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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-62250</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62250</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;LibreDWG is a free C library to read and write DWG files. Prior to 0.14.8413, a crafted pre-R13 DWG can make `decode_preR13_entities()` in `src/decode.c` enter a nonterminating loop that allocates a new object each iteration. `decode_preR13` in `src/decode_r11.c` computes `size` from the raw file-controlled `entities_start` and `entities_end` header bounds; the callee clamps `end` to `dat-&amp;gt;size` but never recalculates `size`. At `end` of input, `bit_read_RC` and `bit_read_RS` stop advancing `dat-&amp;gt;byte`, the overflow guard fails because `end` equals `dat-&amp;gt;size`, and the no-advance check compares against `oldpos` saved before the loop instead of the previous iteration. This leaves repeated allocation of `dwg-&amp;gt;object` entries until allocation fails or the process is OOM-killed, not merely a constant-memory CPU hang. The defect remains after the clamping and no-progress changes associated with the earlier issue 1131. Applications and tools calling `dwg_read_file()` on untrusted files, including `dwg2dxf`, `dwgread` and `dwg2svg`, can suffer denial of service when a user or automated pipeline opens a malformed file; no attacker credentials are required. This issue is fixed in repository nightly version 0.14.8413.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;LibreDWG is a free C library to read and write DWG files. Prior to 0.14.8413, a crafted pre-R13 DWG can make `decode_preR13_entities()` in `src/decode.c` enter a nonterminating loop that allocates a new object each iteration. `decode_preR13` in `src/decode_r11.c` computes `size` from the raw file-controlled `entities_start` and `entities_end` header bounds; the callee clamps `end` to `dat-&amp;gt;size` but never recalculates `size`. At `end` of input, `bit_read_RC` and `bit_read_RS` stop advancing `dat-&amp;gt;byte`, the overflow guard fails because `end` equals `dat-&amp;gt;size`, and the no-advance check compares against `oldpos` saved before the loop instead of the previous iteration. This leaves repeated allocation of `dwg-&amp;gt;object` entries until allocation fails or the process is OOM-killed, not merely a constant-memory CPU hang. The defect remains after the clamping and no-progress changes associated with the earlier issue 1131. Applications and tools calling `dwg_read_file()` on untrusted files, including `dwg2dxf`, `dwgread` and `dwg2svg`, can suffer denial of service when a user or automated pipeline opens a malformed file; no attacker credentials are required. This issue is fixed in repository nightly version 0.14.8413.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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