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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-130176</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-130176</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;aMQTT is an open source MQTT broker and client. From 0.11.0 until 0.12.1, the QoS 2 transaction handler in amqtt/mqtt/protocol/handler.py, _handle_qos2_message_flow(), can retain transaction state and packet identifiers when a client disconnects before the handshake completes, unlike QoS 1 flows that expire after the default five-second timeout. A remote client can repeatedly begin QoS 2 flows and disconnect without maintaining long-lived connections; anonymous clients can do this with the default configuration, while authenticated deployments remain affected when a client may initiate QoS 2 flows. The retained state grows broker memory until resource exhaustion can terminate the process; no confidentiality or integrity impact is identified. This issue is fixed in version 0.12.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;aMQTT is an open source MQTT broker and client. From 0.11.0 until 0.12.1, the QoS 2 transaction handler in amqtt/mqtt/protocol/handler.py, _handle_qos2_message_flow(), can retain transaction state and packet identifiers when a client disconnects before the handshake completes, unlike QoS 1 flows that expire after the default five-second timeout. A remote client can repeatedly begin QoS 2 flows and disconnect without maintaining long-lived connections; anonymous clients can do this with the default configuration, while authenticated deployments remain affected when a client may initiate QoS 2 flows. The retained state grows broker memory until resource exhaustion can terminate the process; no confidentiality or integrity impact is identified. This issue is fixed in version 0.12.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-130176</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-wcqj-wx85-c75p — aMQTT: Denial of Service (DoS) via Memory Leak in Unmanaged QoS 2 Session Handshakes</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-wcqj-wx85-c75p</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: amqtt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`amqtt` is vulnerable to a remote denial of service caused by incomplete MQTT QoS 2 transactions remaining allocated after the associated client disconnects.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MQTT QoS 2 uses a four-step handshake to provide exactly-once delivery. If a client begins a QoS 2 transaction but disconnects before the handshake completes, `amqtt` retains the associated transaction state and packet identifier without an expiration mechanism to remove it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;QoS 1 transactions are protected by a timeout mechanism, which defaults to 5 seconds, allowing abandoned state to be released. Equivalent timeout handling was not applied to incomplete QoS 2 transactions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can repeatedly connect to the broker, initiate QoS 2 transactions, and disconnect before completing the handshake. Each incomplete transaction leaves state allocated in memory. Repeating this process causes broker memory consumption to grow continuously.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Successful exploitation can cause:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* Unbounded growth in broker memory usage
* Accumulation of incomplete QoS 2 transaction state
* Increasing memory pressure on the host system
* Termination of the broker process when available memory is exhausted
* Operating-system Out-Of-Memory (OOM) intervention
* Complete loss of availability for the affected broker process&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation does not require maintaining long-lived connections. An attacker can create incomplete QoS 2 transactions and disconnect, leaving the broker to retain the associated state after the network connect…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: amqtt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`amqtt` is vulnerable to a remote denial of service caused by incomplete MQTT QoS 2 transactions remaining allocated after the associated client disconnects.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MQTT QoS 2 uses a four-step handshake to provide exactly-once delivery. If a client begins a QoS 2 transaction but disconnects before the handshake completes, `amqtt` retains the associated transaction state and packet identifier without an expiration mechanism to remove it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;QoS 1 transactions are protected by a timeout mechanism, which defaults to 5 seconds, allowing abandoned state to be released. Equivalent timeout handling was not applied to incomplete QoS 2 transactions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can repeatedly connect to the broker, initiate QoS 2 transactions, and disconnect before completing the handshake. Each incomplete transaction leaves state allocated in memory. Repeating this process causes broker memory consumption to grow continuously.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Successful exploitation can cause:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* Unbounded growth in broker memory usage
* Accumulation of incomplete QoS 2 transaction state
* Increasing memory pressure on the host system
* Termination of the broker process when available memory is exhausted
* Operating-system Out-Of-Memory (OOM) intervention
* Complete loss of availability for the affected broker process&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation does not require maintaining long-lived connections. An attacker can create incomplete QoS 2 transactions and disconnect, leaving the broker to retain the associated state after the network connect…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-wcqj-wx85-c75p</guid>
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