https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 07 Nov 2026 00:51:55 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-aider-cve-2026-112902 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: aider</p> <p>``` ============================================================================ Memory disclosure and segfault in libtiff encoder via crafted TIFF tags Location: src/encode.c:1014 in PyImaging_LibTiffEncoderNew() Commit: a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6 ============================================================================ ```</p> <p>A crafted TIFF file of a few hundred bytes makes Pillow copy an attacker-chosen amount of its own process memory into the TIFF it writes back out, or crash the process outright. The trigger is an ordinary `Image.open()` followed by a bare `im.save(fp, &#34;TIFF&#34;)`. The only precondition is that the application re-saves images as TIFF. When the uploaded file is compressed, Pillow routes that save through libtiff automatically, with no options from the application. The attached reproducer does this with a 356-byte LZW TIFF: one crafted tag comes back holding 65536 bytes taken from `_imaging.so`&#39;s read-only data, and a second crafted tag makes the worker die with SIGSEGV on every run.</p> <p>The bug is in `PyImaging_LibTiffEncoderNew` (`src/encode.c`). It decides what arguments to pass to the variadic `TIFFSetField()` from the shape of the Python value (scalar, tuple or bytes). It assumes its `ImagingLibTiffMergeFieldInfo()` call defined how libtiff will read them. But `TIFFMergeFieldInfo()` never overrides libtiff&#39;s built-in field table, so libtiff reads the arguments according to its own definition of the tag:</p> <p>- For a counted array tag such as…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: aider</p> <p>``` ============================================================================ Memory disclosure and segfault in libtiff encoder via crafted TIFF tags Location: src/encode.c:1014 in PyImaging_LibTiffEncoderNew() Commit: a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6 ============================================================================ ```</p> <p>A crafted TIFF file of a few hundred bytes makes Pillow copy an attacker-chosen amount of its own process memory into the TIFF it writes back out, or crash the process outright. The trigger is an ordinary `Image.open()` followed by a bare `im.save(fp, &#34;TIFF&#34;)`. The only precondition is that the application re-saves images as TIFF. When the uploaded file is compressed, Pillow routes that save through libtiff automatically, with no options from the application. The attached reproducer does this with a 356-byte LZW TIFF: one crafted tag comes back holding 65536 bytes taken from `_imaging.so`&#39;s read-only data, and a second crafted tag makes the worker die with SIGSEGV on every run.</p> <p>The bug is in `PyImaging_LibTiffEncoderNew` (`src/encode.c`). It decides what arguments to pass to the variadic `TIFFSetField()` from the shape of the Python value (scalar, tuple or bytes). It assumes its `ImagingLibTiffMergeFieldInfo()` call defined how libtiff will read them. But `TIFFMergeFieldInfo()` never overrides libtiff&#39;s built-in field table, so libtiff reads the arguments according to its own definition of the tag:</p> <p>- For a counted array tag such as…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-aider-cve-2026-112902 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cleanstart-2026-pb73705 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: apache-superset</p> <p>Security vulnerability affects the apache-superset package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: apache-superset</p> <p>Security vulnerability affects the apache-superset package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cleanstart-2026-pb73705 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-112902 <p>Pillow is a Python imaging library. In versions through 12.3.0, the libtiff TIFF encoder can pass arguments to  TIFFSetField()  that do not match libtiff’s definition of the corresponding tag. When an application saves attacker-controlled image metadata through this encoder, crafted tag values can cause invalid memory reads, copying process memory into the encoded output or crashing the process. Applications that return the encoded output to an attacker can disclose that memory. The issue is reachable when re-saving compressed TIFF images and through certain conversions that preserve EXIF metadata into compressed TIFF output. This vulnerability is fixed in version 13.0.0.</p> <p>Pillow is a Python imaging library. In versions through 12.3.0, the libtiff TIFF encoder can pass arguments to  TIFFSetField()  that do not match libtiff’s definition of the corresponding tag. When an application saves attacker-controlled image metadata through this encoder, crafted tag values can cause invalid memory reads, copying process memory into the encoded output or crashing the process. Applications that return the encoded output to an attacker can disclose that memory. The issue is reachable when re-saving compressed TIFF images and through certain conversions that preserve EXIF metadata into compressed TIFF output. This vulnerability is fixed in version 13.0.0.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-112902 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-xvh5-g6gv-559v <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: Pillow</p> <p>``` ============================================================================ Memory disclosure and segfault in libtiff encoder via crafted TIFF tags Location: src/encode.c:1014 in PyImaging_LibTiffEncoderNew() Commit: a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6 ============================================================================ ```</p> <p>A crafted TIFF file of a few hundred bytes makes Pillow copy an attacker-chosen amount of its own process memory into the TIFF it writes back out, or crash the process outright. The trigger is an ordinary `Image.open()` followed by a bare `im.save(fp, &#34;TIFF&#34;)`. The only precondition is that the application re-saves images as TIFF. When the uploaded file is compressed, Pillow routes that save through libtiff automatically, with no options from the application. The attached reproducer does this with a 356-byte LZW TIFF: one crafted tag comes back holding 65536 bytes taken from `_imaging.so`&#39;s read-only data, and a second crafted tag makes the worker die with SIGSEGV on every run.