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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 01 Nov 2026 15:58:24 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-119276</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-119276</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;MariaDB Connector/J is used to connect applications developed in Java to MariaDB and MySQL databases. From 3.0.0 until 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11, when CLIENT_SESSION_TRACK was negotiated, the OkPacket.parse() and OkPacket.parseWithInfo() paths allocated byte arrays using server-declared lengths for the OK packet info field and session-state variable names and values before confirming that the bytes remained in the packet. A malicious or compromised server, or a machine-in-the-middle attacker, could send a small OK packet declaring a much larger length and repeatedly force attacker-controlled heap allocations before the subsequent copy failed. This could create garbage-collection pressure or an OutOfMemoryError in the client application. This issue is fixed in versions 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;MariaDB Connector/J is used to connect applications developed in Java to MariaDB and MySQL databases. From 3.0.0 until 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11, when CLIENT_SESSION_TRACK was negotiated, the OkPacket.parse() and OkPacket.parseWithInfo() paths allocated byte arrays using server-declared lengths for the OK packet info field and session-state variable names and values before confirming that the bytes remained in the packet. A malicious or compromised server, or a machine-in-the-middle attacker, could send a small OK packet declaring a much larger length and repeatedly force attacker-controlled heap allocations before the subsequent copy failed. This could create garbage-collection pressure or an OutOfMemoryError in the client application. This issue is fixed in versions 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-119276</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-h599-m3w5-9m7x — MariaDB Connector/J: Rogue server can drive large heap allocations from server-declared lengths in OK packets</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-h599-m3w5-9m7x</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: org.mariadb.jdbc:mariadb-java-client&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MariaDB Connector/J sized heap allocations from lengths declared by the server
in OK packets before checking that those lengths fit in the packet. A rogue or
MitM server can make the client allocate megabytes from a packet of a few bytes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `CLIENT_SESSION_TRACK` is negotiated (the default), an OK packet carries an
info field followed by session-state blocks, each tracked variable being sent as a
length-encoded name and value. `OkPacket.parse()` and `parseWithInfo()` allocated
`new byte[len]` for the info field, the variable name and the value with the
server-declared `len`, then copied the packet data into it. The copy failed with an
`ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException` when the packet was shorter, but only after the
allocation had taken place.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A server-declared length of 8 MiB in an 18-byte packet was enough to trigger an
8 MiB allocation; the integer-range validation of length-encoded values does not
help, since such lengths are valid positive integers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix validates every server-declared length against the remaining packet bytes
before any allocation (`ReadableByteBuf.checkLength()` and a bounded
`readBytes(int)`), and stops reading the session state at the first inconsistent
entry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Availability only: a malicious or compromised server, or a MitM, can drive
attacker-controlled heap allocations on every OK packet, creating GC pressure up to
`OutOfMemoryError` in the client application. Exploitation requires control of the
server si…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: org.mariadb.jdbc:mariadb-java-client&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MariaDB Connector/J sized heap allocations from lengths declared by the server
in OK packets before checking that those lengths fit in the packet. A rogue or
MitM server can make the client allocate megabytes from a packet of a few bytes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `CLIENT_SESSION_TRACK` is negotiated (the default), an OK packet carries an
info field followed by session-state blocks, each tracked variable being sent as a
length-encoded name and value. `OkPacket.parse()` and `parseWithInfo()` allocated
`new byte[len]` for the info field, the variable name and the value with the
server-declared `len`, then copied the packet data into it. The copy failed with an
`ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException` when the packet was shorter, but only after the
allocation had taken place.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A server-declared length of 8 MiB in an 18-byte packet was enough to trigger an
8 MiB allocation; the integer-range validation of length-encoded values does not
help, since such lengths are valid positive integers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix validates every server-declared length against the remaining packet bytes
before any allocation (`ReadableByteBuf.checkLength()` and a bounded
`readBytes(int)`), and stops reading the session state at the first inconsistent
entry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Availability only: a malicious or compromised server, or a MitM, can drive
attacker-controlled heap allocations on every OK packet, creating GC pressure up to
`OutOfMemoryError` in the client application. Exploitation requires control of the
server si…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-h599-m3w5-9m7x</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-119276</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-119276</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: mariadb-connector-java, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: mariadb-connector-java, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: mariadb-connector-java, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: mariadb-connector-java, Ubuntu:26.10: mariadb-connector-java, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: mariadb-connector-java&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MariaDB Connector/J is used to connect applications developed in Java to MariaDB and MySQL databases. From 3.0.0 until 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11, when CLIENT_SESSION_TRACK was negotiated, the OkPacket.parse() and OkPacket.parseWithInfo() paths allocated byte arrays using server-declared lengths for the OK packet info field and session-state variable names and values before confirming that the bytes remained in the packet. A malicious or compromised server, or a machine-in-the-middle attacker, could send a small OK packet declaring a much larger length and repeatedly force attacker-controlled heap allocations before the subsequent copy failed. This could create garbage-collection pressure or an OutOfMemoryError in the client application. This issue is fixed in versions 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: mariadb-connector-java, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: mariadb-connector-java, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: mariadb-connector-java, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: mariadb-connector-java, Ubuntu:26.10: mariadb-connector-java, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: mariadb-connector-java&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MariaDB Connector/J is used to connect applications developed in Java to MariaDB and MySQL databases. From 3.0.0 until 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11, when CLIENT_SESSION_TRACK was negotiated, the OkPacket.parse() and OkPacket.parseWithInfo() paths allocated byte arrays using server-declared lengths for the OK packet info field and session-state variable names and values before confirming that the bytes remained in the packet. A malicious or compromised server, or a machine-in-the-middle attacker, could send a small OK packet declaring a much larger length and repeatedly force attacker-controlled heap allocations before the subsequent copy failed. This could create garbage-collection pressure or an OutOfMemoryError in the client application. This issue is fixed in versions 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-119276</guid>
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