https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 14 Nov 2026 13:44:56 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123818 <p>LMDeploy is a toolkit for compressing, deploying, and serving large language models. From 0.12.3 until 0.15.0, _is_safe_url validates remote media URLs with urlparse while requests.Session().get interprets backslashes differently when sending the request. An attacker can provide a URL whose validation hostname appears globally routable but whose request destination resolves to an internal host, bypassing non-global address checks. Applications that accept attacker-controlled remote media URLs can therefore be induced to access internal HTTP services and expose data available from those services. This issue is fixed in version 0.15.0.</p> <p>LMDeploy is a toolkit for compressing, deploying, and serving large language models. From 0.12.3 until 0.15.0, _is_safe_url validates remote media URLs with urlparse while requests.Session().get interprets backslashes differently when sending the request. An attacker can provide a URL whose validation hostname appears globally routable but whose request destination resolves to an internal host, bypassing non-global address checks. Applications that accept attacker-controlled remote media URLs can therefore be induced to access internal HTTP services and expose data available from those services. This issue is fixed in version 0.15.0.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123818 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-39wr-7q6h-cf68 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: lmdeploy</p> <p>### Summary The URL checking logic in lmdeploy has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks.</p> <p>### Details The current lmdeploy project uses `_is_safe_url` to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks. &lt;img width=&#34;943&#34; height=&#34;836&#34; alt=&#34;QQ20260416-203956-16-1&#34; src=&#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/042faad1-7458-444a-bbc9-525c772b0a4d&#34; /&gt; However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. Currently, almost all application scenarios in this project involve first using `_is_safe_url` for URL validation, and then using requests.Session().get to send the request. &lt;img width=&#34;1086&#34; height=&#34;576&#34; alt=&#34;QQ20260416-204053-16-2&#34; src=&#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7ffb8a69-b155-483a-90be-016c53e6387a&#34; /&gt; The core issue: `urlparse()` and `requests` disagree on which host a URL like `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` points to:</p> <p>- `urlparse()` treats `\` as a regular character and `@` as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as 1.1.1.1 (public) - `requests` treats `\` as a path character, connecting to `127.0.0.1` (internal)</p> <p>Below is a test code I wrote following the code. ``` from urllib.parse import urlparse import ipaddress import socket import requests</p> <p>def _is_safe_url(url: str) -&gt; tuple[bool, str]: &#34;&#34;&#34;Check if the URL is safe to fetch (not inte…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: lmdeploy</p> <p>### Summary The URL checking logic in lmdeploy has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks.</p> <p>### Details The current lmdeploy project uses `_is_safe_url` to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks. &lt;img width=&#34;943&#34; height=&#34;836&#34; alt=&#34;QQ20260416-203956-16-1&#34; src=&#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/042faad1-7458-444a-bbc9-525c772b0a4d&#34; /&gt; However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. Currently, almost all application scenarios in this project involve first using `_is_safe_url` for URL validation, and then using requests.Session().get to send the request. &lt;img width=&#34;1086&#34; height=&#34;576&#34; alt=&#34;QQ20260416-204053-16-2&#34; src=&#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7ffb8a69-b155-483a-90be-016c53e6387a&#34; /&gt; The core issue: `urlparse()` and `requests` disagree on which host a URL like `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` points to:</p> <p>- `urlparse()` treats `\` as a regular character and `@` as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as 1.1.1.1 (public) - `requests` treats `\` as a path character, connecting to `127.0.0.1` (internal)</p> <p>Below is a test code I wrote following the code. ``` from urllib.parse import urlparse import ipaddress import socket import requests</p> <p>def _is_safe_url(url: str) -&gt; tuple[bool, str]: &#34;&#34;&#34;Check if the URL is safe to fetch (not inte…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-39wr-7q6h-cf68