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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 22:49:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-132644</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-132644</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;MISP contains an authorization flaw in the GalaxyCluster model&amp;#39;s captureCluster() function, which handles the import and synchronization of Galaxy Clusters. Prior to the fix, any authenticated user holding the galaxy editor role could replace an existing locked Galaxy Cluster by supplying its UUID in an import request, regardless of which organization owned the cluster. The function unconditionally called captureOrganisationAndSG() before the save operation, overwriting the cluster&amp;#39;s org_id and orgc_id fields with the importing user&amp;#39;s organization, effectively transferring ownership of the cluster to the attacker&amp;#39;s organization. Additionally, the save operation was not restricted to a specific set of fields, allowing arbitrary field modification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable behavior required the attacker to possess a valid MISP account with the perm_galaxy_editor role and to know or discover the UUID of a target cluster belonging to another organization. No site-admin or owner-organization privilege was enforced for the update path. The result was that a low-privilege galaxy editor in one organization could modify the content (value, description, distribution, etc.) of clusters owned by other organizations and seize ownership, corrupting the integrity of shared threat-intelligence data across the MISP instance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability was reported by ENISA and CERT.pl. The fix introduces an explicit authorization gate that restricts cluster updates to the owner organization, a sync user who…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;MISP contains an authorization flaw in the GalaxyCluster model&amp;#39;s captureCluster() function, which handles the import and synchronization of Galaxy Clusters. Prior to the fix, any authenticated user holding the galaxy editor role could replace an existing locked Galaxy Cluster by supplying its UUID in an import request, regardless of which organization owned the cluster. The function unconditionally called captureOrganisationAndSG() before the save operation, overwriting the cluster&amp;#39;s org_id and orgc_id fields with the importing user&amp;#39;s organization, effectively transferring ownership of the cluster to the attacker&amp;#39;s organization. Additionally, the save operation was not restricted to a specific set of fields, allowing arbitrary field modification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable behavior required the attacker to possess a valid MISP account with the perm_galaxy_editor role and to know or discover the UUID of a target cluster belonging to another organization. No site-admin or owner-organization privilege was enforced for the update path. The result was that a low-privilege galaxy editor in one organization could modify the content (value, description, distribution, etc.) of clusters owned by other organizations and seize ownership, corrupting the integrity of shared threat-intelligence data across the MISP instance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability was reported by ENISA and CERT.pl. The fix introduces an explicit authorization gate that restricts cluster updates to the owner organization, a sync user who…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-132644</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>gcve-1-2026-20201 — MISP Galaxy Cluster Import Authorization Bypass Allows Cross-Organization Cluster Takeover</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20201</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; misp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MISP contains an authorization flaw in the GalaxyCluster model&amp;#39;s captureCluster() function, which handles the import and synchronization of Galaxy Clusters. Prior to the fix, any authenticated user holding the galaxy editor role could replace an existing locked Galaxy Cluster by supplying its UUID in an import request, regardless of which organization owned the cluster. The function unconditionally called captureOrganisationAndSG() before the save operation, overwriting the cluster&amp;#39;s org_id and orgc_id fields with the importing user&amp;#39;s organization, effectively transferring ownership of the cluster to the attacker&amp;#39;s organization. Additionally, the save operation was not restricted to a specific set of fields, allowing arbitrary field modification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable behavior required the attacker to possess a valid MISP account with the perm_galaxy_editor role and to know or discover the UUID of a target cluster belonging to another organization. No site-admin or owner-organization privilege was enforced for the update path. The result was that a low-privilege galaxy editor in one organization could modify the content (value, description, distribution, etc.) of clusters owned by other organizations and seize ownership, corrupting the integrity of shared threat-intelligence data across the MISP instance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability was reported by ENISA and CERT.pl. The fix introduces an explicit authorization gate that restricts cluster updates to the owner organization, a sync user who…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; misp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MISP contains an authorization flaw in the GalaxyCluster model&amp;#39;s captureCluster() function, which handles the import and synchronization of Galaxy Clusters. Prior to the fix, any authenticated user holding the galaxy editor role could replace an existing locked Galaxy Cluster by supplying its UUID in an import request, regardless of which organization owned the cluster. The function unconditionally called captureOrganisationAndSG() before the save operation, overwriting the cluster&amp;#39;s org_id and orgc_id fields with the importing user&amp;#39;s organization, effectively transferring ownership of the cluster to the attacker&amp;#39;s organization. Additionally, the save operation was not restricted to a specific set of fields, allowing arbitrary field modification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable behavior required the attacker to possess a valid MISP account with the perm_galaxy_editor role and to know or discover the UUID of a target cluster belonging to another organization. No site-admin or owner-organization privilege was enforced for the update path. The result was that a low-privilege galaxy editor in one organization could modify the content (value, description, distribution, etc.) of clusters owned by other organizations and seize ownership, corrupting the integrity of shared threat-intelligence data across the MISP instance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability was reported by ENISA and CERT.pl. The fix introduces an explicit authorization gate that restricts cluster updates to the owner organization, a sync user who…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20201</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8g4h-8grg-2529</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8g4h-8grg-2529</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;MISP contains an authorization flaw in the GalaxyCluster model&amp;#39;s captureCluster() function, which handles the import and synchronization of Galaxy Clusters. Prior to the fix, any authenticated user holding the galaxy editor role could replace an existing locked Galaxy Cluster by supplying its UUID in an import request, regardless of which organization owned the cluster. The function unconditionally called captureOrganisationAndSG() before the save operation, overwriting the cluster&amp;#39;s org_id and orgc_id fields with the importing user&amp;#39;s organization, effectively transferring ownership of the cluster to the attacker&amp;#39;s organization. Additionally, the save operation was not restricted to a specific set of fields, allowing arbitrary field modification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable behavior required the attacker to possess a valid MISP account with the perm_galaxy_editor role and to know or discover the UUID of a target cluster belonging to another organization. No site-admin or owner-organization privilege was enforced for the update path. The result was that a low-privilege galaxy editor in one organization could modify the content (value, description, distribution, etc.) of clusters owned by other organizations and seize ownership, corrupting the integrity of shared threat-intelligence data across the MISP instance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability was reported by ENISA and CERT.pl. The fix introduces an explicit authorization gate that restricts cluster updates to the owner organization, a sync user who…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;MISP contains an authorization flaw in the GalaxyCluster model&amp;#39;s captureCluster() function, which handles the import and synchronization of Galaxy Clusters. Prior to the fix, any authenticated user holding the galaxy editor role could replace an existing locked Galaxy Cluster by supplying its UUID in an import request, regardless of which organization owned the cluster. The function unconditionally called captureOrganisationAndSG() before the save operation, overwriting the cluster&amp;#39;s org_id and orgc_id fields with the importing user&amp;#39;s organization, effectively transferring ownership of the cluster to the attacker&amp;#39;s organization. Additionally, the save operation was not restricted to a specific set of fields, allowing arbitrary field modification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable behavior required the attacker to possess a valid MISP account with the perm_galaxy_editor role and to know or discover the UUID of a target cluster belonging to another organization. No site-admin or owner-organization privilege was enforced for the update path. The result was that a low-privilege galaxy editor in one organization could modify the content (value, description, distribution, etc.) of clusters owned by other organizations and seize ownership, corrupting the integrity of shared threat-intelligence data across the MISP instance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability was reported by ENISA and CERT.pl. The fix introduces an explicit authorization gate that restricts cluster updates to the owner organization, a sync user who…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8g4h-8grg-2529</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4669 — MISP: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4669</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in MISP ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in MISP ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4669</guid>
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