<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 12:45:54 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-58497</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-58497</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Uni-CLI gives people and agents one command interface for websites, browsers, desktop applications, local tools, and MCP. Prior to version 0.225.2, Uni-CLI exposed the legacy JSON-RPC-over-HTTP MCP transport on loopback without validating browser Origin headers before routing requests. A malicious web page could send a CORS simple POST request, such as text/plain, to the local /mcp endpoint and deliver a JSON-RPC body to the dispatcher. If the user had started the local MCP HTTP transport, that page could drive tools/call requests against the user&amp;#39;s local Uni-CLI server. The Streamable HTTP transport already enforced this browser-to-localhost boundary. The legacy stateless HTTP path did not, so the two HTTP transports had drifted. This issue is about the browser-to-localhost boundary; it does not change Uni-CLI&amp;#39;s local-code-execution trust model. This issue has been patched in version 0.225.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Uni-CLI gives people and agents one command interface for websites, browsers, desktop applications, local tools, and MCP. Prior to version 0.225.2, Uni-CLI exposed the legacy JSON-RPC-over-HTTP MCP transport on loopback without validating browser Origin headers before routing requests. A malicious web page could send a CORS simple POST request, such as text/plain, to the local /mcp endpoint and deliver a JSON-RPC body to the dispatcher. If the user had started the local MCP HTTP transport, that page could drive tools/call requests against the user&amp;#39;s local Uni-CLI server. The Streamable HTTP transport already enforced this browser-to-localhost boundary. The legacy stateless HTTP path did not, so the two HTTP transports had drifted. This issue is about the browser-to-localhost boundary; it does not change Uni-CLI&amp;#39;s local-code-execution trust model. This issue has been patched in version 0.225.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-58497</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-v3f4-w7r7-v3hm — Uni-CLI: Legacy HTTP MCP transport accepted browser-originated localhost requests</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-v3f4-w7r7-v3hm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @zenalexa/unicli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Uni-CLI versions before 0.225.2 exposed the legacy JSON-RPC-over-HTTP MCP transport on loopback without validating browser Origin headers before routing requests. A malicious web page could send a CORS simple POST request, such as text/plain, to the local /mcp endpoint and deliver a JSON-RPC body to the dispatcher. If the user had started the local MCP HTTP transport, that page could drive tools/call requests against the user&amp;#39;s local Uni-CLI server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Streamable HTTP transport already enforced this browser-to-localhost boundary. The legacy stateless HTTP path did not, so the two HTTP transports had drifted. This issue is about the browser-to-localhost boundary; it does not change Uni-CLI&amp;#39;s local-code-execution trust model.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Version 0.225.2 fixes the issue by moving the Origin policy into a shared guard and applying it before routing in both HTTP transports. Non-loopback browser Origins are rejected with HTTP 403 before health, OAuth, or /mcp dispatch runs. Non-browser clients that omit Origin remain supported.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to 0.225.2 or later. If upgrading is not immediately possible, do not expose the legacy HTTP MCP transport to browser-originated traffic; use the default stdio transport or the Streamable HTTP transport instead.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credits&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reported privately by Ryan Vonbrubeck ([@dodge1218](https://github.com/dodge1218)).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @zenalexa/unicli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Uni-CLI versions before 0.225.2 exposed the legacy JSON-RPC-over-HTTP MCP transport on loopback without validating browser Origin headers before routing requests. A malicious web page could send a CORS simple POST request, such as text/plain, to the local /mcp endpoint and deliver a JSON-RPC body to the dispatcher. If the user had started the local MCP HTTP transport, that page could drive tools/call requests against the user&amp;#39;s local Uni-CLI server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Streamable HTTP transport already enforced this browser-to-localhost boundary. The legacy stateless HTTP path did not, so the two HTTP transports had drifted. This issue is about the browser-to-localhost boundary; it does not change Uni-CLI&amp;#39;s local-code-execution trust model.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Version 0.225.2 fixes the issue by moving the Origin policy into a shared guard and applying it before routing in both HTTP transports. Non-loopback browser Origins are rejected with HTTP 403 before health, OAuth, or /mcp dispatch runs. Non-browser clients that omit Origin remain supported.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to 0.225.2 or later. If upgrading is not immediately possible, do not expose the legacy HTTP MCP transport to browser-originated traffic; use the default stdio transport or the Streamable HTTP transport instead.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credits&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reported privately by Ryan Vonbrubeck ([@dodge1218](https://github.com/dodge1218)).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-v3f4-w7r7-v3hm</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
