https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 01 Oct 2026 20:44:35 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-58269 <p>Sync-in Server is an open-source platform for file storage, sharing, collaboration, and syncing. Prior to version 2.4.0, `POST /api/auth/token` authenticates with username and password only, then calls `getTokens()`, which returns full access and refresh JWTs without checking whether the account has TOTP 2FA enabled. An attacker with stolen or phished credentials can bypass 2FA in a single request. The parallel login endpoint (`POST /api/auth/login`) correctly enforces 2FA by calling `setCookies(user, res, true)`, which gates on `user.twoFaEnabled`. Version 2.4.0 patches the issue.</p> <p>Sync-in Server is an open-source platform for file storage, sharing, collaboration, and syncing. Prior to version 2.4.0, `POST /api/auth/token` authenticates with username and password only, then calls `getTokens()`, which returns full access and refresh JWTs without checking whether the account has TOTP 2FA enabled. An attacker with stolen or phished credentials can bypass 2FA in a single request. The parallel login endpoint (`POST /api/auth/login`) correctly enforces 2FA by calling `setCookies(user, res, true)`, which gates on `user.twoFaEnabled`. Version 2.4.0 patches the issue.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-58269 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-92cr-jxw4-5wjg <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @sync-in/server</p> <p>**Affected component:** Sync-in Server v2.3.0, `POST /api/auth/token` (`auth.controller.ts:50-55`).</p> <p>**Required attacker capability:** Valid username and password for a 2FA-enabled account.</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>`POST /api/auth/token` authenticates with username and password only, then calls `getTokens()`, which returns unrestricted Bearer access and refresh JWTs without checking whether the account has TOTP 2FA enabled. An attacker who already knows valid credentials for a 2FA-enabled account can bypass 2FA in a single request.</p> <p>The parallel login endpoint (`POST /api/auth/login`) correctly enforces 2FA by calling `setCookies(user, res, true)`, which gates on `user.twoFaEnabled` when server-side TOTP is enabled.</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>The token endpoint at `auth.controller.ts:50-55` uses `AuthLocalGuard` (password-only) and calls `getTokens()` directly: ```typescript // auth.controller.ts:50-55 @Post(AUTH_ROUTE.TOKEN) @AuthTokenSkip() @UseGuards(AuthLocalGuard) token(@GetUser() user: UserModel): Promise&lt;TokenResponseDto&gt; { return this.authManager.getTokens(user) } ``` `getTokens()` at `auth.service.ts:25-39` signs and returns access and refresh JWTs. It never reads `user.twoFaEnabled`: ```typescript // auth.service.ts:25-39 async getTokens(user: UserModel, refresh = false): Promise&lt;TokenResponseDto&gt; { const currentTime = currentTimeStamp() // ...expiration logic... return { [TOKEN_TYPE.ACCESS]: await this.jwtSign(user, TOKEN_TYPE.ACCESS, accessExpiration), [TOKEN_TYPE.REFRESH]…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @sync-in/server</p> <p>**Affected component:** Sync-in Server v2.3.0, `POST /api/auth/token` (`auth.controller.ts:50-55`).</p> <p>**Required attacker capability:** Valid username and password for a 2FA-enabled account.</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>`POST /api/auth/token` authenticates with username and password only, then calls `getTokens()`, which returns unrestricted Bearer access and refresh JWTs without checking whether the account has TOTP 2FA enabled. An attacker who already knows valid credentials for a 2FA-enabled account can bypass 2FA in a single request.</p> <p>The parallel login endpoint (`POST /api/auth/login`) correctly enforces 2FA by calling `setCookies(user, res, true)`, which gates on `user.twoFaEnabled` when server-side TOTP is enabled.</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>The token endpoint at `auth.controller.ts:50-55` uses `AuthLocalGuard` (password-only) and calls `getTokens()` directly: ```typescript // auth.controller.ts:50-55 @Post(AUTH_ROUTE.TOKEN) @AuthTokenSkip() @UseGuards(AuthLocalGuard) token(@GetUser() user: UserModel): Promise&lt;TokenResponseDto&gt; { return this.authManager.getTokens(user) } ``` `getTokens()` at `auth.service.ts:25-39` signs and returns access and refresh JWTs. It never reads `user.twoFaEnabled`: ```typescript // auth.service.ts:25-39 async getTokens(user: UserModel, refresh = false): Promise&lt;TokenResponseDto&gt; { const currentTime = currentTimeStamp() // ...expiration logic... return { [TOKEN_TYPE.ACCESS]: await this.jwtSign(user, TOKEN_TYPE.ACCESS, accessExpiration), [TOKEN_TYPE.REFRESH]…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-92cr-jxw4-5wjg