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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-115912</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115912</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. Prior to 0.32.0, an authenticated caller can place forged shared-memory address and monotonic_id values in public multimodal features.kwargs_data. In scale-out deployments with shared-memory multimodal caching enabled, workers trust those values and pass attacker-selected bytes to pickle.loads(), allowing arbitrary Python execution even when insecure serialization is disabled. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. Prior to 0.32.0, an authenticated caller can place forged shared-memory address and monotonic_id values in public multimodal features.kwargs_data. In scale-out deployments with shared-memory multimodal caching enabled, workers trust those values and pass attacker-selected bytes to pickle.loads(), allowing arbitrary Python execution even when insecure serialization is disabled. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115912</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w — vLLM: Public multimodal SHM handle forgery reaches worker-side `pickle.loads()` with insecure serialization disabled</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-6757-hggm-hp2w</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: vllm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Ecosystem / package:** pip / `vllm`
- **Affected versions:** vLLM &amp;lt; 0.32.0.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `--mm-processor-cache-type shm` is enabled, vLLM&amp;#39;s multimodal SHM cache represents a cached item with an `address` and `monotonic_id` pair and treats that pair as authority to dereference shared memory in the worker. A public scale-out request can supply its own multimodal `features.kwargs_data`, so an authenticated caller can forge an inner SHM carrier that points at attacker-controlled bytes already staged in the ring buffer. The worker then reaches `pickle.loads()` while deserializing the forged object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is reachable through ordinary public HTTP routes and does not require `VLLM_ALLOW_INSECURE_SERIALIZATION=1`. The live chain used `/v1/chat/completions/render` to obtain a valid feature envelope, `/v1/chat/completions` to stage attacker-chosen bytes into SHM, and `/inference/v1/generate` to submit the forged inner carrier.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Links pinned to the confirmed commit [`752a3a504485`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/tree/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34) (v0.25.1):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- [`vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_object_storage.py#L375-L400`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_object_storage.py#L375-L400) — SHM object deserialization reaches `pickle.loads(serialized_data)` for byte objects.
- [`vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L567-L581`](https://github.com/…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: vllm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Ecosystem / package:** pip / `vllm`
- **Affected versions:** vLLM &amp;lt; 0.32.0.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `--mm-processor-cache-type shm` is enabled, vLLM&amp;#39;s multimodal SHM cache represents a cached item with an `address` and `monotonic_id` pair and treats that pair as authority to dereference shared memory in the worker. A public scale-out request can supply its own multimodal `features.kwargs_data`, so an authenticated caller can forge an inner SHM carrier that points at attacker-controlled bytes already staged in the ring buffer. The worker then reaches `pickle.loads()` while deserializing the forged object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is reachable through ordinary public HTTP routes and does not require `VLLM_ALLOW_INSECURE_SERIALIZATION=1`. The live chain used `/v1/chat/completions/render` to obtain a valid feature envelope, `/v1/chat/completions` to stage attacker-chosen bytes into SHM, and `/inference/v1/generate` to submit the forged inner carrier.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Links pinned to the confirmed commit [`752a3a504485`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/tree/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34) (v0.25.1):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- [`vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_object_storage.py#L375-L400`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_object_storage.py#L375-L400) — SHM object deserialization reaches `pickle.loads(serialized_data)` for byte objects.
- [`vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L567-L581`](https://github.com/…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-6757-hggm-hp2w</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-4345</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4345</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: vllm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. Prior to 0.32.0, an authenticated caller can place forged shared-memory address and monotonic_id values in public multimodal features.kwargs_data. In scale-out deployments with shared-memory multimodal caching enabled, workers trust those values and pass attacker-selected bytes to pickle.loads(), allowing arbitrary Python execution even when insecure serialization is disabled. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: vllm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. Prior to 0.32.0, an authenticated caller can place forged shared-memory address and monotonic_id values in public multimodal features.kwargs_data. In scale-out deployments with shared-memory multimodal caching enabled, workers trust those values and pass attacker-selected bytes to pickle.loads(), allowing arbitrary Python execution even when insecure serialization is disabled. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4345</guid>
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