</p> <p>The bug is in `PyImaging_LibTiffEncoderNew` (`src/encode.c`). It decides what arguments to pass to the variadic `TIFFSetField()` from the shape of the Python value (scalar, tuple or bytes). It assumes its `ImagingLibTiffMergeFieldInfo()` call defined how libtiff will read them. But `TIFFMergeFieldInfo()` never overrides libtiff&#39;s built-in field table, so libtiff reads the arguments according to its own definition of the tag:</p> <p>- For a counted array tag such as…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: Pillow</p> <p>``` ============================================================================ Memory disclosure and segfault in libtiff encoder via crafted TIFF tags Location: src/encode.c:1014 in PyImaging_LibTiffEncoderNew() Commit: a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6 ============================================================================ ```</p> <p>A crafted TIFF file of a few hundred bytes makes Pillow copy an attacker-chosen amount of its own process memory into the TIFF it writes back out, or crash the process outright. The trigger is an ordinary `Image.open()` followed by a bare `im.save(fp, &#34;TIFF&#34;)`. The only precondition is that the application re-saves images as TIFF. When the uploaded file is compressed, Pillow routes that save through libtiff automatically, with no options from the application. The attached reproducer does this with a 356-byte LZW TIFF: one crafted tag comes back holding 65536 bytes taken from `_imaging.so`&#39;s read-only data, and a second crafted tag makes the worker die with SIGSEGV on every run.</p> <p>The bug is in `PyImaging_LibTiffEncoderNew` (`src/encode.c`). It decides what arguments to pass to the variadic `TIFFSetField()` from the shape of the Python value (scalar, tuple or bytes). It assumes its `ImagingLibTiffMergeFieldInfo()` call defined how libtiff will read them. But `TIFFMergeFieldInfo()` never overrides libtiff&#39;s built-in field table, so libtiff reads the arguments according to its own definition of the tag:</p> <p>- For a counted array tag such as…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-xvh5-g6gv-559v https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:12251-1 <p>python313-Pillow-13.0.0-2.1 on GA media</p> <p>python313-Pillow-13.0.0-2.1 on GA media</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:12251-1 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/rhsa-2026:94702 <p>mcp: mcp: Denial of Service via session memory exhaustion in streamable HTTP servers vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via Regular Expression processing vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via negative token ID input vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via unbounded P2P KV offloading sessions pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via decompression bomb check bypass in multi-frame images pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via decompression bomb bypass in SPIDER images pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via crafted RLE BMP image pillow: Pillow multi-frame loaders can reuse stale native image storage after mode transitions pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via duplicate page references in PDF files pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via integer overflow in text-width calculation pillow: Pillow: Denial of Service via negative archive member size in TarIO pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via repeated EXIF headers pillow: Pillow: Denial of Service via out-of-bounds read in metafile parser pillow: pillow: Arbitrary code execution via JPEG encoder buffer overflow vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via unbounded media ingestion aiohttp: aiohttp: Information disclosure via unenforced Secure attribute on shared cookies aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via missing initial request timeout aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via Max-Age processing overflow aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via file descriptor exhaustion in multipart request processing aiohttp: aiohttp: Security control bypass via request schem…</p> <p>mcp: mcp: Denial of Service via session memory exhaustion in streamable HTTP servers vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via Regular Expression processing vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via negative token ID input vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via unbounded P2P KV offloading sessions pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via decompression bomb check bypass in multi-frame images pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via decompression bomb bypass in SPIDER images pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via crafted RLE BMP image pillow: Pillow multi-frame loaders can reuse stale native image storage after mode transitions pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via duplicate page references in PDF files pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via integer overflow in text-width calculation pillow: Pillow: Denial of Service via negative archive member size in TarIO pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via repeated EXIF headers pillow: Pillow: Denial of Service via out-of-bounds read in metafile parser pillow: pillow: Arbitrary code execution via JPEG encoder buffer overflow vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via unbounded media ingestion aiohttp: aiohttp: Information disclosure via unenforced Secure attribute on shared cookies aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via missing initial request timeout aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via Max-Age processing overflow aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via file descriptor exhaustion in multipart request processing aiohttp: aiohttp: Security control bypass via request schem…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/rhsa-2026:94702 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/suse-su-2026:5038-1 <p>Security update for python-Pillow</p> <p>Security update for python-Pillow</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/suse-su-2026:5038-1