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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-129302</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-129302</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Guard Core is an API security core engine for the FastAPI-Guard, FlaskAPI Guard, and DjAPI Guard adapters. From 3.5.0 until 3.13.0, built-in penetration-detection patterns in guard_core/handlers/suspatterns_handler.py execute through a direct pattern.search(content) call instead of the timeout-protected create_safe_matcher() path used for custom patterns. The built-in template-injection detector contains an unbounded expression with quadratic behavior when scanning repeated opening braces. Because penetration detection and enhanced mode are enabled by a stock SecurityConfig, an unauthenticated request can block the shared asyncio event loop, affecting all application endpoints. The triggering input does not produce a detection match, so the request can complete without incrementing ban counters or being recorded as suspicious. This issue is fixed in version 3.13.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Guard Core is an API security core engine for the FastAPI-Guard, FlaskAPI Guard, and DjAPI Guard adapters. From 3.5.0 until 3.13.0, built-in penetration-detection patterns in guard_core/handlers/suspatterns_handler.py execute through a direct pattern.search(content) call instead of the timeout-protected create_safe_matcher() path used for custom patterns. The built-in template-injection detector contains an unbounded expression with quadratic behavior when scanning repeated opening braces. Because penetration detection and enhanced mode are enabled by a stock SecurityConfig, an unauthenticated request can block the shared asyncio event loop, affecting all application endpoints. The triggering input does not produce a detection match, so the request can complete without incrementing ban counters or being recorded as suspicious. This issue is fixed in version 3.13.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-129302</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r7hm-rjvg-xx7j — Guard Core: Quadratic ReDoS in built-in detection pattern freezes the event loop with a single request</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-r7hm-rjvg-xx7j</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: guard-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A polynomial (quadratic) regular-expression denial of service in guard-core&amp;#39;s built-in penetration-detection patterns allows any unauthenticated remote client to freeze **every** endpoint of an application for seconds per request, using only the default configuration. The triggering request completes without any detection match — no ban counter increments, no rate-limit violation is recorded — so it can be repeated indefinitely. Since guard-core 3.5.0, only *custom* patterns are executed through the compiler&amp;#39;s timeout-protected `create_safe_matcher()`; all built-in patterns run as a bare, inline `pattern.search(content)` directly on the asyncio event loop. guard-core ≤ 3.4.0 ran built-ins through the safe matcher (verified in the 3.4.0 wheel, `_check_regex_pattern`), so this is a **regression introduced in 3.5.0** — and it silently undoes the protection credited to GHSA-rrf6-pxg8-684g (CVE-2025-54365) and the unbounded-quantifier remediation of GHSA-j47q-rc62-w448 (CVE-2025-53539) for every stock pattern, despite the changelog advertising &amp;#34;Safe regex execution with configurable timeouts to prevent ReDoS attacks.&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. The pattern** — `guard_core/handlers/suspatterns_handler.py:519` (master `08780f1`), the built-in template-injection detector:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
r&amp;#34;\{\{\s*[^\}]+(?:system|exec|popen|eval|require|include)\s*\}\}&amp;#34;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On an input of `{` repeated N times, every one of the N−1 positions starts a `\{\{` match attempt and `[^\}]+` scans to end-of-…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: guard-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A polynomial (quadratic) regular-expression denial of service in guard-core&amp;#39;s built-in penetration-detection patterns allows any unauthenticated remote client to freeze **every** endpoint of an application for seconds per request, using only the default configuration. The triggering request completes without any detection match — no ban counter increments, no rate-limit violation is recorded — so it can be repeated indefinitely. Since guard-core 3.5.0, only *custom* patterns are executed through the compiler&amp;#39;s timeout-protected `create_safe_matcher()`; all built-in patterns run as a bare, inline `pattern.search(content)` directly on the asyncio event loop. guard-core ≤ 3.4.0 ran built-ins through the safe matcher (verified in the 3.4.0 wheel, `_check_regex_pattern`), so this is a **regression introduced in 3.5.0** — and it silently undoes the protection credited to GHSA-rrf6-pxg8-684g (CVE-2025-54365) and the unbounded-quantifier remediation of GHSA-j47q-rc62-w448 (CVE-2025-53539) for every stock pattern, despite the changelog advertising &amp;#34;Safe regex execution with configurable timeouts to prevent ReDoS attacks.&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. The pattern** — `guard_core/handlers/suspatterns_handler.py:519` (master `08780f1`), the built-in template-injection detector:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
r&amp;#34;\{\{\s*[^\}]+(?:system|exec|popen|eval|require|include)\s*\}\}&amp;#34;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On an input of `{` repeated N times, every one of the N−1 positions starts a `\{\{` match attempt and `[^\}]+` scans to end-of-…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-r7hm-rjvg-xx7j</guid>
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