fkie_cve-2026-50125

MKP is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes. Prior to 0.4.1, cmd/server/main.go exposes the default HTTP endpoint and pkg/mcp/server.go registers the unauthenticated get_resource tool, which accepts attacker-controlled limitBytes and tailLines values for the pods logs subresource. buildPodLogOpts() in pkg/k8s/subresource.go parses those values as unbounded int64 parameters, and defaultGetPodLogs() copies the returned Kubernetes log stream through io.Copy into an in-memory bytes.Buffer without an application-side cap. A remote attacker who can reach the default port 8080 MCP endpoint and select a pod with sufficiently large accumulated logs can send one tools/call request that causes large allocations and additional response copies, while the request-frequency limiter does not constrain per-request volume. This can exhaust process memory, terminate the MKP server, and deny the MCP service; observed testing showed more than one GiB of RSS growth while handling a 128 MiB requested stream. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.1.

GHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj — MKP: Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled `limitBytes`/`tailLines` Causes Memory Exhaustion

Affected: Go: github.com/StacklokLabs/mkp

## Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled `limitBytes`/`tailLines` Causes Memory Exhaustion

### Summary

The MKP (Model Context Protocol for Kubernetes) server exposes a `get_resource` MCP tool that proxies Kubernetes pod log requests. User-supplied `limitBytes` and `tailLines` parameters are parsed as unbounded `int64` values and forwarded directly to the Kubernetes API. The server then reads the entire returned log stream into an in-memory `bytes.Buffer` using `io.Copy` without any application-side size cap. A remote unauthenticated attacker can exploit this to exhaust the MKP server's memory by sending a single crafted `tools/call` request, leading to process termination (OOM kill) and denial of service. Dynamic reproduction confirmed the MKP process RSS grew from 25.8 MB to 1,179.3 MB (+1,153.4 MB) while handling one request with `limitBytes=134217728`.

### Details

The vulnerability exists in `pkg/k8s/subresource.go` in the `buildPodLogOpts()` and `defaultGetPodLogs()` functions.

**Source — unbounded parameter parsing (`pkg/k8s/subresource.go:171–181`):**

```go // pkg/k8s/subresource.go defaultLimitBytes := int64(32 * 1024) // 32 KB — only used when parameters map is nil ... if limitBytes, ok := parameters["limitBytes"]; ok { if b, err := strconv.ParseInt(limitBytes, 10, 64); err == nil { podLogOpts.LimitBytes = &b // no upper-bound check } } if tailLines, ok := parameters["tailLines"]; ok { if lines, err := strconv.ParseInt(tailLines, 1…

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fkie_cve-2026-50125

GHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj — MKP: Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled `limitBytes`/`tailLines` Causes Memory Exhaustion