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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-58270</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-58270</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Sync-in Server is an open-source platform for file storage, sharing, collaboration, and syncing. Prior to version 2.4.0, the sync diff endpoint compiles a user-supplied string into a `RegExp` with no complexity validation. A catastrophic-backtracking pattern (e.g. `^(a+)+b`) blocks the Node.js event loop, making the entire server unresponsive to all users until the container is restarted. Version 2.4.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Sync-in Server is an open-source platform for file storage, sharing, collaboration, and syncing. Prior to version 2.4.0, the sync diff endpoint compiles a user-supplied string into a `RegExp` with no complexity validation. A catastrophic-backtracking pattern (e.g. `^(a+)+b`) blocks the Node.js event loop, making the entire server unresponsive to all users until the container is restarted. Version 2.4.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-58270</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-jx63-h26r-8cph — Sync-in Server has a ReDoS via Unsanitized Regex in Sync Diff `pathFilters`</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-jx63-h26r-8cph</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @sync-in/server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected component:** Sync-in Server v2.3.0, `POST /api/app/sync/operation/diff/:id`, vulnerable implementation of `pathFilters` in `backend/src/applications/sync/dtos/sync-operations.dto.ts`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the vulnerable version, the sync diff endpoint accepted a user-controlled regex pattern through `pathFilters` and compiled it into a `RegExp` without complexity validation. The resulting regex was then executed synchronously against relative file paths during diff generation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A catastrophic-backtracking pattern, such as `^(a+)+b`, can block the affected Node.js event loop when evaluated against a worst-case path shape. In a single-process deployment, this can make the server unavailable to other users while the regex evaluation is running. Repeated malicious requests can sustain the denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`SyncDiffDto` transformed user input directly into a `RegExp` without validating regex complexity:
```typescript
// backend/src/applications/sync/dtos/sync-operations.dto.ts
@IsOptional()
@Transform(({ value }) =&amp;gt; (typeof value === &amp;#39;string&amp;#39; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; value.length &amp;gt; 0 ? new RegExp(value, &amp;#39;i&amp;#39;) : null))
pathFilters?: RegExp = null
```
The compiled regex was then executed synchronously during sync diff traversal:
```typescript
// backend/src/applications/sync/services/sync-manager.service.ts
if (ctx.syncDiff.pathFilters &amp;amp;&amp;amp; ctx.syncDiff.pathFilters.test(filePath)) {
```
Because `.test()` is synchronous, a catastrophic-backtracking pattern can block the Node.js event lo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @sync-in/server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected component:** Sync-in Server v2.3.0, `POST /api/app/sync/operation/diff/:id`, vulnerable implementation of `pathFilters` in `backend/src/applications/sync/dtos/sync-operations.dto.ts`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the vulnerable version, the sync diff endpoint accepted a user-controlled regex pattern through `pathFilters` and compiled it into a `RegExp` without complexity validation. The resulting regex was then executed synchronously against relative file paths during diff generation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A catastrophic-backtracking pattern, such as `^(a+)+b`, can block the affected Node.js event loop when evaluated against a worst-case path shape. In a single-process deployment, this can make the server unavailable to other users while the regex evaluation is running. Repeated malicious requests can sustain the denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`SyncDiffDto` transformed user input directly into a `RegExp` without validating regex complexity:
```typescript
// backend/src/applications/sync/dtos/sync-operations.dto.ts
@IsOptional()
@Transform(({ value }) =&amp;gt; (typeof value === &amp;#39;string&amp;#39; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; value.length &amp;gt; 0 ? new RegExp(value, &amp;#39;i&amp;#39;) : null))
pathFilters?: RegExp = null
```
The compiled regex was then executed synchronously during sync diff traversal:
```typescript
// backend/src/applications/sync/services/sync-manager.service.ts
if (ctx.syncDiff.pathFilters &amp;amp;&amp;amp; ctx.syncDiff.pathFilters.test(filePath)) {
```
Because `.test()` is synchronous, a catastrophic-backtracking pattern can block the Node.js event lo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-jx63-h26r-8cph</guid>
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