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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-119328</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-119328</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Immich is a high-performance self-hosted photo and video management solution. Prior to 3.3.0, the unauthenticated machine-learning /predict endpoint in machine-learning/immich_ml/main.py accepted an options object and passed its values into model construction in machine-learning/immich_ml/models/base.py without restricting security-sensitive parameters. An attacker with network access to the service could set cache_dir to an arbitrary writable path, causing model downloads to write there and causing clear_cache() to pass that path to shutil.rmtree() after selected model-loading failures. Depending on filesystem permissions and the selected path, this could modify files in mounted data locations or recursively delete an attacker-selected directory. The model-name allowlist prevents this issue from becoming arbitrary-model deserialization or code execution. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Immich is a high-performance self-hosted photo and video management solution. Prior to 3.3.0, the unauthenticated machine-learning /predict endpoint in machine-learning/immich_ml/main.py accepted an options object and passed its values into model construction in machine-learning/immich_ml/models/base.py without restricting security-sensitive parameters. An attacker with network access to the service could set cache_dir to an arbitrary writable path, causing model downloads to write there and causing clear_cache() to pass that path to shutil.rmtree() after selected model-loading failures. Depending on filesystem permissions and the selected path, this could modify files in mounted data locations or recursively delete an attacker-selected directory. The model-name allowlist prevents this issue from becoming arbitrary-model deserialization or code execution. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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