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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-111762</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-111762</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A2A Java SDK is the official Java SDK for the Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol. Prior to 1.3.0.Final, RestHandler.parseRequestBody in `transport/rest/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/transport/rest/handler/RestHandler.java` logs the entire JSON request body at SEVERE level when JsonFormat.parser().merge() throws InvalidProtocolBufferException. With push notifications enabled, createTaskPushNotificationConfiguration reaches this parser for requests to `/v1/tenants/{tenant}/tasks/{taskId}/pushNotificationConfigs`, whose token and authentication.credentials fields can contain bearer tokens and authentication credentials for client push endpoints. A valid JSON body that fails protobuf deserialization, including an unknown field under strict parsing or a schema mismatch, causes those secrets to be written to the server logs in cleartext. An attacker with access to the server logs or a log aggregation system can retrieve the credentials and potentially use the credentials to send forged task status updates to the client&amp;#39;s push notification endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.0.Final.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;A2A Java SDK is the official Java SDK for the Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol. Prior to 1.3.0.Final, RestHandler.parseRequestBody in `transport/rest/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/transport/rest/handler/RestHandler.java` logs the entire JSON request body at SEVERE level when JsonFormat.parser().merge() throws InvalidProtocolBufferException. With push notifications enabled, createTaskPushNotificationConfiguration reaches this parser for requests to `/v1/tenants/{tenant}/tasks/{taskId}/pushNotificationConfigs`, whose token and authentication.credentials fields can contain bearer tokens and authentication credentials for client push endpoints. A valid JSON body that fails protobuf deserialization, including an unknown field under strict parsing or a schema mismatch, causes those secrets to be written to the server logs in cleartext. An attacker with access to the server logs or a log aggregation system can retrieve the credentials and potentially use the credentials to send forged task status updates to the client&amp;#39;s push notification endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.0.Final.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-111762</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-x32g-jvvm-4725 — A2A Java SDK: Push notification credentials logged in cleartext on protobuf parse failure</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-x32g-jvvm-4725</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: org.a2aproject.sdk:a2a-java-sdk-transport-rest&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### *Impact.** Push notification bearer tokens and authentication credentials submitted by clients are written to server log files in cleartext. Any operator, log aggregation system, or attacker with log access can read these secrets and use them to authenticate to the client&amp;#39;s push notification endpoints, potentially sending forged task status updates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Where.** `transport/rest/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/transport/rest/handler/RestHandler.java:676` in `parseRequestBody`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**What.** The `parseRequestBody` method logs the entire JSON request body at `SEVERE` level when `JsonFormat.parser().merge()` throws `InvalidProtocolBufferException`. This method is called from `createTaskPushNotificationConfiguration` (line 377), where the body contains client-supplied push notification bearer tokens (field `token`) and authentication credentials (field `authentication.credentials`). These secrets are written to server log files in full.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Exploit scenario.** A client creates a push notification configuration by POSTing to `/v1/tenants/{tenant}/tasks/{taskId}/pushNotificationConfigs` with a body containing `{&amp;#34;url&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;https://client.example.com/webhook&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;token&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;secret-bearer-token&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;authentication&amp;#34;: {&amp;#34;scheme&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;Bearer&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;credentials&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;oauth-access-token&amp;#34;}, &amp;#34;extraField&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;value&amp;#34;}`. The extra field causes `JsonFormat.parser().merge()` to throw `InvalidProtocolBufferException`. The entire body including `secret-bearer-token` and `oauth-access-token` is logged at SEVERE level. An…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: org.a2aproject.sdk:a2a-java-sdk-transport-rest&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### *Impact.** Push notification bearer tokens and authentication credentials submitted by clients are written to server log files in cleartext. Any operator, log aggregation system, or attacker with log access can read these secrets and use them to authenticate to the client&amp;#39;s push notification endpoints, potentially sending forged task status updates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Where.** `transport/rest/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/transport/rest/handler/RestHandler.java:676` in `parseRequestBody`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**What.** The `parseRequestBody` method logs the entire JSON request body at `SEVERE` level when `JsonFormat.parser().merge()` throws `InvalidProtocolBufferException`. This method is called from `createTaskPushNotificationConfiguration` (line 377), where the body contains client-supplied push notification bearer tokens (field `token`) and authentication credentials (field `authentication.credentials`). These secrets are written to server log files in full.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Exploit scenario.** A client creates a push notification configuration by POSTing to `/v1/tenants/{tenant}/tasks/{taskId}/pushNotificationConfigs` with a body containing `{&amp;#34;url&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;https://client.example.com/webhook&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;token&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;secret-bearer-token&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;authentication&amp;#34;: {&amp;#34;scheme&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;Bearer&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;credentials&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;oauth-access-token&amp;#34;}, &amp;#34;extraField&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;value&amp;#34;}`. The extra field causes `JsonFormat.parser().merge()` to throw `InvalidProtocolBufferException`. The entire body including `secret-bearer-token` and `oauth-access-token` is logged at SEVERE level. An…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-x32g-jvvm-4725</guid>
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