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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 06:58:58 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>gcve-1-2026-20340 — vulnerability-lookup: Session Persists After Password Change (CWE-613)</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20340</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; vulnerability-lookup&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the vulnerability-lookup web application, the Flask-Login session identifier was set to the bare numeric user ID (User.get_id() returned self.id). Because the session ID contained no component derived from the user&amp;#39;s credential, it remained valid indefinitely regardless of any subsequent password change, account recovery, or administrator-initiated password reset. An attacker who had obtained a valid session for a user account (for example through cross-site scripting, session hijacking, or a previously exposed feed or API key) could continue to access that user&amp;#39;s account after the user changed their password, because the session cookie still carried the same static user ID and the user_loader accepted it without any credential-bound validation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The affected component is the session management layer of the vulnerability-lookup Flask application, specifically the User.get_id() method in website/models/user.py and the load_user callback in website/web/views/session_mgmt.py. The vulnerability required that an attacker already possessed a valid session for the target user; no additional authentication or special deployment configuration was needed beyond a standard deployment of the application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security impact is that a user cannot effectively revoke an attacker&amp;#39;s access by changing their password, performing an account recovery, or having an administrator reset the credential. The attacker retains full authenticated access to the user&amp;#39;s profile, subscriptions, and any…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; vulnerability-lookup&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the vulnerability-lookup web application, the Flask-Login session identifier was set to the bare numeric user ID (User.get_id() returned self.id). Because the session ID contained no component derived from the user&amp;#39;s credential, it remained valid indefinitely regardless of any subsequent password change, account recovery, or administrator-initiated password reset. An attacker who had obtained a valid session for a user account (for example through cross-site scripting, session hijacking, or a previously exposed feed or API key) could continue to access that user&amp;#39;s account after the user changed their password, because the session cookie still carried the same static user ID and the user_loader accepted it without any credential-bound validation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The affected component is the session management layer of the vulnerability-lookup Flask application, specifically the User.get_id() method in website/models/user.py and the load_user callback in website/web/views/session_mgmt.py. The vulnerability required that an attacker already possessed a valid session for the target user; no additional authentication or special deployment configuration was needed beyond a standard deployment of the application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security impact is that a user cannot effectively revoke an attacker&amp;#39;s access by changing their password, performing an account recovery, or having an administrator reset the credential. The attacker retains full authenticated access to the user&amp;#39;s profile, subscriptions, and any…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20340</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rj73-gwhj-q23q</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-rj73-gwhj-q23q</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the vulnerability-lookup web application, the Flask-Login session identifier was set to the bare numeric user ID (User.get_id() returned self.id). Because the session ID contained no component derived from the user&amp;#39;s credential, it remained valid indefinitely regardless of any subsequent password change, account recovery, or administrator-initiated password reset. An attacker who had obtained a valid session for a user account (for example through cross-site scripting, session hijacking, or a previously exposed feed or API key) could continue to access that user&amp;#39;s account after the user changed their password, because the session cookie still carried the same static user ID and the user_loader accepted it without any credential-bound validation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The affected component is the session management layer of the vulnerability-lookup Flask application, specifically the User.get_id() method in website/models/user.py and the load_user callback in website/web/views/session_mgmt.py. The vulnerability required that an attacker already possessed a valid session for the target user; no additional authentication or special deployment configuration was needed beyond a standard deployment of the application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security impact is that a user cannot effectively revoke an attacker&amp;#39;s access by changing their password, performing an account recovery, or having an administrator reset the credential. The attacker retains full authenticated access to the user&amp;#39;s profile, subscriptions, and any…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the vulnerability-lookup web application, the Flask-Login session identifier was set to the bare numeric user ID (User.get_id() returned self.id). Because the session ID contained no component derived from the user&amp;#39;s credential, it remained valid indefinitely regardless of any subsequent password change, account recovery, or administrator-initiated password reset. An attacker who had obtained a valid session for a user account (for example through cross-site scripting, session hijacking, or a previously exposed feed or API key) could continue to access that user&amp;#39;s account after the user changed their password, because the session cookie still carried the same static user ID and the user_loader accepted it without any credential-bound validation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The affected component is the session management layer of the vulnerability-lookup Flask application, specifically the User.get_id() method in website/models/user.py and the load_user callback in website/web/views/session_mgmt.py. The vulnerability required that an attacker already possessed a valid session for the target user; no additional authentication or special deployment configuration was needed beyond a standard deployment of the application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security impact is that a user cannot effectively revoke an attacker&amp;#39;s access by changing their password, performing an account recovery, or having an administrator reset the credential. The attacker retains full authenticated access to the user&amp;#39;s profile, subscriptions, and any…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-rj73-gwhj-q23q</guid>
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