<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 23:37:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-126537</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-126537</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Ninja Forms - File Uploads add-on for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion (and arbitrary file read via S3/Dropbox/Google Drive exfiltration) in versions up to, and including, 3.3.36. The flaw spans NF_FU_Fields_Upload::process() in includes/fields/upload.php — which returns early (leaving the client-supplied files[] intact) whenever a public submission carries a nonempty extra.saveProgress — and NF_FU_External_Abstracts_Service::process_upload() in includes/external/abstracts/service.php, whose authoritative-path reload only fires when the client sends upload_id. By omitting upload_id, an attacker&amp;#39;s data[file_path] survives into the Background Upload queue and is used by both upload_file_to_s3() (as SourceFile) and the maybe_delete_server_file() unlink() call in includes/external/abstracts/backgroundupload.php, with no canonicalization or upload-directory containment check (the plugin&amp;#39;s own is_path_within_upload_dir() helper is only applied on admin paths). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the affected site&amp;#39;s server which may make remote code execution possible — specifically, deleting wp-config.php forces WordPress into its setup screen, enabling full site takeover.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Ninja Forms - File Uploads add-on for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion (and arbitrary file read via S3/Dropbox/Google Drive exfiltration) in versions up to, and including, 3.3.36. The flaw spans NF_FU_Fields_Upload::process() in includes/fields/upload.php — which returns early (leaving the client-supplied files[] intact) whenever a public submission carries a nonempty extra.saveProgress — and NF_FU_External_Abstracts_Service::process_upload() in includes/external/abstracts/service.php, whose authoritative-path reload only fires when the client sends upload_id. By omitting upload_id, an attacker&amp;#39;s data[file_path] survives into the Background Upload queue and is used by both upload_file_to_s3() (as SourceFile) and the maybe_delete_server_file() unlink() call in includes/external/abstracts/backgroundupload.php, with no canonicalization or upload-directory containment check (the plugin&amp;#39;s own is_path_within_upload_dir() helper is only applied on admin paths). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the affected site&amp;#39;s server which may make remote code execution possible — specifically, deleting wp-config.php forces WordPress into its setup screen, enabling full site takeover.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-126537</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rfc5-f6j6-9jgj</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-rfc5-f6j6-9jgj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Ninja Forms - File Uploads add-on for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion (and arbitrary file read via S3/Dropbox/Google Drive exfiltration) in versions up to, and including, 3.3.36. The flaw spans NF_FU_Fields_Upload::process() in includes/fields/upload.php — which returns early (leaving the client-supplied files[] intact) whenever a public submission carries a nonempty extra.saveProgress — and NF_FU_External_Abstracts_Service::process_upload() in includes/external/abstracts/service.php, whose authoritative-path reload only fires when the client sends upload_id. By omitting upload_id, an attacker&amp;#39;s data[file_path] survives into the Background Upload queue and is used by both upload_file_to_s3() (as SourceFile) and the maybe_delete_server_file() unlink() call in includes/external/abstracts/backgroundupload.php, with no canonicalization or upload-directory containment check (the plugin&amp;#39;s own is_path_within_upload_dir() helper is only applied on admin paths). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the affected site&amp;#39;s server which may make remote code execution possible — specifically, deleting wp-config.php forces WordPress into its setup screen, enabling full site takeover.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Ninja Forms - File Uploads add-on for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion (and arbitrary file read via S3/Dropbox/Google Drive exfiltration) in versions up to, and including, 3.3.36. The flaw spans NF_FU_Fields_Upload::process() in includes/fields/upload.php — which returns early (leaving the client-supplied files[] intact) whenever a public submission carries a nonempty extra.saveProgress — and NF_FU_External_Abstracts_Service::process_upload() in includes/external/abstracts/service.php, whose authoritative-path reload only fires when the client sends upload_id. By omitting upload_id, an attacker&amp;#39;s data[file_path] survives into the Background Upload queue and is used by both upload_file_to_s3() (as SourceFile) and the maybe_delete_server_file() unlink() call in includes/external/abstracts/backgroundupload.php, with no canonicalization or upload-directory containment check (the plugin&amp;#39;s own is_path_within_upload_dir() helper is only applied on admin paths). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the affected site&amp;#39;s server which may make remote code execution possible — specifically, deleting wp-config.php forces WordPress into its setup screen, enabling full site takeover.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-rfc5-f6j6-9jgj</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
