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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-118249</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-118249</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Highcharts JS is a JavaScript charting library based on SVG. From 13.0.0 until 13.1.0, Highcharts builds series data columns by using point option keys directly as column IDs. Own enumerable __proto__ and constructor keys from parsed point objects can therefore direct integer-indexed writes to Object.prototype or the Object constructor. The inherited values affect reads and for-in enumeration across the page and can disrupt rendering or alter consuming application behavior without user interaction beyond rendering the chart. This issue is fixed in 13.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Highcharts JS is a JavaScript charting library based on SVG. From 13.0.0 until 13.1.0, Highcharts builds series data columns by using point option keys directly as column IDs. Own enumerable __proto__ and constructor keys from parsed point objects can therefore direct integer-indexed writes to Object.prototype or the Object constructor. The inherited values affect reads and for-in enumeration across the page and can disrupt rendering or alter consuming application behavior without user interaction beyond rendering the chart. This issue is fixed in 13.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-118249</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gfvx-2c2g-38wq — Highcharts: series column construction writes to Object.prototype</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-gfvx-2c2g-38wq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: highcharts&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
When series columns are built from point objects, the point option keys are used directly as data column ids, so the write that populates a column reaches `Object.prototype` and the `Object` constructor. Keys named `__proto__` and `constructor` survive `JSON.parse` as own enumerable properties, so an attacker who controls the point objects can set integer-keyed properties on `Object.prototype`, one per point index, to values of their choosing. Named properties cannot be reached this way. The integer keys still affect every object in the page: reading an out-of-range index on any array or plain object returns the attacker&amp;#39;s value, and `for...in` over any object yields the injected keys, so unrelated code can take branches it should not using attacker-supplied data, and rendering can fail as a side effect. The properties remain in place once the chart has been built, and no user interaction is required beyond rendering the chart.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Consequences beyond disruption depend on the consuming application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
Drop-in fix - for any versions affected (6.1.0-13.0.2).
Add the below IIFE to run after Highcharts is loaded.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
;!function(t){if(t&amp;amp;&amp;amp;t.Point&amp;amp;&amp;amp;!t.Point.prototype.protoPollutionPatched){var o=t.Point.prototype,r=o.optionsToObject,e=o.setNestedProperty,n=Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;o.optionsToObject=function(t){if(t&amp;amp;&amp;amp;&amp;#34;object&amp;#34;==typeof t&amp;amp;&amp;amp;!Array.isArray(t)&amp;amp;&amp;amp;(n.call(t,&amp;#34;__proto__&amp;#34;)||n.call(t,&amp;#34;constructor&amp;#34;))){var o={};for(var e in t)n.call(t,e)&amp;amp;&amp;amp;!c…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: highcharts&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
When series columns are built from point objects, the point option keys are used directly as data column ids, so the write that populates a column reaches `Object.prototype` and the `Object` constructor. Keys named `__proto__` and `constructor` survive `JSON.parse` as own enumerable properties, so an attacker who controls the point objects can set integer-keyed properties on `Object.prototype`, one per point index, to values of their choosing. Named properties cannot be reached this way. The integer keys still affect every object in the page: reading an out-of-range index on any array or plain object returns the attacker&amp;#39;s value, and `for...in` over any object yields the injected keys, so unrelated code can take branches it should not using attacker-supplied data, and rendering can fail as a side effect. The properties remain in place once the chart has been built, and no user interaction is required beyond rendering the chart.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Consequences beyond disruption depend on the consuming application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
Drop-in fix - for any versions affected (6.1.0-13.0.2).
Add the below IIFE to run after Highcharts is loaded.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
;!function(t){if(t&amp;amp;&amp;amp;t.Point&amp;amp;&amp;amp;!t.Point.prototype.protoPollutionPatched){var o=t.Point.prototype,r=o.optionsToObject,e=o.setNestedProperty,n=Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;o.optionsToObject=function(t){if(t&amp;amp;&amp;amp;&amp;#34;object&amp;#34;==typeof t&amp;amp;&amp;amp;!Array.isArray(t)&amp;amp;&amp;amp;(n.call(t,&amp;#34;__proto__&amp;#34;)||n.call(t,&amp;#34;constructor&amp;#34;))){var o={};for(var e in t)n.call(t,e)&amp;amp;&amp;amp;!c…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-gfvx-2c2g-38wq</guid>
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