authentication required; grants attacker-controlled write over all resources in the Drive.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `server/src/appstate.rs` — creates the `/setup` invite targeting the Drive root with `write=true`, `usagesLeft=1`.
- `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:14-173` — `construct_invite_redirect` destructures `for_agent: _` (redeemer identity discarded); `?public-key=` → `Agent::new_from_public_key` → `add_rights(agent, target, write=true)`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Steps to Reproduce&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Environment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop` in Docker, `http://localhost:9883`, fresh store. No auth headers are used.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Confirm the invite is live — `GET /setup` (Accept: `application/ad+json`) shows `invite/write = true`, `invite/target = http://localhost:9883` (Drive root), `usagesLeft = 1`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. Redeem it anonymously with an attacker-generated ed25519 publi…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: atomic-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;atomic-server provisions a well-known invite at `{server}/setup` with `write = true`, `target` = the Drive root, and `usagesLeft = 1`. Invite redemption **ignores the redeemer&amp;#39;s identity** (`for_agent: _` in `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22`), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An **unauthenticated** attacker who sends `GET /setup?public-key=&amp;lt;attacker_key&amp;gt;` has the server create a new Agent and grant it **write access to the entire Drive**. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Severity&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8).** No authentication required; grants attacker-controlled write over all resources in the Drive.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `server/src/appstate.rs` — creates the `/setup` invite targeting the Drive root with `write=true`, `usagesLeft=1`.
- `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:14-173` — `construct_invite_redirect` destructures `for_agent: _` (redeemer identity discarded); `?public-key=` → `Agent::new_from_public_key` → `add_rights(agent, target, write=true)`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Steps to Reproduce&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Environment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop` in Docker, `http://localhost:9883`, fresh store. No auth headers are used.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Confirm the invite is live — `GET /setup` (Accept: `application/ad+json`) shows `invite/write = true`, `invite/target = http://localhost:9883` (Drive root), `usagesLeft = 1`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. Redeem it anonymously with an attacker-generated ed25519 publi…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj</guid>
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