<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 31 Oct 2026 07:52:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-61708</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61708</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, `POST /api/agent_data_store/upload` in `backend/app/data_store/data_store_routes.py` permits `customer_user` callers to choose `bucket_name` and `object_name` without an allowlist, tenant prefix, ownership check or content restriction. The only file check requires a nonempty filename. The operations in `backend/app/data_store/data_store_operations.py` create missing buckets and upsert objects, allowing existing objects belonging to any tenant to be overwritten. Targets include `sysmon-configs/&amp;lt;customer_code&amp;gt;/sysmon_config.xml` distributed to managed Windows endpoints, `copilot-case-report-templates/&amp;lt;name&amp;gt;` rendered server-side, and case evidence or forensic artifacts under `copilot-cases/&amp;lt;case_id&amp;gt;/&amp;lt;file&amp;gt;` and `velociraptor-artifacts/&amp;lt;agent_id&amp;gt;/&amp;lt;flow_id&amp;gt;/&amp;lt;file&amp;gt;`. A lowest-privilege user can tamper with cross-tenant evidence, blind endpoint telemetry, poison report templates for later code execution, plant data or exhaust storage. Sibling list, download and delete routes remain restricted to admin/analyst; the exposed operation is the upload write path. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, `POST /api/agent_data_store/upload` in `backend/app/data_store/data_store_routes.py` permits `customer_user` callers to choose `bucket_name` and `object_name` without an allowlist, tenant prefix, ownership check or content restriction. The only file check requires a nonempty filename. The operations in `backend/app/data_store/data_store_operations.py` create missing buckets and upsert objects, allowing existing objects belonging to any tenant to be overwritten. Targets include `sysmon-configs/&amp;lt;customer_code&amp;gt;/sysmon_config.xml` distributed to managed Windows endpoints, `copilot-case-report-templates/&amp;lt;name&amp;gt;` rendered server-side, and case evidence or forensic artifacts under `copilot-cases/&amp;lt;case_id&amp;gt;/&amp;lt;file&amp;gt;` and `velociraptor-artifacts/&amp;lt;agent_id&amp;gt;/&amp;lt;flow_id&amp;gt;/&amp;lt;file&amp;gt;`. A lowest-privilege user can tamper with cross-tenant evidence, blind endpoint telemetry, poison report templates for later code execution, plant data or exhaust storage. Sibling list, download and delete routes remain restricted to admin/analyst; the exposed operation is the upload write path. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61708</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
