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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-114478</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-114478</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Insufficient preservation of the original sender in the forwarding of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.6 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to have mail they write, naming in its From an address at a domain the server hosts, delivered to other receivers as passing that domain&amp;#39;s DMARC policy. When the server sent on a copy of mail that came from outside - an account&amp;#39;s forward, a mail rule&amp;#39;s forward, a Sieve redirect, a list&amp;#39;s copy, or an alias or list expanding to an outside address - it could give the copy an SMTP identity in the organisation of the domain the copy&amp;#39;s From names, whatever the message&amp;#39;s origin: with the Sender Rewriting Scheme or the rewrite of the envelope sender on forwarding enabled (both off by default), an address at the forwarding domain; for a list, its bounce address; for a message with an empty envelope sender, none, under the server&amp;#39;s own host name; and an envelope sender the message came with at a subdomain of a hosted domain was kept. Where that identity&amp;#39;s SPF record authorises the server, other receivers&amp;#39; SPF check of the copy passed for a domain aligned with the From, and DMARC passed with it, although the message had not passed DMARC when the server received it. Exploitation needs a forward, redirect, alias or list that carries the hosted domain&amp;#39;s mail to an outside address, and one of: SRS or the envelope rewrite enabled; a list whose bounce address is in the domain&amp;#39;s organisation; an envelope sender at a subdomain whose SP…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Insufficient preservation of the original sender in the forwarding of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.6 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to have mail they write, naming in its From an address at a domain the server hosts, delivered to other receivers as passing that domain&amp;#39;s DMARC policy. When the server sent on a copy of mail that came from outside - an account&amp;#39;s forward, a mail rule&amp;#39;s forward, a Sieve redirect, a list&amp;#39;s copy, or an alias or list expanding to an outside address - it could give the copy an SMTP identity in the organisation of the domain the copy&amp;#39;s From names, whatever the message&amp;#39;s origin: with the Sender Rewriting Scheme or the rewrite of the envelope sender on forwarding enabled (both off by default), an address at the forwarding domain; for a list, its bounce address; for a message with an empty envelope sender, none, under the server&amp;#39;s own host name; and an envelope sender the message came with at a subdomain of a hosted domain was kept. Where that identity&amp;#39;s SPF record authorises the server, other receivers&amp;#39; SPF check of the copy passed for a domain aligned with the From, and DMARC passed with it, although the message had not passed DMARC when the server received it. Exploitation needs a forward, redirect, alias or list that carries the hosted domain&amp;#39;s mail to an outside address, and one of: SRS or the envelope rewrite enabled; a list whose bounce address is in the domain&amp;#39;s organisation; an envelope sender at a subdomain whose SP…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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      <title>GHSA-w852-m7j4-xm48</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-w852-m7j4-xm48</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Insufficient preservation of the original sender in the forwarding of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.6 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to have mail they write, naming in its From an address at a domain the server hosts, delivered to other receivers as passing that domain&amp;#39;s DMARC policy. When the server sent on a copy of mail that came from outside - an account&amp;#39;s forward, a mail rule&amp;#39;s forward, a Sieve redirect, a list&amp;#39;s copy, or an alias or list expanding to an outside address - it could give the copy an SMTP identity in the organisation of the domain the copy&amp;#39;s From names, whatever the message&amp;#39;s origin: with the Sender Rewriting Scheme or the rewrite of the envelope sender on forwarding enabled (both off by default), an address at the forwarding domain; for a list, its bounce address; for a message with an empty envelope sender, none, under the server&amp;#39;s own host name; and an envelope sender the message came with at a subdomain of a hosted domain was kept. Where that identity&amp;#39;s SPF record authorises the server, other receivers&amp;#39; SPF check of the copy passed for a domain aligned with the From, and DMARC passed with it, although the message had not passed DMARC when the server received it. Exploitation needs a forward, redirect, alias or list that carries the hosted domain&amp;#39;s mail to an outside address, and one of: SRS or the envelope rewrite enabled; a list whose bounce address is in the domain&amp;#39;s organisation; an envelope sender at a subdomain whose SP…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Insufficient preservation of the original sender in the forwarding of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.6 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to have mail they write, naming in its From an address at a domain the server hosts, delivered to other receivers as passing that domain&amp;#39;s DMARC policy. When the server sent on a copy of mail that came from outside - an account&amp;#39;s forward, a mail rule&amp;#39;s forward, a Sieve redirect, a list&amp;#39;s copy, or an alias or list expanding to an outside address - it could give the copy an SMTP identity in the organisation of the domain the copy&amp;#39;s From names, whatever the message&amp;#39;s origin: with the Sender Rewriting Scheme or the rewrite of the envelope sender on forwarding enabled (both off by default), an address at the forwarding domain; for a list, its bounce address; for a message with an empty envelope sender, none, under the server&amp;#39;s own host name; and an envelope sender the message came with at a subdomain of a hosted domain was kept. Where that identity&amp;#39;s SPF record authorises the server, other receivers&amp;#39; SPF check of the copy passed for a domain aligned with the From, and DMARC passed with it, although the message had not passed DMARC when the server received it. Exploitation needs a forward, redirect, alias or list that carries the hosted domain&amp;#39;s mail to an outside address, and one of: SRS or the envelope rewrite enabled; a list whose bounce address is in the domain&amp;#39;s organisation; an envelope sender at a subdomain whose SP…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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