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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 12:46:35 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-krane-CVE-2026-126080 — Active Support: Possible DoS vulnerability in Active Support safe_constantize</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-krane-cve-2026-126080</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: krane&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
When constant lookup raises `LoadError`, `ActiveSupport::Inflector#safe_constantize` (and `String#safe_constantize`) builds a regular expression from the requested constant name without escaping it, so a caller that passes untrusted input lets the attacker choose the source of a pattern that the application compiles. Crafted patterns can trigger defects in Ruby&amp;#39;s regular expression compiler, possibly leading to a crash of the server process, and repeated requests could keep the application unavailable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Action Cable passes the `channel` value of each `subscribe` command to `safe_constantize` before any channel lookup, so in the default configuration an unauthenticated client of the Action Cable endpoint can reach this code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The check that decides whether `safe_constantize` returns `nil` or re-raises the `LoadError` now matches the first segment of the constant name against the error message as a literal string, and no longer compiles a regular expression. It returns the same result as before for constant names that contain no regular expression syntax.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected applications
An application is affected if it meets all of these requirements:
- Mounts Action Cable, which a new Rails application does by default at `/cable` (`config.action_cable.mount_path`), or otherwise passes untrusted input to `safe_constantize`.
- Accepts Action Cable connections from untrusted clients. `ApplicationCable::Connection#connect` authenticates nobody unless the applica…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: krane&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
When constant lookup raises `LoadError`, `ActiveSupport::Inflector#safe_constantize` (and `String#safe_constantize`) builds a regular expression from the requested constant name without escaping it, so a caller that passes untrusted input lets the attacker choose the source of a pattern that the application compiles. Crafted patterns can trigger defects in Ruby&amp;#39;s regular expression compiler, possibly leading to a crash of the server process, and repeated requests could keep the application unavailable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Action Cable passes the `channel` value of each `subscribe` command to `safe_constantize` before any channel lookup, so in the default configuration an unauthenticated client of the Action Cable endpoint can reach this code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The check that decides whether `safe_constantize` returns `nil` or re-raises the `LoadError` now matches the first segment of the constant name against the error message as a literal string, and no longer compiles a regular expression. It returns the same result as before for constant names that contain no regular expression syntax.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected applications
An application is affected if it meets all of these requirements:
- Mounts Action Cable, which a new Rails application does by default at `/cable` (`config.action_cable.mount_path`), or otherwise passes untrusted input to `safe_constantize`.
- Accepts Action Cable connections from untrusted clients. `ApplicationCable::Connection#connect` authenticates nobody unless the applica…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-krane-cve-2026-126080</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-126080</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-126080</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Active Support is a collection of utility classes and standard library extensions used by Rails and other Ruby projects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, when constant lookup raises LoadError, ActiveSupport::Inflector#safe_constantize (and String#safe_constantize) builds a regular expression from the requested constant name without escaping it, so a caller that passes untrusted input lets the attacker choose the source of a pattern that the application compiles. Crafted patterns can trigger defects in Ruby&amp;#39;s regular expression compiler, possibly leading to a crash of the server process, and repeated requests could keep the application unavailable. Action Cable passes the channel value of each subscribe command to safe_constantize before any channel lookup, so an unauthenticated client can reach this code when the application mounts Action Cable and accepts connections from untrusted clients without an added authentication check. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Active Support is a collection of utility classes and standard library extensions used by Rails and other Ruby projects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, when constant lookup raises LoadError, ActiveSupport::Inflector#safe_constantize (and String#safe_constantize) builds a regular expression from the requested constant name without escaping it, so a caller that passes untrusted input lets the attacker choose the source of a pattern that the application compiles. Crafted patterns can trigger defects in Ruby&amp;#39;s regular expression compiler, possibly leading to a crash of the server process, and repeated requests could keep the application unavailable. Action Cable passes the channel value of each subscribe command to safe_constantize before any channel lookup, so an unauthenticated client can reach this code when the application mounts Action Cable and accepts connections from untrusted clients without an added authentication check. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-126080</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8474-xrp6-wh69 — Active Support: Possible DoS vulnerability in Active Support safe_constantize</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8474-xrp6-wh69</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: activesupport&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
When constant lookup raises `LoadError`, `ActiveSupport::Inflector#safe_constantize` (and `String#safe_constantize`) builds a regular expression from the requested constant name without escaping it, so a caller that passes untrusted input lets the attacker choose the source of a pattern that the application compiles. Crafted patterns can trigger defects in Ruby&amp;#39;s regular expression compiler, possibly leading to a crash of the server process, and repeated requests could keep the application unavailable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Action Cable passes the `channel` value of each `subscribe` command to `safe_constantize` before any channel lookup, so in the default configuration an unauthenticated client of the Action Cable endpoint can reach this code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The check that decides whether `safe_constantize` returns `nil` or re-raises the `LoadError` now matches the first segment of the constant name against the error message as a literal string, and no longer compiles a regular expression. It returns the same result as before for constant names that contain no regular expression syntax.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected applications
An application is affected if it meets all of these requirements:
- Mounts Action Cable, which a new Rails application does by default at `/cable` (`config.action_cable.mount_path`), or otherwise passes untrusted input to `safe_constantize`.
