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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-123877</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123877</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A certificate validation bypass in Node.js https.Agent lets a cached TLS session authenticated under one CA policy be reused by a later request with a stricter policy. https.Agent.prototype.getName() assigns the same Agent and session-cache key to a request that omits ca and one that explicitly supplies ca: [], because an omitted value appends nothing to the key while an empty array stringifies to an empty string. The two policies differ: omitting ca uses the default trust store, while supplying ca replaces it. Since they share a key, a TLS session authenticated under the broader default policy is handed to a new connection made under the later ca: [] policy, and TLS 1.3 session resumption carries the earlier authentication forward, so the second request reports authorized === true and transmits confidential data to a server its own CA policy would reject on a fresh connection. This vulnerability affects Node.js 26.x, 24.x, and 22.x.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;A certificate validation bypass in Node.js https.Agent lets a cached TLS session authenticated under one CA policy be reused by a later request with a stricter policy. https.Agent.prototype.getName() assigns the same Agent and session-cache key to a request that omits ca and one that explicitly supplies ca: [], because an omitted value appends nothing to the key while an empty array stringifies to an empty string. The two policies differ: omitting ca uses the default trust store, while supplying ca replaces it. Since they share a key, a TLS session authenticated under the broader default policy is handed to a new connection made under the later ca: [] policy, and TLS 1.3 session resumption carries the earlier authentication forward, so the second request reports authorized === true and transmits confidential data to a server its own CA policy would reject on a fresh connection. This vulnerability affects Node.js 26.x, 24.x, and 22.x.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123877</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-4g6g-xjc7-fh73</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-4g6g-xjc7-fh73</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A certificate validation bypass in Node.js https.Agent lets a cached TLS session authenticated under one CA policy be reused by a later request with a stricter policy. https.Agent.prototype.getName() assigns the same Agent and session-cache key to a request that omits ca and one that explicitly supplies ca: [], because an omitted value appends nothing to the key while an empty array stringifies to an empty string. The two policies differ: omitting ca uses the default trust store, while supplying ca replaces it. Since they share a key, a TLS session authenticated under the broader default policy is handed to a new connection made under the later ca: [] policy, and TLS 1.3 session resumption carries the earlier authentication forward, so the second request reports authorized === true and transmits confidential data to a server its own CA policy would reject on a fresh connection. This vulnerability affects Node.js 26.x, 24.x, and 22.x.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;A certificate validation bypass in Node.js https.Agent lets a cached TLS session authenticated under one CA policy be reused by a later request with a stricter policy. https.Agent.prototype.getName() assigns the same Agent and session-cache key to a request that omits ca and one that explicitly supplies ca: [], because an omitted value appends nothing to the key while an empty array stringifies to an empty string. The two policies differ: omitting ca uses the default trust store, while supplying ca replaces it. Since they share a key, a TLS session authenticated under the broader default policy is handed to a new connection made under the later ca: [] policy, and TLS 1.3 session resumption carries the earlier authentication forward, so the second request reports authorized === true and transmits confidential data to a server its own CA policy would reject on a fresh connection. This vulnerability affects Node.js 26.x, 24.x, and 22.x.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-4g6g-xjc7-fh73</guid>
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