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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-125325</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125325</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;pgEdge RAG Server is an API server for retrieval-augmented generation over PostgreSQL content using pgvector. Prior to 2.0.0, the BM25 keyword index is a single per-pipeline object shared by the unauthenticated query endpoint, and concurrent requests lock its clear, refill, and search operations separately. This allows one request to search a corpus populated through another request&amp;#39;s search filter, which can return documents belonging to a different tenant or customer without malformed input. The affected responses cannot be identified retrospectively from the server logs. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;pgEdge RAG Server is an API server for retrieval-augmented generation over PostgreSQL content using pgvector. Prior to 2.0.0, the BM25 keyword index is a single per-pipeline object shared by the unauthenticated query endpoint, and concurrent requests lock its clear, refill, and search operations separately. This allows one request to search a corpus populated through another request&amp;#39;s search filter, which can return documents belonging to a different tenant or customer without malformed input. The affected responses cannot be identified retrospectively from the server logs. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125325</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-w437-9mwm-j6vq — pgEdge RAG Server shared keyword index leaked results between concurrent unauthenticated requests</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-w437-9mwm-j6vq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/pgEdge/pgedge-rag-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Documents belonging to one caller could be returned to another. Where an application passes a customer or tenant identifier as a search filter, that scoping could be defeated by ordinary concurrent traffic. **No injection and no malformed input are required** — normal load is enough.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The BM25 keyword index was a single per-pipeline object shared by every request. A request cleared it, refilled it from its own filtered corpus and then searched it, taking a separate lock for each step rather than holding the sequence as a unit. Concurrent requests therefore interleaved, and a search could run against a corpus that a different request&amp;#39;s filter had populated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Who is affected:** any deployment of pgEdge RAG Server at `1.0.0` or earlier, including all alpha and beta pre-releases, that serves concurrent queries — most acutely those relying on a search filter to separate tenants or customers. The query endpoint is unauthenticated in the affected versions (`internal/server/middleware.go:37` applies logging, panic recovery and optional CORS only), so both the party whose results leak and the party receiving them are anonymous remote callers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Fixed in `2.0.0`. Upgrade to `2.0.0` or later.**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The index is now built per request rather than shared. The regression is pinned by `TestSearch_ConcurrentRequestsDoNotShareKeywordIndex` in `internal/pipeline/orchestrator_test.go`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Upgrading does not tell a developer whether or not their application affected, and…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/pgEdge/pgedge-rag-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Documents belonging to one caller could be returned to another. Where an application passes a customer or tenant identifier as a search filter, that scoping could be defeated by ordinary concurrent traffic. **No injection and no malformed input are required** — normal load is enough.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The BM25 keyword index was a single per-pipeline object shared by every request. A request cleared it, refilled it from its own filtered corpus and then searched it, taking a separate lock for each step rather than holding the sequence as a unit. Concurrent requests therefore interleaved, and a search could run against a corpus that a different request&amp;#39;s filter had populated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Who is affected:** any deployment of pgEdge RAG Server at `1.0.0` or earlier, including all alpha and beta pre-releases, that serves concurrent queries — most acutely those relying on a search filter to separate tenants or customers. The query endpoint is unauthenticated in the affected versions (`internal/server/middleware.go:37` applies logging, panic recovery and optional CORS only), so both the party whose results leak and the party receiving them are anonymous remote callers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Fixed in `2.0.0`. Upgrade to `2.0.0` or later.**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The index is now built per request rather than shared. The regression is pinned by `TestSearch_ConcurrentRequestsDoNotShareKeywordIndex` in `internal/pipeline/orchestrator_test.go`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Upgrading does not tell a developer whether or not their application affected, and…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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