- Accepts Action Cable connections from untrusted clients. `ApplicationCable::Connection#connect` authenticates nobody unless the applica…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: activesupport&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
When constant lookup raises `LoadError`, `ActiveSupport::Inflector#safe_constantize` (and `String#safe_constantize`) builds a regular expression from the requested constant name without escaping it, so a caller that passes untrusted input lets the attacker choose the source of a pattern that the application compiles. Crafted patterns can trigger defects in Ruby&amp;#39;s regular expression compiler, possibly leading to a crash of the server process, and repeated requests could keep the application unavailable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Action Cable passes the `channel` value of each `subscribe` command to `safe_constantize` before any channel lookup, so in the default configuration an unauthenticated client of the Action Cable endpoint can reach this code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The check that decides whether `safe_constantize` returns `nil` or re-raises the `LoadError` now matches the first segment of the constant name against the error message as a literal string, and no longer compiles a regular expression. It returns the same result as before for constant names that contain no regular expression syntax.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected applications
An application is affected if it meets all of these requirements:
- Mounts Action Cable, which a new Rails application does by default at `/cable` (`config.action_cable.mount_path`), or otherwise passes untrusted input to `safe_constantize`.
- Accepts Action Cable connections from untrusted clients. `ApplicationCable::Connection#connect` authenticates nobody unless the applica…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8474-xrp6-wh69</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-126080</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-126080</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:26.10: rails, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rails&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Active Support is a collection of utility classes and standard library extensions used by Rails and other Ruby projects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, when constant lookup raises LoadError, ActiveSupport::Inflector#safe_constantize (and String#safe_constantize) builds a regular expression from the requested constant name without escaping it, so a caller that passes untrusted input lets the attacker choose the source of a pattern that the application compiles. Crafted patterns can trigger defects in Ruby&amp;#39;s regular expression compiler, possibly leading to a crash of the server process, and repeated requests could keep the application unavailable. Action Cable passes the channel value of each subscribe command to safe_constantize before any channel lookup, so an unauthenticated client can reach this code when the application mounts Action Cable and accepts connections from untrusted clients without an added authentication check. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:26.10: rails, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rails&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Active Support is a collection of utility classes and standard library extensions used by Rails and other Ruby projects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, when constant lookup raises LoadError, ActiveSupport::Inflector#safe_constantize (and String#safe_constantize) builds a regular expression from the requested constant name without escaping it, so a caller that passes untrusted input lets the attacker choose the source of a pattern that the application compiles. Crafted patterns can trigger defects in Ruby&amp;#39;s regular expression compiler, possibly leading to a crash of the server process, and repeated requests could keep the application unavailable. Action Cable passes the channel value of each subscribe command to safe_constantize before any channel lookup, so an unauthenticated client can reach this code when the application mounts Action Cable and accepts connections from untrusted clients without an added authentication check. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-126080</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4317 — Ruby on Rails: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4317</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Ruby on Rails ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Daten zu manipulieren, um falsche Informationen darzustellen, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Ruby on Rails ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Daten zu manipulieren, um falsche Informationen darzustellen, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4317</guid>
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