https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 22 Oct 2026 18:26:14 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-114145 <p>GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to 3.2.1, create_submodule() in git/objects/submodule/base.py accepts an attacker-influenced submodule path such as .git/hooks and invokes _clone_repo() before safely rejecting the destination. In 3.1.x, _validate_repo_path() does not exist and the call succeeds silently, while in 3.2.0 and later affected revisions the check in git/index/base.py raises ValueError only after the clone has written to disk and does not remove the planted file. An attacker-controlled submodule can therefore place an executable post-checkout hook that a later Git operation executes. Exploitation requires an application to accept an untrusted submodule path and a clone destination such as .git/hooks that is empty enough for Git to clone into it, which commonly means that default sample hooks are absent. This issue is fixed in version 3.2.1.</p> <p>GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to 3.2.1, create_submodule() in git/objects/submodule/base.py accepts an attacker-influenced submodule path such as .git/hooks and invokes _clone_repo() before safely rejecting the destination. In 3.1.x, _validate_repo_path() does not exist and the call succeeds silently, while in 3.2.0 and later affected revisions the check in git/index/base.py raises ValueError only after the clone has written to disk and does not remove the planted file. An attacker-controlled submodule can therefore place an executable post-checkout hook that a later Git operation executes. Exploitation requires an application to accept an untrusted submodule path and a clone destination such as .git/hooks that is empty enough for Git to clone into it, which commonly means that default sample hooks are absent. This issue is fixed in version 3.2.1.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-114145 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-83vg-56qc-22m7 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: Gitpython</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`create_submodule(name, path, url)` clones a submodule into the repo&#39;s own `.git` directory before it rejects the path. A `path` of &#34;.git/hooks&#34; is accepted by the pre-clone check, so the submodule is cloned straight into the live hooks directory, and a file named `post-checkout` in the submodule becomes an executable `.git/hooks/post-checkout`. On 3.2.0+ the later index check does raise `ValueError`, but only after the clone already wrote to disk, and it does not remove the planted hook; on 3.1.x there is no such check and the call succeeds silently. Either way the hook runs on the next git operation (e.g. checkout), giving code execution.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The checkout path is validated too late, after the clone has already mutated disk. This breaks the &#34;validate before mutation&#34; invariant that commit 43a43cd8 (&#34;Validate submodule checkout and metadata paths before mutation&#34;) set out to enforce.</p> <p>Submodule.add() calls the permissive path check before cloning, and the strict check only reaches the &#34;.git&#34; alias at index time, after _clone_repo has written to disk:</p> <p>git/objects/submodule/base.py (Submodule.add) 599: path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path) # accepts &#34;.git/hooks&#34; 673: mrepo = cls._clone_repo(repo, url, path, name, ...) # clones into &lt;worktree&gt;/.git/hooks 714: index.add([sm], write=True) # strict check only triggers here</p> <p>git/index/base.py (IndexFile._preprocess_add_items) 732: _validate_repo_path(entry.path)…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: Gitpython</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`create_submodule(name, path, url)` clones a submodule into the repo&#39;s own `.git` directory before it rejects the path. A `path` of &#34;.git/hooks&#34; is accepted by the pre-clone check, so the submodule is cloned straight into the live hooks directory, and a file named `post-checkout` in the submodule becomes an executable `.git/hooks/post-checkout`. On 3.2.0+ the later index check does raise `ValueError`, but only after the clone already wrote to disk, and it does not remove the planted hook; on 3.1.x there is no such check and the call succeeds silently. Either way the hook runs on the next git operation (e.g. checkout), giving code execution.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The checkout path is validated too late, after the clone has already mutated disk. This breaks the &#34;validate before mutation&#34; invariant that commit 43a43cd8 (&#34;Validate submodule checkout and metadata paths before mutation&#34;) set out to enforce.</p> <p>Submodule.add() calls the permissive path check before cloning, and the strict check only reaches the &#34;.git&#34; alias at index time, after _clone_repo has written to disk:</p> <p>git/objects/submodule/base.py (Submodule.add) 599: path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path) # accepts &#34;.git/hooks&#34; 673: mrepo = cls._clone_repo(repo, url, path, name, ...) # clones into &lt;worktree&gt;/.git/hooks 714: index.add([sm], write=True) # strict check only triggers here</p> <p>git/index/base.py (IndexFile._preprocess_add_items) 732: _validate_repo_path(entry.path)…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-83vg-56qc-22m7