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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-69155</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69155</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Atomic Server is an open source headless CMS and real-time database. From 0.30.0 until 0.40.3, an authenticated Agent with folder write access can use POST /upload to store HTML or SVG content that GET /download/{path} serves from the application origin through server/src/handlers/download.rs. The response sets Content-Disposition: inline and lacks forced attachment handling and X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, allowing the browser to render the uploaded active content as the application. When a victim opens the link, the script can access the JavaScript-readable atomic_session cookie and the Agent private key in same-origin IndexedDB, enabling persistent account impersonation. This issue is fixed in version 0.40.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Atomic Server is an open source headless CMS and real-time database. From 0.30.0 until 0.40.3, an authenticated Agent with folder write access can use POST /upload to store HTML or SVG content that GET /download/{path} serves from the application origin through server/src/handlers/download.rs. The response sets Content-Disposition: inline and lacks forced attachment handling and X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, allowing the browser to render the uploaded active content as the application. When a victim opens the link, the script can access the JavaScript-readable atomic_session cookie and the Agent private key in same-origin IndexedDB, enabling persistent account impersonation. This issue is fixed in version 0.40.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69155</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-x277-3wcg-g9r2 — Atomic Server: Stored XSS via uploaded files served inline (same-origin) on `/download` → account takeover</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-x277-3wcg-g9r2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: atomic-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Files uploaded via `POST /upload` are served back by `GET /download/{path}` using `actix_files::NamedFile`. For `text/html` and `image/svg+xml`, actix-files (0.6.6) sets `Content-Disposition: inline`, so the browser **renders** the file instead of downloading it. The `/download` route sets **no `Content-Security-Policy`, no `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, and no forced `attachment`** (CSP exists only on the SPA route), and files are served from the **same origin** as the app UI. An authenticated Agent uploads `evil.html` containing `&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;`; when a victim opens the link, the script executes in the app origin. Because the `atomic_session` cookie is set via `document.cookie` (not HttpOnly) and the Agent&amp;#39;s Ed25519 private key is stored in same-origin IndexedDB (`browser/data-browser/src/helpers/agentStorage.ts`), the script exfiltrates the private key → **permanent account takeover**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `server/src/handlers/upload.rs` — stores the file; mimetype guessed from extension.
- `server/src/handlers/download.rs:65` — `NamedFile::open(...).into_response(req)` with no CSP/nosniff/attachment; CSP is only set in `server/src/handlers/single_page_app.rs`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Steps to Reproduce&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Environment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop`, `http://localhost:9883`. Attacker is any Agent with write on a folder.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Upload an HTML file (multipart, with signed auth headers):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```http
POST /upload?parent=http://localhost:9883 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
x-atomic-publ…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: atomic-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Files uploaded via `POST /upload` are served back by `GET /download/{path}` using `actix_files::NamedFile`. For `text/html` and `image/svg+xml`, actix-files (0.6.6) sets `Content-Disposition: inline`, so the browser **renders** the file instead of downloading it. The `/download` route sets **no `Content-Security-Policy`, no `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, and no forced `attachment`** (CSP exists only on the SPA route), and files are served from the **same origin** as the app UI. An authenticated Agent uploads `evil.html` containing `&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;`; when a victim opens the link, the script executes in the app origin. Because the `atomic_session` cookie is set via `document.cookie` (not HttpOnly) and the Agent&amp;#39;s Ed25519 private key is stored in same-origin IndexedDB (`browser/data-browser/src/helpers/agentStorage.ts`), the script exfiltrates the private key → **permanent account takeover**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `server/src/handlers/upload.rs` — stores the file; mimetype guessed from extension.
- `server/src/handlers/download.rs:65` — `NamedFile::open(...).into_response(req)` with no CSP/nosniff/attachment; CSP is only set in `server/src/handlers/single_page_app.rs`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Steps to Reproduce&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Environment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop`, `http://localhost:9883`. Attacker is any Agent with write on a folder.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Upload an HTML file (multipart, with signed auth headers):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```http
POST /upload?parent=http://localhost:9883 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
x-atomic-publ…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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