https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 02 Nov 2026 03:57:27 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-120307 <p>The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant&#39;s container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount&#39;s source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker&#39;s own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod&#39;s Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source.</p> <p>The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant&#39;s container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount&#39;s source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker&#39;s own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod&#39;s Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-120307 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-6h4h-qffc-3gfp <p>The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant&#39;s container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount&#39;s source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker&#39;s own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod&#39;s Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source.</p> <p>The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant&#39;s container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount&#39;s source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker&#39;s own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod&#39;s Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-6h4h-qffc-3gfp