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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-129303</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-129303</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Guard Core is an API security core engine for the FastAPI-Guard, FlaskAPI Guard, and DjAPI Guard adapters. From 1.0.0 until 3.13.0, ContentPreprocessor.preprocess() in guard_core/detection_engine/preprocessor.py collapses all whitespace before built-in pattern matching in the default enhanced mode. This removes carriage returns and newlines required by the http_split and newline-anchored cmd_injection detectors in guard_core/handlers/suspatterns_handler.py, making those detectors unable to match. Framework-decoded CRLF can therefore pass through Guard Core unflagged while the downstream application still receives the raw newline-bearing value. Direct security impact requires a downstream stack or application that persists or re-emits the value into a CRLF-tolerant response or command context. This issue is fixed in version 3.13.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Guard Core is an API security core engine for the FastAPI-Guard, FlaskAPI Guard, and DjAPI Guard adapters. From 1.0.0 until 3.13.0, ContentPreprocessor.preprocess() in guard_core/detection_engine/preprocessor.py collapses all whitespace before built-in pattern matching in the default enhanced mode. This removes carriage returns and newlines required by the http_split and newline-anchored cmd_injection detectors in guard_core/handlers/suspatterns_handler.py, making those detectors unable to match. Framework-decoded CRLF can therefore pass through Guard Core unflagged while the downstream application still receives the raw newline-bearing value. Direct security impact requires a downstream stack or application that persists or re-emits the value into a CRLF-tolerant response or command context. This issue is fixed in version 3.13.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-129303</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-w7wg-6q7v-44f2 — Guard Core: Whitespace-collapse preprocessing permanently disables the CRLF-anchored http-splitting and command-injecti…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-w7wg-6q7v-44f2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: guard-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the default &amp;#34;enhanced&amp;#34; detection mode, `ContentPreprocessor.preprocess()` collapses all whitespace (`re.sub(r&amp;#34;\s+&amp;#34;, &amp;#34; &amp;#34;, content)`, `guard_core/detection_engine/preprocessor.py:137` on master `08780f1`; `:384` in the 3.12.0 sdist) **before** pattern matching. This erases every `\r` and `\n` from the scanned value, rendering two built-in detectors structurally unmatchable regardless of input:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- http_split — `guard_core/handlers/suspatterns_handler.py:540`: `r&amp;#34;[\r\n]\s*(?:HTTP\/[0-9.]+|Location:|Set-Cookie:)&amp;#34;` requires a literal `\r` or `\n`, which no longer exists after preprocessing;
- cmd_injection — `r&amp;#34;\n\s*(?:bash|sh|...)\s+-c\b&amp;#34;` — same structural death.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The downstream application receives the **raw** value with CRLF intact (Starlette percent-decodes `%0d%0a` in query parameters before the adapter passes `request.query_params.items()` to `guard_core/utils.py:843-865`), so a response-splitting-shaped payload passes detection unflagged.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Verified end-to-end against a real uvicorn server running the fastapi-guard adapter over guard-core 3.12.0, default config:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| request (`?q=`) | status |
|---|---|
| `value%0d%0aHTTP%2F1.1+200+OK%0d%0aSet-Cookie%3A+pwned%3D1` (decoded to literal CRLF by the framework) | **200 — missed** |
| `&amp;#39; OR 1=1--` | 400 — blocked (detection otherwise working) |
| `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users--` | 400 — blocked |
| `; cat /etc/passwd` | 400 — blocked |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The legacy mode (no `SecurityConfig` detection attributes) sk…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: guard-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the default &amp;#34;enhanced&amp;#34; detection mode, `ContentPreprocessor.preprocess()` collapses all whitespace (`re.sub(r&amp;#34;\s+&amp;#34;, &amp;#34; &amp;#34;, content)`, `guard_core/detection_engine/preprocessor.py:137` on master `08780f1`; `:384` in the 3.12.0 sdist) **before** pattern matching. This erases every `\r` and `\n` from the scanned value, rendering two built-in detectors structurally unmatchable regardless of input:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- http_split — `guard_core/handlers/suspatterns_handler.py:540`: `r&amp;#34;[\r\n]\s*(?:HTTP\/[0-9.]+|Location:|Set-Cookie:)&amp;#34;` requires a literal `\r` or `\n`, which no longer exists after preprocessing;
- cmd_injection — `r&amp;#34;\n\s*(?:bash|sh|...)\s+-c\b&amp;#34;` — same structural death.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The downstream application receives the **raw** value with CRLF intact (Starlette percent-decodes `%0d%0a` in query parameters before the adapter passes `request.query_params.items()` to `guard_core/utils.py:843-865`), so a response-splitting-shaped payload passes detection unflagged.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Verified end-to-end against a real uvicorn server running the fastapi-guard adapter over guard-core 3.12.0, default config:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| request (`?q=`) | status |
|---|---|
| `value%0d%0aHTTP%2F1.1+200+OK%0d%0aSet-Cookie%3A+pwned%3D1` (decoded to literal CRLF by the framework) | **200 — missed** |
| `&amp;#39; OR 1=1--` | 400 — blocked (detection otherwise working) |
| `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users--` | 400 — blocked |
| `; cat /etc/passwd` | 400 — blocked |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The legacy mode (no `SecurityConfig` detection attributes) sk…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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