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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 05:05:23 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-736f-c93q-9fwx — russh try_sign: asynchronous confirmation can sign after agent lock</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-736f-c93q-9fwx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In russh `0.65.0`, a sign request for a confirmation-constrained key can retain
and use the private key after another connection locks the agent. `try_sign()`
snapshots an `Arc&amp;lt;PrivateKey&amp;gt;` before awaiting `Agent::confirm()` and does not
revalidate the shared lock state after the await. An agent-forwarding peer can
therefore obtain a signature while the agent is locked and every new request is
being rejected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The agent&amp;#39;s lock and key stores are shared by all connections. `respond()` reads
the lock state once, then dispatches a sign request:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
let is_locked = {
    // ... read the shared lock ...
};&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// ...
Some((&amp;amp;13, mut r))
    if !is_locked &amp;amp;&amp;amp; agentref.confirm_request(MessageType::Sign).await =&amp;gt;
{
    let agent = self.agent.take().ok_or(Error::AgentFailure)?;
    let (agent, signed) = self.try_sign(agent, &amp;amp;mut r, writebuf).await?;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `try_sign()`, russh clones the private key from the shared store and drops the
store lock before awaiting the asynchronous confirmation callback:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
let key = {
    let blob = Bytes::decode(r)?;
    let k = self.keys.0.read().or(Err(Error::AgentFailure))?;
    if let Some((key, _, constraints)) = k.get(&amp;amp;blob.to_vec()) {
        if constraints.contains(&amp;amp;Constraint::Confirm) {
            needs_confirm = true;
        }
        key.clone()
    } else {
        return Ok((agent, false));
    }
};&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;let agent = if needs_confirm {
    let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;
    if !ok {…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In russh `0.65.0`, a sign request for a confirmation-constrained key can retain
and use the private key after another connection locks the agent. `try_sign()`
snapshots an `Arc&amp;lt;PrivateKey&amp;gt;` before awaiting `Agent::confirm()` and does not
revalidate the shared lock state after the await. An agent-forwarding peer can
therefore obtain a signature while the agent is locked and every new request is
being rejected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The agent&amp;#39;s lock and key stores are shared by all connections. `respond()` reads
the lock state once, then dispatches a sign request:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
let is_locked = {
    // ... read the shared lock ...
};&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// ...
Some((&amp;amp;13, mut r))
    if !is_locked &amp;amp;&amp;amp; agentref.confirm_request(MessageType::Sign).await =&amp;gt;
{
    let agent = self.agent.take().ok_or(Error::AgentFailure)?;
    let (agent, signed) = self.try_sign(agent, &amp;amp;mut r, writebuf).await?;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `try_sign()`, russh clones the private key from the shared store and drops the
store lock before awaiting the asynchronous confirmation callback:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
let key = {
    let blob = Bytes::decode(r)?;
    let k = self.keys.0.read().or(Err(Error::AgentFailure))?;
    if let Some((key, _, constraints)) = k.get(&amp;amp;blob.to_vec()) {
        if constraints.contains(&amp;amp;Constraint::Confirm) {
            needs_confirm = true;
        }
        key.clone()
    } else {
        return Ok((agent, false));
    }
};&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;let agent = if needs_confirm {
    let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;
    if !ok {…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-736f-c93q-9fwx</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-128088</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-128088</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.10: rust-russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. Prior to version 0.65.1, try_sign() captures an Arc&amp;lt;PrivateKey&amp;gt; before awaiting Agent::confirm() and does not revalidate the shared lock state or key presence after the await. This is a distinct residual defect in the remediation for CVE-2026-116794. A peer, including a remote SSH server using agent forwarding, can begin a confirmation-constrained signature request while the agent is unlocked and receive the signature after another connection locks the agent if the stale confirmation returns true. New post-lock requests are rejected and private key material is not disclosed, but the pending operation bypasses the current lock state. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.10: rust-russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. Prior to version 0.65.1, try_sign() captures an Arc&amp;lt;PrivateKey&amp;gt; before awaiting Agent::confirm() and does not revalidate the shared lock state or key presence after the await. This is a distinct residual defect in the remediation for CVE-2026-116794. A peer, including a remote SSH server using agent forwarding, can begin a confirmation-constrained signature request while the agent is unlocked and receive the signature after another connection locks the agent if the stale confirmation returns true. New post-lock requests are rejected and private key material is not disclosed, but the pending operation bypasses the current lock state. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-128088</guid>
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